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ASSESSING THE LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANY
Wayne M. Gazur* and Neil M. Goff**
The limited liability company is one of the newest forms of
business organization. This form combines the limited liability
of a corporation with the tax benefits normally associated with
a partnership. The authors examine various implications and
ramifications of this organizational form.
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INTRODUCTION
IN 1977 THE Wyoming legislature. authorized the creation of a
new form of business organization known as the limited liability
company ("LLC").1 Florida subsequently adopted the LLC with
legislation patterned after Wyoming's statute.' The LLC legisla-
tion in each state combined limited partnership and corporate pro-
visions drawn primarily from the Uniform Limited Partnership
Act ("ULPA")s  and the Model Business Corporation Act
("MBCA").4
From a business planning standpoint, the LLC was created to
secure both the federal income tax advantages associated with
partnership status 5 and state law limited liability for all partici-
pants in the venture.6 These advantages indirectly presented po-
tential benefits to states permitting the organization of LLCs. The
Wyoming legislators were reportedly interested in pioneering the
new investment vehicle to lure business to their state. In addition,
Wyoming hoped to reap associated benefits from acting as the na-
tional haven for "tramp" LLCs that would bring their activities,
or at least their organizational activities, to Wyoming in order to
avail themselves of the LLC statute.7 The Florida statutewas sim-
1. See Wyo. STAT. §§ 17-15-I01 to -136 (1977).
2. See FLA. STAT. §§ 608.401- 471 (Supp. 1989).
3. UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT, 6 U.L.A. 561 (1916).
4. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT (1969) (the 1969 version of the MBCA is cited
where the MBCA is compared with the Wyoming LLC since the 1969 version was in effect
when Wyoming drafted its LLC statute).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 349-56.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 61-78.
7. The Wyoming statute requires LLCs to maintain a registered office and registered
agent in the state. See Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-110 (1977). The registered office "may be, but
need not be, the same as its place of business." Id. The Wyoming statute also requires that
the articles of organization list "[t]he address of its principal place of business in the state
and the name and address of its registered agent in the state " Id. § 17-15-
107(a)(iv). While operations need not be conducted in Wyoming, a place of business must
be maintained:
Since the Act does not require that operations be conducted within the State of
Wyoming (the Act merely provides that a place of business and a registered
agent be maintained in the State) it was anticipated that interest in this form of
entity would be generated in all parts of the U.S. as occurred in response to the
attractiveness of the corporation laws of Delaware or Nevada for the organiza-
tion of corporate enterprises. The state would benefit through the generation of
revenues from the modest filing fees provided in the Act and the additional busi-
ness activity which would be generated through the organization of companies
under the Act and maintenance of nominal places of business and registered
agents in the state by such companies.
Burke & Sessions, The Wyoming Limited Liability Company: An Alternative to Sub S
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ilarly intended to attract business investment, especially from
Latin America."
The Treasury Department frustrated the realization of these
anticipated benefits by its inconsistent treatment of the partner-
ship tax classification issue as it applied to the LLC.9 This incon-
sistency yielded uncertainty, and consequently few LLCs were
formed, leaving Wyoming and Florida as the sole sponsor states.1"
In 1988, however, the Internal Revenue Service ("I.R.S.") is-
sued Revenue Ruling 88-76, favorably classifying a Wyoming
LLC as a partnership for federal income tax purposes. 1 This pro-
nouncement has renewed interest in the LLC.1 2 In addition, Colo-
rado and Kansas have recently enacted statutes authorizing the
creation of LLCs, 3 and Indiana has provided for the registration
of LLCs from other jurisdictions.1 4 Like all tax conduit entities,
and Limited Partnerships?, 54 J. TAX'N 232, 235 (1981).
Section 12(a) of the MBCA also provides that the registered office "may be, but need
not be, the same as its place of business." MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 12(a) (1979).
The confusion created by Wyoming's statute is avoided because the articles of incorpora-
tion are not required to set forth the corporation's place of business. Only the address of its
initial registered office is required. See id. § 54(i). An LLC statute enacted in Colorado,
for example, requires only that the articles of organization state "if known, [the LLC'sJ
principal place of business." COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-204(1)(a) (Supp. 1990).
8. Comment, The Limited Liability Company Act, 1 I FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 387, 387
(1983) ("The LLC is similar to a business organization called the limitada which exists in
[Latin America]. It was thought that having a familiar business organization would attract
foreign investment." (footnote omitted)).
9. For an account of the Treasury's treatment of the LLC, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 301-48.
10. Two LLCs were reportedly formed under Florida law in the year following adop-
tion of the enabling legislation. See Comment, supra note 8, at 388. As of February 22,
1988, only 26 Wyoming LLCs had been formed. See Comment, The Wyoming Limited
Liability Company: A Viable Alternative to the S Corporation and the Limited Partner-
ship?, 23 LAND & WATER L. REV. 523, 523 (1988) (discussing the tax status and liability
protection aspects of the LLC form as adopted in Wyoming).
11. See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.
12. See, e.g., August & Shaw, The Limited Liability Company - A New Tax Ref-
uge? 7 J. TAX'N INVESTMENTS 179 (1990) (discussing the history, structure, and tax impli-
cations of the LLC, as an organizational form); Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A
Possible Choice for Doing Business?, 41 FLA. L. REV. 721 (1989) (discussing settlement of
the tax status of an LLC following the categorization of the entity as a partnership in
Revenue Ruling 88-76); Lederman, Miami Device: The Florida Limited Liability Com-
pany, 67 TAXES 339 (1989) (discussing the ease with which an LLC could be classified as a
partnership under Revenue Ruling 88-76).
13. See Colorado Limited Liability Company Act, COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-101
(Supp. 1990); Kansas Limited Liability Company Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7601 (Supp.
1990). LLC legislation has also been introduced in Michigan, House Bill No. 5464, 85th
Leg., 2d Sess. (1990), reprinted in 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 401 (March 16, 1990).
14. See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-16-10.1-1 to -10.1-4 (Burns Supp. 1990).
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the LLC indirectly benefitted from the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
which significantly increased the income tax cost of doing business
as a regular corporation.1 5 As discussed later in this article, the
federal income tax advantages of the LLC, coupled with limited
liability for all participants, may render .the LLC the most desira-
ble tax conduit entity 16 The LLC may be viewed as a survivor of
the continuing controversy over the appropriate classification of
entities for federal income tax purposes.
Characterization as a partnership, for federal tax purposes, is
not a goal shared by all taxpayers. At first blush, the largely in-
come tax driven, state level motivation for the enactment of LLC
legislation and its utilization over a thirteen year period invites
comparison to the development of the professional corporation
("PC"). With respect to the PC, the taxpayer's primary objective
was corporate classification. After almost twenty years of contro-
versy, the I.R.S. finally capitulated and every state now has some
form of legislation permitting PCs. The policy considerations un-
derlying PCs and LLCs, however, differ significantly Hence, the
LLC may not follow the PC's course. 17 Ironically, after favorable
15. See Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C.). For example, this act eliminated the so-called "General Utilities"
exemption for gains realized on the sale of corporate assets, strengthened the corporate
alternative minimum tax, phased out the long-term capital gains tax preference, and pre-
scribed corporate tax rates that, at their highest point, exceeded the highest individual tax
rates, even before consideration of the established regime of "double taxation" of corporate
income. For a discussion of the technical aspects of the changes, see Friedrich, The
Unmcorporation of America?, 14 J. CORP. TAX'N 3 (1987) (explaining how changes
wrought by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 have made the regular corporation an endangered
form). For a discussion of the policy implications of this penalty on regular corporations,
see Zolt, Corporate Taxation After the Tax Reform Act of 1986: A State of Dise-
quilibrium, 66 N.C.L. REV. 839 (1988) (contending that the changes imposed on corpora-
tions upset the balance between the individual and corporate tax systems and that the
resulting "disequilibrium" has produced many unexpected and undesirable consequences
for corporations).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 385-405.
17. Traditionally, licensed professions were limited to the sole proprietor and part-
nership forms and prohibited from incorporating. However, the corporate form offered cer-
tain tax advantages, particularly in the area of employee benefits. The states responded
with legislation permitting the formation of professional corporations and associations. The
I.R.S. opposed attempts to utilize these state laws for the purposes of federal tax character-
ization. After several courts rejected its position, the I.R.S. recanted and approved the state
classification of professional corporations. See Philipps, McNider & Riley, Origins of Tax
Law: The History of the Personal Service Corporation, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 433, 441
(1983) (discussing the various disputes between the I.R.S. and taxpayers seeking PC status
ultimately resulting in the taxpayers' victory). For a summary of the tax advantages and
disadvantages of professional corporations, see Dodd, Professional Corporations: Planning
Problems, 6 GoNz. L. REV. 1 (1970); Malone, Professional Corporations - A Current Ap-
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classification of PCs, many of the anticipated benefits were lost in
subsequent amendments to the Internal Revenue Code."" State
law issues aside, the degree of tax advantage it will provide, as
compared with regular corporations, will determine the viability of
the LLC as an organizational form.
This article seeks to:
1. examine certain significant state law issues concerning
the structure and operation of the LLC as organized in Wyo-
ming, Florida, Colorado, and Kansas;
2. discuss briefly the federal income tax classification of the
LLC;
3. examine the overall advantages and drawbacks of the
LLC in order to evaluate the prospects for widespread adoption
of this form of doing business; and
praisal, 23 ARK. L. REV. 215 (1969).
Not all the benefits of PC status are related to taxation. In Colorado, for example,
attorney shareholders are not vicariously liable for the legal malpractice of their fellow
shareholders as long as prescribed professional liability insurance is maintained. See COLO.
Sup. CT. R. 265, reprinted in COLO. REV. STAT. ch. 22 (1973) (establishing the guidelines
within which lawyers may form and operate a professional service corporation). LLCs pre-
sent different considerations from those of the professional corporation. For example, regu-
lation of licensed professionals is a fundamental prerogative of the state in which the pro-
fessional practices. Multijurisdictional effects are secondary, and a state can take action
without cooperation from other states. As discussed in this article, questions about the
status of the LLC in jurisdictions outside its state of formation may initially impede its use
in foreign jurisdictions until more states enact legislation expressly addressing the LLC.
See infra text accompanying notes 218-64. Moreover, allowing highly regulated individuals
circumscribed flexibility in choosing their organizational form has only a limited impact on
persons outside the profession. By contrast, the LLC carries broad implications as a new
limited liability vehicle available to all who actively conduct, or wish to organize, a busi-
ness, supplanting longstanding forms of business organization such as the S corporation
and the limited partnership.
18. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96
Stat. 324 (1982) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) [hereinafter
"TEFRA"], eliminated much of the disparity between corporate employee plans and self-
employed plans. Philipps, McNider & Riley, supra note 17, at 435-36. In addition,
TEFRA enacted I.R.C. § 269A, which further limits the tax avoidance potential of per-
sonal services corporations. Id. at 454-56 (outlining the provisions in the Internal Revenue
Code that give the I.R.S. flexibility in determining how income and deductions are allo-
cated in order to prevent tax avoidance by PCs); see Halliday, The Advantages and Disad-
vantages of Professional Corporations and Partnerships After TEFRA, 8 REV. OF TAX'N
OF INDIVIDUALs 23 (1984) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of PC and part-
nership status and exploring various alternatives available if a PC chooses to liquidate).
The Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.), changed matters further by (1) establishing a
maximum individual income tax rate that was less than the highest corporate rate; (2)
taxing personal services corporations at only the highest corporate rates without benefit of
the lower bracket rates; and (3) requiring the use of the calendar year as the taxable year
in most cases.
392 [Vol. 41:387
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES
4. consider some problems and unanswered questions
presented by the application of traditional federal partnership
income tax principles to an LLC.
I. STRUCTURE AND OPERATION
A. The Partnership Association - Precursor to the LLC
The limited partnership association is the LLC's predecessor
in the United States.19 In 1874 Pennsylvania 20 took the lead,
which Michigan,21 New Jersey,22 and Ohio23 followed several
years later, in creating the "limited partnership association," or
"partnership association," an entity roughly equivalent to a gen-
eral partnership with limited liability for all members.
The United States had no federal income tax at the time
these statutes were enacted. 24 Thus, unlike the LLC, the partner-
ship association was not created for tax advantages. One purpose
of the limited partnership association was to create a simpler al-
ternative to the corporation.25 Another motive was avoidance of
restrictive corporate shareholder liability requirements.2 6
19. For a detailed history of the limited partnership association, see Schwartz, The
Limited Partnership Association - An Alternative to the Corporation for the Small Busi-
ness with "Control" Problems?, 20 RUTGERS L. REv. 29 (1965). Virginia enacted partner-
ship association legislation in 1874 only to repeal 'it in 1918. Id. at 29 n.3.
20. The Pennsylvania statute was repealed in 1970. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 341
(Purdon 1964), repealed by Act of Dec. 21, 1988, Pub. L. 1444, No. 177, § 302(e)(1)
(effective Oct. 1, 1989).
21. See MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 449.301 (1979).
22. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:3-1 (West 1940 & Supp. 1990). As of September 21,
1988, no new limited partnership associations may be formed in New Jersey. Id. § 42:3-I.
23. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1783.01 (Anderson 1985).
24. The Pennsylvania statute was enacted in 1874, the Michigan statute in 1877, the
New Jersey statute in 1880, and the Ohio statute in 1881. Schwartz, supra note 19, at 30-
31. These enactments fell between the Civil War income tax, which was repealed in 1872,
and the 1894 income tax. See, e.g., S. SURREY, P. MCDANIEL. H. AULT & S. KOPPELMAN,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 1-17 (1986) (historical account of the development of federal
income tax).
25. See Schwartz, supra note 19, at 31 (indicating that the primary motive for en-
acting New Jersey's statute was dissatisfaction with the complicated requirements for
forming a corporation).
26. Id. at 32. Pennsylvania's legislature passed a corporation statute and a separate
partnership association statute in 1874. The corporation statute subjected shareholders to
personal liability (in an additional amount equal to their stock subscriptions) for all labor
and materials furnished to carry on the operations of the corporation. The double liability
aspects of the corporation statute reportedly reflected the views of anticorporation legisla-
tors. These legislators, however, were rebuffed by the partnership association statute which
limited personal liability to the share subscription amount. See E. WARREN. CORPORATE
ADVANTAGES WITHOUT INCORPORATION 508-14 (1929).
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After the income tax became a consideration, the I.R.S. clas-
sified limited partnership associations created under Oho 2 7 and
Pennsylvania 28 law as associations taxable as corporations. How-
ever, a limited partnership association formed under the Michigan
law was accorded partnership status.29 Aside from its uncertain
classification for income tax purposes, the partnership association
suffered from state law restrictions, such as a limitation on the
number of members and the effective confinement of its principal
business activities to the state of formation."0 In any event, the
limited partnership association withered in the United States after
being specifically prohibited by law in Pennsylvania and New
Jersey," while the concept of an unincorporated limited liability
association continued to develop abroad.3 2
27. See Rev. Rul. 71-434, 1971-2 C.B. 430, 431-32 (if an association has the corpo-
rate characteristics of continuity of life, limited liability, and centralized management, it
has sufficient corporate characteristics to justify classification as a corporation for federal
income tax purposes). In Giant Auto Parts, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 307 (1949), the
Tax Court held that a limited partnership association formed under Ohio law was to be
taxed as a corporation because the organization provided limited liability to participants,
free transferability of interests subject to a first right of refusal, and centralized manage-
ment. The treasury regulations recognize partnership associations and state that such as-
sociations will be treated as corporations if they more nearly resemble a corporation. Treas.
Reg. § 301.7701-3(c) (1960).
28. See Rev. Rul. 71-277, 1971-1k C.B. 422, 423 (if an association has the corporate
characteristics of centralized management and free transferability of interests, it has suffi-
cient corporate characteristics to be taxed as a corporation for federal income tax
purposes).
29. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 75-05-290-310A (May 29, 1975).
30. Under all of the partnership association statutes, the association had to maintain
its principal place of business in the state of creation. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 449.301
(1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:3-1 (West 1940 & Supp. 1990); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1783.01 (Anderson 1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 341 (Purdon 1964), repealed by Dec.
21, 1988, P.L. 1444, No. 177, § 302(e)(1) (effective Oct. 1, 1989). Under the Ohio statute,
membership was not permitted to number less than three or more than twenty-five persons.
See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1783.01. One commentator concluded that:
the limited partnership associatioll affords a promising vehicle for the small, rel-
atively localized business having few active participants, each of whom desires
the type of control usually available only through the partnership form. For
[these] persons engaging in substantial multi-state transactions, the uncertainties
as to how such partnership associations will be treated by out-of-state courts and
regulatory agencies unfamiliar with'this statutory form of doing business may
militate against its use.
Schwartz, supra note 19, at 88.
31. See supra notes 20 & 22. "[The limited partnership association's] importance to
the field of partnership, never decisive, may be expected to continue to decline." H. REUS-
CHLEIN & W GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 265 (2d ed. 1990).
32. The aspect of limited liability for all members of an association is found in a
number of foreign organizations, including the Latin American limitada and the German
[Vol. 41:387
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B. The LLC Statutory Schemes
Wyoming enacted the nation's first LLC legislation.33 Al-
though drawn primarily from the ULPA and the MBCA, Wyo-
ming's statute also contains several provisions apparently adapted
from the partnership association statutes.3 4 Florida's statute, for
the most part, closely follows the Wyoming model. Kansas's stat-
ute in turn resembles Florida's statute with some modifications.3 5
Gesellschaft mit beschrenkter Haftung (GmbH). For a discussion and comparison of Cen-
tral American forms of business entities, including the limitada, see Gordon, Joint Busi-
ness Ventures in the Central American Common Market, 21 .VAND. L. REV. 315 (1968).
The I.R.S. has held that local law of the foreign jurisdiction is to be applied in deter-
mining the legal relationship of the members of an organization, among themselves, and
with the public at large, as well as the interests of the members of the organization in its
assets. Rev. Rul. 73-254, 1973-1 C.B. 613. Moreover, an entity organized under foreign
law is classified for federal tax purposes solely on the basis of the characteristics set forth
in section 301.7701-2 of the regulations. Rev. RuL 88-8, 1988-1 C.B. 403.
The tax entity classification of a limitada utilized by U.S. taxpayers for a cotton farm-
ing operation in Mexico was at issue in Elot H. Rafferty Farms, Inc. v. United States, 511
F.2d 1234 (8th Cir. 1975) (limitada treated as a corporation). The limitada and GmbH
have been found taxable as partnerships in several private letter rulings, except where mul-
tiple interests in the entity are held by related parties. See Rev. Rul. 77-214, 1977-1 C.B.
408 (GmbH classified as an association taxable as a corporation because sole interest hold-
ers were wholly owned subsidiaries of a common parent); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-10-028 (Dec.
7, 1989) (GmbH classified as a partnership); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-01-018 (Oct. 6, 1989)
(GmbH classified as a partnership); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-03-072 (Oct. 25, 1979) (Brazilian
limitada classified as a partnership); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 78-41-042 (July 14, 1978) (Brazilian
limitada clissified as a partnership); Tech. Adv. Mem. 84-01-001 (June 16, 1983) (Brazil-
ian limitada classified as an association taxable as a corporation because sole interest hold-
ers were wholly owned subsidiaries of a common parent). But see MCA, Inc. v. United
States, 685 F.2d 1099 (9th Cir. 1982) (an entity owned by a subsidiary corporation and a
related employee trust for the benefit of the subsidiary's top directors found not to be an
association); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 82-43-193 (July 29, 1982) (participants under common control
issue not raised in context of entity comprised of two wholly owned subsidiaries of a U.S.
parent company).
33. See supra text accompanying note I.
34. Some of the Wyoming LLC name provisions were apparently drawn from the
partnership association statutes. For a detailed history of the LLC statutes, refer to the
comparative chart of LLC statutes set forth as an appendix to this article. See infra pp.
472-501.
35. Kansas's statute made several improvements to Florida's statute. It permits the
use of names that would otherwise be deceptive, with distinguishing alterations, provided
that the written consent of the other corporation, limited partnership, or LLC is obtained.
See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7606 (Supp. 1990). A minimum of 10 days' written notice of
member meetings is required. See id. § 17-7613(b). The procedure for calling special meet-
ings of members is specified, member actions by writing without a meeting are expressly
recognized, written proxies are recognized, and the offices of president and secretary are
required. See id. Certificates that are required to be filed, such as articles of organization
and amendments, may be executed by an attorney-m-fact, and execution constitutes an
oath, under penalties of perjury, that the facts stated in the certificates are true and that
any power of attorney is in proper form and substance. See id. § 17-7634. Restated and
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Colorado's statute represents the greatest departure from Wyo-
ming's legislation, adopting a number of procedural refinements.
As additional states adopt LLC statutes, such statutes will likely
continue to follow the fundamental provisions of Wyoming's stat-
ute in order to align themselves with Revenue Ruling 88-76,
which classified an LLC formed under Wyoming law as a partner-
ship. 6 On the other hand, procedural requirements need not be
slavishly duplicated by other jurisdictions because they are not
critical to the federal income tax classification of the LLC entity
A chart comparing the significant differences between the statu-
tory provisions currently in effect in Wyoming, Florida, and Colo-
rado is set forth as an appendix to this article.3 7 The Kansas stat-
ute is omitted for the sake of brevity and because it closely
resembles Florida's LLC law The appendix provides a detailed
outline of the statutory requirements for an LLC, including such
matters as formation, operation, dissolution, and the apparent ori-
gin of the provisions. Consequently, the following discussion fo-
cuses on the substantive aspects of selected provisions of the state
statutes and will not repeat the information set forth in the
appendix.
1. Formation
In Wyoming two or more persons must sign and deliver arti-
cles of organization to the Secretary of State to form an LLC.38
This requirement differs from the MBCA which requires only
"one or more" incorporators.3 Wyoming's corporation statute, in
effect at the time of enactment of the LLC legislation, also re-
quired only one incorporator.4 0 A comparison of the Wyoming
amended articles of organization are expressly recognized. See id. § 17-7635. Finally, re-
gistration of foreign LLCs is permitted, see id. §§ 17-7636 to -7644, annual LLC reports
are required, see id. §§ 17-7647 to -7649, and the merger of LLCs is permitted, see id. §
17-7650.
36. See infra text accompanying notes 313-33 (discussing Rev. Rul. 88-76).
37. See infra pp. 472-501.
38. "Two (2) or more persons may form a limited liability company by signing, veri-
fying and delivering in duplicate to the secretary of state articles of organization for such
limited liability company." Wvo. STAT. § 17-15-106 (1977). The Florida and Kansas pro-
visions are nearly identical. See FLA. STAT. § 608.405 (Supp. 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
17-7605 (Supp. 1990). The term "person" includes individuals, general and limited part-
nerships, LLCs, corporations, trusts, business trusts, real estate investment trusts, estates.
and other associations. See WYO. STAT. § 17-15-102(a)(iv).
39. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 53 (1969).
40. WYO. STAT. § 17-1-201 (repealed 1989).
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corporation and LLC statutory requirements suggests that inclu-
sion of the multiple organizer requirement for the LLC was there-
fore purposeful and not a return to early corporation statutes,
which often required three or more incorporators for a single
shareholder corporation.41 Such corporate statutes which imposed
a multiple organizer requirement were frequently circumvented
through the use of "dummy" incorporators who had no function
other than satisfying the statutorily imposed formalities. 42 Al-
though Wyoming's legislature acted purposefully in adopting a
multiple organizer requirement for its LLC statute, the LLC for-
mation requirement could nevertheless be avoided, like its corpo-
rate ancestor, if the LLC statute did not require the existence of
two or more members at all times. While the term "members" is
used elsewhere in Wyoming's statute, there is no express require-
ment that an LLC have two or more members, except to comply
with the formation requirement. The Florida and Kansas statutes
suffer from the same uncertainty
This is a significant issue. The corporate multiple organizer
requirement, which did not impede single shareholder corpora-
tions, is unlike the Uniform Partnership Act ("UPA"), 4 which
defines a partnership as "an association of two or more persons. 4
If the LLC formation requirement serves a purpose similar to the
UPA definition, requiring at least two members at all times,
rather than serving the formalistic multiple organizer purposes of
outdated corporate law, a partnership flavor is created that differ-
entiates the LLC from corporations, which can have a sole share-
holder45 and, in some cases, a sole director.4
41. See, e.g., MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 47 (1960) ("Three or more natural
persons of the age of twenty-one years or more, may act as incorporators of a corporation
"). By 1960 only eight jurisdictions permitted incorporation by less than three incor-
porators. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AT ANN. t 2.02(i) (1960).
42. "Dummy" incorporators promoted the interests of individuals wishing to incorpo-
rate their business and existing corporations seeking to form a subsidiary. This charade was
possible since the incorporator served only a ritualistic purpose having no significant or
lasting effect upon the entity created. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 53 t 2
comment (2d ed. 1971); H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 135
(1983). Pennsylvania's partnership association requirement of at least three members was
held to be mandatory, prohibiting the use of dummy members. See Sturgeon v. Apollo Oil
& Gas Co., 203 Pa. 369, 53 A. 189 (1902).
43. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT, 6 U.L.A. 1 (1914).
44. Id. § 6(1).
45. See, e.g., REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AT § 1.42 (1984).
46. See id. § 8.03(a) ("A board of directors must consist of one or more individuals
11).
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Colorado's LLC statute permits "one or more" natural per-
sons, eighteen years of age or older, to organize an LLC by exe-
cuting and filing the articles of organization.47 In effect, this re-
quirement adopts the corporate distinction between
nonshareholder incorporators and shareholders, since LLC or-
ganizers need not be "members" of the LLC after formation.48
However, a Colorado LLC is required to "have two or more mem-
bers at the time of its formation,' 4 and the context of the statute
as a whole suggests that there must be at least two members at all
times.5"
The requirement of two or more members prevents the use of
the LLC by sole proprietors seeking limited liability without the
complications presented by token co-owners or tiered ownership
structures." Although no I.R.S. pronouncement addresses this
consideration, the LLC requirement of two or more participants
was probably intended to support classification of the LLC as a
partnership for federal tax purposes. 2
47. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-203(1) (Supp. 1990) (formation requirement); id.
§ 7-80-205 (execution and filing of articles of organization). The other LLC statutes refer
to "persons" who may organize an LLC but do not expressly limit organizers to "natural"
persons. See infra note 153 (comparison of the statutory definitions of the term "person").
48. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-203(1). Colorado's statute borrows from the RE-
VISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 204(c), 6 U.L.A. 291 (1985), in stating that the
execution of the articles of organization constitutes an affirmation of the signatory, under
penalty of perjury, that the facts stated therein are true. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-
203(1). Drawing from RULPA § 204(b), the statute also permits execution of the articles
of organization under a written power of attorney. See id. § 7-80-203(i).
49. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-203(2).
50. The two member requirement derives from considering together the requirement
that there be two or more members upon formation, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-203(2),
and the provision that dissolution occurs upon a member's death, bankruptcy, expulsion, or
resignation, unless there are at least two remaining members and all members consent to
continue the LLC, see id. § 7-80-801(I)(c). Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(b)(l)(i)(a)
(1956) (providing that termination of a two person partnership does not occur upon the
death of one partner until the deceased partner's interest is liquidated).
51. For example, a sole proprietor could possibly create an entity to hold one of the
two required LLC interests. Even assuming that the additional expense associated with
multiple entities can be justified, such a course would draw the income tax classification of
the LLC into question. See infra note 344 and accompanying text (discussing the single
economic interest theory).
52. "The term 'partnership' is broader in scope than the common law meaning of
partnership and may include groups not commonly called partnerships." Treas. Reg. §
301.7701-3(a) (1967). The use of the term "group" seems to indicate multiple participants.
Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(b)(1)(i)(a) (suggesting that, for tax purposes, except for a
suspended period for liquidation of a deceased partner's interest, the two person partner-
ship terminates upon the death of one partner). Although two or more participants may be
required for tax partnership status, the number of participants has little apparent effect on
[Vol. 41:387
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES
2. Stated Period of Duration
All four LLC statutes provide that an LLC cannot endure for
a greater period than thirty years,5 3 as opposed to the MBCA,
which allows perpetual corporate existence." The ULPA certifi-
cate is required to state "[t]he term for which the partnership is
to exist."5 The RULPA prescribes no set term for limited part-
nership duration but instead refers to that date chosen by the
partners as the "latest date upon which the limited partnership is
to dissolve." 56 The limitation of the duration of an LLC to a term
of thirty years could reduce its appeal to the participants of a
long-term business undertaking. Although LLC members would
arguably not be precluded from agreeing to reform an expiring
LLC, 7 the uncertainty attending the statutory limitation on LLC
an association's status. See infra text accompanying notes 276-345. If there are two or
more participants, there are "associates," but that factor is common to both partnerships
and corporations and would not be determinative of corporate or partnership status. See
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(2) (1983) (defining a business as including corporations and
partnerships for tax purposes). If there were only one participant, the same regulation
would still find "associates" due to a parenthetical reference to the "so-called one-man
corporation and the sole proprietorship." Id. The courts have generally found that one per-
son corporations meet this test. See B. BITrKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS § 2.02 n.13 (5th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1989). The
statute may also reflect the partnership association's ancestry, which required multiple par-
ticipants. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1783.01 (Anderson 1985) (requiring at least
three members in a partnership association).
53. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-204(l)(b) (Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. §
608.407(i)(b) (Supp. 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7607(A)(2) (Supp. 1990); Wyo. STAT.
§ 17-15-107(a)(ii) (1977).
54. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 54(b) (1969) (allowing the articles of incor-
poration to designate the corporation's period of duration as perpetual).
55. UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 2(l)(a)V (1916).
56. REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 201(a)(4) (1985); see id. § 801 (set-
ting forth the events of dissolution, one of which is the passage of "the time specified in the
certificate of limited partnership.").
57. All four LLC statutes provide that the period of duration may not exceed 30
years from the date of filing the articles of organization. See supra note 53. Because the
duration is linked to the filing of the original articles of organization, LLC participants can
not subsequently amend the articles to further extend the period of duration. However, it
would apparently not violate the letter of the statutes if the members of an expiring LLC
agree to formally dissolve the LLC, agreeing, however, to immediately thereafter organize
a new LLC to continue the business of the predecessor LLC. The line could be even further
blurred in a state like Kansas, which permits mergers of LLCs, see supra note 34, because
an expiring LLC can be merged into a newly formed LLC, with the latter as the surviving
entity. A merger would minimize complications presented by the mechanics of dissolving
and reorganizing the LLC, such as asset transfers and liability assumptions. For partner-
ship income tax purposes, a merger of partnerships with identical ownership, but with the
older LLC/partnership providing the bulk of the combined assets, would result in a contin-
uation of the older LLC. See Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(b)(2)(i) (1956).
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duration represents a disadvantage when compared with the com-
peting corporate or limited partnership alternatives, which are not
similarly restricted.5"
The origin of the LLC's limited duration might lie in the lim-
ited partnership association statutes of Michigan, New Jersey, and
Ohio, which contained twenty year limitations. 59 The thirty year
limitation should be eliminated if it is based on the precedent of
limited partnership associations or on misplaced fears of adverse
federal income tax entity classification.60
3. Liability of Members
a. Broad Exculpation
All four LLC statutes use similar language providing broad
liability exculpation to LLC members and managers."' The LLC
The phrase "letter of the statutes" warrants emphasis. For partnership income tax
purposes, the merger approach will be construed as a continuation of the old LLC. Simi-
larly, the liquidation and immediate reincorporation of a corporate enterprise will often be
viewed in substance as a continuation of the liquidated corporation in the nature of a "D"
reorganization. For a discussion of the federal income tax of the liquidation reincorporation
device, see B. BITirKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 52, § 14.54. It is uncertain whether the
income tax concepts would be extended to the LLC state law context to invalidate the
successor LLC as a continuation of the dissolving predecessor LLC. For state tort law
purposes, a form of continuity of corporate enterprise has been reflected in decisions that
hold a successor corporation liable for the product liability of a predecessor's products. See,
e.g., Ray v. Alad Corp. 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977) (purchaser of
manufacturing assets held liable for product liability claims of predecessor corporation).
For a discussion of this issue and extensive citations to authority, see H. HENN & J. ALEX-
ANDER, supra note 42, at 967 (a significant factor in liability is whether "the successor is a
mere continuation of the predecessor (same shareholders, directors, and officers)").
58. The uncertainty of a future agreement to extend the duration of the LLC could
be reduced if, for example, the LLC is comprised solely of limited partnerships. A unani-
mous vote on this matter would not be required at the limited partnership level, although
the limited partnerships would need to unanimously agree on continuation as LLC mem-
bers. However, tiered ownership structures present some income tax classification uncer-
tainties. See infra text accompanying notes 336-45.
59. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 449.301 (1979); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42:3-2.a.Vll
(West 1940 & Supp. 1990)); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1783.01 (Anderson 1985). Initially,
corporations had limited lives, expiring after 20 years. See Weidner, A Perspective to Re-
consider Partnership Law, 16 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 1, 28-29 (1988); see also Liggett Co. v.
Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548 n.3 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (noting that limited 20, 30, or
50 year periods of duration were imposed on corporations in their early stages of
development).
60. See infra text accompanying notes 334-35.
61. "Neither the members of a limited liability company nor the managers of a lim-
ited liability company managed by a manager or managers are liable under a judgment,
decree, or order of a court, or in any other manner, for a debt, obligation, or liability of the
limited liability company." FLA. STAT. § 608.436 (Supp. 1989). Wyoming's statutory lan-
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statutory language is clearer than the exemption expressed in the
MBCA62 and broader than the RMBCA.13 A corporate share-
holder, however, may be subject to personal liability if a court
decides to "pierce the corporate veil."'"
b. Piercing the Corporate Veil Doctrine - LLC Applications
A limited partner is not liable to creditors unless the limited
partner takes part in the management or control of the business.6 5
Under the RULPA, a limited partner can engage in specified ac-
tivities without incurring personal liability for partnership obliga-
tions.6 An individual seeking active participation 67 in a new busi-
guage is identical. See Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-113 (1977). The Kansas statute is identical
except that it also refers to officers of the LLC. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7620 (Supp.
1990). Colorado's statute varies slightly due to a difference in the authority of managers.
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-705 (Supp. 1990) (containing language similar to the Wyo-
ming and Florida statutes, deleting only the phrase "managed by a manager or
managers").
62. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 25 (1969). Some of the LLC statutes also
provide for member liability with respect to unpaid capital contributions and returns of
capital. See FLA. STAT. § 608.435 (Supp. 1989); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-121 (1977).
63. See REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 6.22(b) (1984) (potential liability
by reason of a shareholder's own acts or conduct).
64. For some of the cases and literature on this doctrine, see Barber, Piercing the
Corporate Veil, 17 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 371 (1981); Hackney & Benson, Shareholder
Liability for Inadequate Capital, 43 U. PITT. L. REv. 837 (1982); Krendl & Krendl, Pierc-
ing the Corporate Veil: Focusing the Inquiry, 55 DEN. L.J. 1 (1978).
65. UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 7 (1916); REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP
ACT § 303 (1985).
66. See REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 303(b).
67. The degree of activity of corporate shareholders is a factor in disregarding the
corporate form and assessing personal liability. "The courts have refused to impose per-
sonal liability under a veil-piercing theory upon inactive shareholders." L. RIBSTEIN, Busi-
NESS ASSOCIATIONS § 2.04, at 2-64 (1983) (citing Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National
Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1973), modified, 490 F.2d 916 (5th Cir.
1974); Fisser v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1960)). In environmental liabil-
ity cases, courts have held active shareholders and directors liable in order to achieve some
control over a polluting corporation. See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceuti-
cal & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986) (officers of chemical manufacturer found
liable for cleanup costs of hazardous waste site), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); New
York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985) (property owner and officer held
indivldually liable for cleanup of hazardous waste disposal site); Comment, Corporate Of-
ficer Liability for Hazardous Waste Disposal: What Are the Consequences? 38 MERCER L.
REv. 677 (1987) (discussing ramifications of corporate officer liability under hazardous
waste laws).
Support for the proposition that only those shareholders actively involved in manage-
ment will be personally liable has been referred to as "dicta in a few cases." See Barber,
supra note 66, at 373. Justice Traynor suggested that, in cases involving inadequately capi-
talized corporations, liability rests on shareholders that actively participate in the conduct
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ness may, nevertheless, prefer the corporate form to a limited
partnership. The corporation, even subject to potential disregard
of the corporate entity, affords greater certainty of protection than
the RULPA guidelines, the parameters of which are not clearly
defined.68 An important issue, therefore, is whether the equitable
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil will apply to the LLC.
The limited partnership association and corporation are simi-
lar to an LLC because all participants enjoy limited liability The
veil-piercing doctrine does not appear to extend to limited partner-
ship associations in those states permitting such organizations ab-
sent such factors as fraudulent promoter representations in the
sale of interests or defective formation. 9 The rationale underlying
limited liability for limited partners and corporate shareholders is
similar: parties should be permitted to invest in enterprises with-
out risking their personal assets.70 The doctrine of piercing the
limited liability shield, however, generally has not been extended
to limited partners. 1 This inconsistency may result from the es-
of corporate affairs. Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576, 579, 364 P.2d 473, 475, 15 Cal.
Rptr. 641, 643 (1961); see Pearl v. Shore, 17 Cal. App. 3d 608, 95 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1971)
(dismissal of alter ego liability claim filed against inactive investor of adequately capital-
ized corporation); Slusarski v. American Confinement Sys., 218 Neb. 576, 357 N.W.2d
450 (1984) (no liability for directors not actively involved in fraudulent activities). But see
Briggs Transp. Co. v. Starr Sales Co., 262 N.W.2d 805 (Iowa 1978) (inactive shareholder
found liable for disregarding corporation's inadequate capitalization and failure to main-
tain corporate books).
68. The 1985 RULPA amendments to section 303 clarified matters but questions
remain. Under section 303(a), a limited partner is not liable for the obligations of the
partnership unless he participates in the control of the business. Section 303(b) provides a
list of activities that do not necessarily constitute control for purposes of section 303(a).
See REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 303. For a detailed analysis of the effects of
the 1985 amendments to § 303, see Basile, Limited Liability for Limited Partners: An
Argument for the Abolition of the Control Rule, 38 VAND. L. REv. 1199, 1214-17 (1985).
69. Two early decisions applied the statutory limited liability standard. See Stayer &
Abbott Mfg. Co. v. Blake, 111 Mich. 282, 69 N.W 508 (1896) (no member liability on a
contract); Whitney v. Backus, 149 Pa. 29, reported sub nom. Whitney v. Short, 24 A. 51
(1892) (no member liability for a tort). A later case held association members liable for
return of membership subscriptions because of fraudulent representations in the sale of
association interests. See Macomber v. Endion Grape Juice Co., 160 Mich. 54, 125 N.W
26 (1910). Of course, members could be personally liable if the association were improp-
erly formed. See, e.g., Nichols v. Buell, 157 Mich. 609, 122 N.W 217 (1909) (promoters
of partnership association found liable because partnership association was never recorded
as required by law).
70. See generally Lewis, The Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 65 U. PA. L. REv.
715 (1917) (discussing history of and purposes for the ULPA).
71. One court found limited partner officers of the corporate general partner liable
because they were engaged in indirect control. See Delaney v. Fidelity Lease, Ltd., 526
S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1975). Two other courts rejected this position, refusing to impose per-
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tablished approach of determining potential limited partner liabil-
ity from the degree of participation in the control of a partner-
ship's business, thereby forestalling reliance on the corporate
piercing doctrine.7 2
This dichotomy may also result from an important structural
distinction between a corporation and a limited partnership: while
all corporate shareholders seek limited liability, a limited partner-
ship has at least one general partner with unlimited liability The
creditor's remedy is to pursue the general partner.1 3 Based on this
latter distinction, the LLC more closely resembles a corporation.
Therefore, the most consistent position is that, in appropriate cir-
cumstances, claimants may pierce the LLC's veil. In fact, Colo-
rado's statute expressly applies this doctrine to LLCs.74 Further-
more, in prescribing formalities such as notices, meetings, records,
and reports, Colorado's LLC statute, to some extent, sets the
stage for a piercing of an LLC's protective veil if members ignore
such formalities. 5
sonal liability upon the limited partner regardless of control. See Western Camps, Inc. v.
Riverway Ranch Enter., 70 Cal. App. 3d 714, 138 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1977) (control test
rejected by court); Frigidaire Sales Corp. v. Union Properties, Inc., 88 Wash. 2d 400, 562
P.2d 244 (1977) (rejecting personal liability for limited partner although corporate general
partner held liable). The RULPA has codified this latter position. See REVISED UNIF. LTD.
PARTNERSHIP AcT § 303(b)(1) (1985). A limited partner does not participate in control of
the partnership by "being an officer, director, or shareholder of a general partner that is a
corporation." Id. However, such participants remain subject to attempts to pierce the cor-
porate general partner.
72. One commentator has argued:
Neither the ULPA nor the RULPA as presently written contains any provision
imposing personal liability on the limited partners of undercapitalized limited
partnerships, provided that the limited partners do not take part in the control of
the business. The control rule is not, and was not intended to be, an effective
prophylactic against the possible formation of thinly capitalized limited
partnerships.
Basile, supra note 68, at 1230-31.
73. The liability of an individual general partner could be reduced, of course, if a
corporation were interposed as the general partner. One commentator has suggested that
the legislators who enacted the early limited partnership statutes probably did not contem-
plate the use of a corporate general partner. See O'Neal, Comments on Recent Develop-
ments in Limited Partnership Law, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 669, 683-84. The persons control-
ling the corporate general partner might be subject to liability upon a decision to pierce the
corporate veil or upon the theory that they engaged in indirect control of the limited part-
nership. See supra note 71.
74. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-107 (Supp. 1990).
75. See, e.g., id. § 7-80-303 (outlining required reports). The failure to respect cor-
porate formalities such as minutes of shareholder meetings and maintenance of corporate
records have been factors referred to by courts in permitting a disregard of the corporate
entity. See, e.g., Barber, supra note 64, at 374 (noting that not following corporate formali-
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c. Liability for Acting Without Proper Formation
The Wyoming, Florida, and Kansas statutes provide that
"[a]ll persons who assume to act as a limited liability company
without authority to do so shall be jointly and severally liable for
all debts and liabilities. ' 76 This provision is patterned after section
146 of the MBCA except that the MBCA adds the qualifying
phrase "incurred or arising as a result thereof" after the word "li-
abilities. 17 7 Colorado's statute supplies a similar sanction but re-
quires lack of authority and lack of "good faith belief that [the
participants] have such authority" before personal liability is
imposed. 78
4. Capital Contributions
The Wyoming and Florida statutes permit capital contribu-
tions of cash or other property, but not services.7 9 This language is
very similar to section 4 of the ULPA 0 and could be modified to
allow contributions of services in the manner permitted under the
RULPA.81 For example, the Colorado statute adopted the
ties has influenced courts' decisions to pierce the corporate veil); Hamilton, The Corporate
Entity, 49 TEX. L. REV. 979, 990 (1971) (summarizing the rule from numerous Texas
cases).
76. FLA. STAT. § 608.437 (Supp. 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7621 (Supp. 1990);
Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-133 (1977).
77. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 146 (1969).
78. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-105. RMBCA § 2.04 differs from MBCA § 146 in
requiring "know[ledge that] there was no incorporation under this Act." The Official Com-
ment to RMBCA § 2.04 suggests that this would immunize participants who "honestly and
reasonably but erroneously believed the articles had been filed." REVISED MODEL BUSINESS
CORP. AT § 2.04 comment 1 (1984). UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 11 (1916) contains
a similar exculpation for erroneous belief, as does REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP AT §
304 (1985), which speaks to erroneous, "good faith" belief.
79. See FLA. STAT. § 608.4211; WvO. STAT. § 17-15-115. Kansas's statute omits lan-
guage specifically addressing capital contributions other than the general language requir-
ing a description in the articles of organization of cash and property other than cash con-
tributed to the LLC. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7607(5).
80. "The contributions of a limited partner may be cash or other property, but not
services." UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 4 (1916).
81. "The contribution of a partner may be in cash, property, or services rendered, or
a promissory note or other obligation to contribute cash or property or to perform services."
REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP AT § 501 (1985). A services partner may be taxed on
the value of the partnership interest received. See Campbell v. Commissioner, 59 T.C.M.
(CCH) 236 (1990) (an organizer of hotel syndications was required to include in income
the value of partnership interests he received in exchange for his services); Diamond v.
Commissioner, 56 T.C. 530 (1971), aff'd, 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974) (plaintiff taxed for
partnership interest he received in exchange for services).
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RULPA language permitting contributions of services rendered or
to be rendered .
2
5. Management
a. Managers
Unless otherwise stated in the articles of organization, man-
agement of the LLC is vested in its members in proportion to
their capital contributions as adjusted from time to time to reflect
contributions or withdrawals.8 3 If provision is made in the articles
of organization, management of the LLC may be undertaken by
managers elected annually by the members. The manner of elec-
tion, offices, and responsibilities are to be established in the oper-
ating agreement.84 The Colorado statute reverses this rule and
vests management in the managers, creating a structure clearly
resembling a board of directors or general partners of a limited
partnership.8 5
The simpler Wyoming, Florida, and Kansas statutes leave
open a number of questions. For example, in requiring that elec-
tions be held "annually,"8 " the statutes might preclude staggered
terms for directors.8 7 The statutes do not expressly require that
managers also be members of the LLC or residents of the state of
82. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-501 (Supp. 1990) (allowing contributions of cash,
property, services rendered, or a promissory note or other obligation to contribute cash or
property or to perform services).
83. See FLA. STAT. § 608.422 (Supp. 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7612 (Supp.
1990); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-116 (1977). This provision is operative only in the absence of
agreement, but its application is unclear. For example, if the LLC property appreciates,
the original LLC members' capital contributions will not reflect the unrealized apprecia-
tion, while the capital contributions of incoming members may in part be based on the new
values. Without adjustment, management would gravitate to newer members.
The Kansas statute creates a mixed management structure. Even if no managers are
elected, the LLC must select a president and secretary. Thus, if managers are elected, the
LLC will have the equivalent of a board of directors as well as corporate officers. See KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 17-7613(b).
84. See FLA. STAT. § 608.422; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7612; WYO. STAT. § 17-15-
116.
85. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-401(1) (management and voting power shall be
vested in the managers).
86. See FLA. STAT. § 608.422; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7612; Wvo. STAT. § 17-15-I 16.
87. On the other hand, they could require an annual vote, but not with respect to all
directors at the time of each vote. By comparison, the Michigan limited partnership associ-
ation statute is clear. "All such partnership associations shall elect their managers annu-
ally, and the entire number of managers shall be balloted for at one and the same time and
not separately." MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 449.301 (1979).
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formation. 8 The Colorado statute, by comparison, fills in a num-
ber of details through the adoption of corporate style governance
provisions. Managers must be natural persons who are 18 years of
age or older but need not be residents of Colorado, unless required
by the articles of organization or the operating agreement.89 The
Colorado statute also addresses the election and term of manag-
ers,90 classification of managers,9 1 manager vacancies,92 and re-
moval of managers. 3 In a drafting inconsistency, the Colorado
statute does not expressly permit action by the managers without
a meeting.94 In addition, the Colorado LLC statute adopts the
corporate prudent manager rule of the MBCA 95 and the extensive
indemnification provisions of the RMBCA.98 However, the statute
rejects the corporate model when dealing with managerial con-
flicts of interest in favor of a liberal RULPA approach, permitting
88. In comparison the MBCA states, in part, "Directors need not be residents of this
State or shareholders of the corporation unless the articles of incorporation or by-laws so
require." MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 35 (1979). However, some states have construed
the limited partnership association to require member-managers. See, e.g., R.F Roof, Ltd.
v. Sommers, 75 Ohio App. 511, 517, 62 N.E.2d 647, 649, appeal dismissed, 143 Ohio St.
311, 64 N.E.2d 957 (1944).
89. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-401(2) (Supp. 1990).
90. See id. § 7-80-402 (providing that the number of managers be set forth in the
articles of organization and that they hold office until the next annual meeting when their
successors take office). This provision resembles the MBCA § 36, which provides for the
same terms regarding election and term of managers. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 36
(1979).
91. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-403 (providing that when there are six or more
managers, they shall be divided into two or three classes whose terms rotate). This provi-
sion resembles the MBCA with the exception that nine members trigger the classification
requirement. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 37.
92. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-404 (providing that vacancies be filled by a written
agreement of a majority of the remaining managers and that the successor serve until the
predecessor's term expires). This provision resembles the MBCA, which states that a va-
cancy should be filled by a majority vote of the remaining directors and, like the Colorado
statute, the successor should serve the unexpired term of the predecessor. MODEL BUSINESS
CORP. ACT § 38.
93. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-405 (requiring that a meeting be called for that
purpose only, at which time managers may be removed in the manner set forth in the
operating agreement). The MBCA includes provisions similar to the Colorado statute but
contains additional provisions regarding cumulative voting and separate classes of share-
holders. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 39.
94. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
95. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-406 (Supp. 1990). Compare MODEL BUSINESS
CORP. ACT § 35 (1979) (manager must act in good faith, must reasonably believe conduct
to be in the interest of the corporation, and must act with the care of a reasonably prudent
person).
96. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-410. Compare REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP.
ACT §§ 8.50-.58 (1984) (nearly identical provision).
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loans to and transaction of business with managers.97
b. Authority of Managers
If authority is not restricted to managers, any member of a
Wyoming or Florida LLC can bind the LLC for debts and liabili-
ties98 as well as acquire and dispose of property '9 This broad
grant of authority is not tempered by the express limitations of
apparent authority that would apply to general partners of a con-
ventional partnership 0 or officers of a corporation.' 0' If managers
are appointed, the power to contract, acquire, or dispose is held by
one or more managers.0 2 This cloaks every manager with author-
ity greater than that of a general partner, given that, unlike gen-
eral partners, members of an LLC are not personally liable for the
entity's obligations, contractual or otherwise. 03 It is unclear
whether the authority of one or more managers to act could be
limited by language in the operating agreement prescribing, for
example, unanimous action by managers for all or selected
transactions.
The Colorado statute follows the Wyoming, Florida, and
Kansas statutes in not limiting the actual authority of a manager
97. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-409. Compare REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP
ACT § 107 (1985) (specifying legitimate transactions between a partner and the limited
partnership) with MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 41 (setting forth disclosure requirements
for director conflicts of interest) and REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT §§ 8.31-.32
(defining the effect of director conflict of interest on corporate transactions and permitting
loans to or guarantees of obligations on behalf of directors, with board of directors' ap-
proval or a determination by the board of directors that the transaction benefits the
corporation).
98. See FLA. STAT. § 608.424 (Supp. 1989); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-117 (1977). The
Kansas statute takes a different approach. All written contracts are to be signed by the
president and secretary of the LLC or by any other person designated at a member meet-
ing. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7613(b) (Supp. 1990). The acquisition, mortgage, or disposition
of property, however, is subject to the general scheme of the Wyoming and Florida stat-
utes. See id.
99. See FLA. STAT. § 608.425; Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-118.
100. See, e.g., UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 9-10 (1914). Courts recognize apparent
authority only in cases where a partner has acted beyond the limits of express authority but
within the scope of the partnership's business. See, e.g., Bamford v. Cope, 31 Colo. App.
161, 499 P.2d 639 (1972); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 8, 159, 161, 166
(1958).
101. See, e.g., MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 50 (1979).
102. See FLA. STAT. §§ 608.424- 425; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7614; WYO. STAT. §§
17-15-117 to -118.
103. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing LLC member limited
liability).
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with respect to LLC property 104 However, with respect to con-
tracting for LLC debts, which would likely encompass a greater
number of transactions, a manager's authority is subject to the
articles of organization, or the operating agreement. 10 5 The Colo-
rado statute states further that managers have apparent authority
for "carrying on in the usual way the business of the limited lia-
bility company,"'' 0 unless the act is in contravention of the arti-
cles of organization or operating agreement or the manager lacks
actual authority "and the person with whom he is dealing has
knowledge of the fact that he has no such authority "107
The potential for acts to contravene the articles of organiza-
tion is great because the Colorado statute enlarges the scope of
notice provision found in the RULPA10 8 and makes the filed arti-
cles of organization "notice of all other facts set forth therein
which are required to be set forth in the articles of organiza-
tion."'1  Although the list of "required" facts is otherwise abbrevi-
ated,110 it is couched in mandatory language with respect to all
provisions that the members elect to include."'
6. Operating Agreement and Members
The Wyoming and Florida statutes are largely silent on the
rights and duties of members, leaving such matters to the articles
of organization and operating agreement. The term "operating
agreement" is referred to in the Wyoming statute but never de-
104. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-408 (Supp. 1990).
105. See id. § 7-80-407.
106. Id. § 7-80-406(4).
107. Id.
108. "The fact that a certificate of limited partnership is on file in the office of the
Secretary of State is notice that the partnership is a limited partnership and the persons
designated therein as general partners are general partners, but it is not notice of any other
fact." REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 208 (1985).
109. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-208 (Supp. 1990).
110. Colorado's requirements for LLC articles of organization are patterned after
the abbreviated certificate requirements introduced by the 1985 amendments to the
RULPA. See REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 201. The articles must specify: (a)
the LLC's name and, if known, principal place of business; (b) the LLC's duration, not to
exceed 30 years; (c) the name and business address of the LLC's registered agent; (d) the
names and business addresses of initial managers; and (e) any other provision, not inconsis-
tent with law, by which the members choose to regulate the LLC's internal affairs. See
COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-204.
111. "The articles of organization shall set forth [a]ny other provision, not in-
consistent with law, which the members elect to set out in the articles of organization
" COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-204(l)(e).
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fined. The context suggests an agreement resembling a partner-
ship agreement or the bylaws of a corporation. The Florida statute
also refers to an operating agreement, without defining it, and to
"regulations," for which a definition is provided."' The Kansas
statute refers to an operating agreement and to "bylaws" of the
LLC."3 The Colorado statute defines the operating agreement as
a written agreement of the members concerning the affairs of an
LLC and the conduct of its business. 1 4 The exclusion of oral
agreements has created some drafting inconsistencies in adopting
the RULPA provisions, which were structured to accommodate
written or oral agreements." 5
Colorado's statute supplies a number of governance refine-
ments. Unless the articles of organization require consent by a
unanimous or majority vote, the operating agreement can grant to
all or specified groups of members the right to consent, vote, or
agree, on a per capita or other basis, upon any matter."" "Unless
the operating agreement provides otherwise, any member may
vote in person or by proxy ""I The Colorado statute draws from
112. "The regulations may contain any provisions for the regulation and manage-
ment of the affairs of the limited liability company not inconsistent with law or the articles
of organization." FLA. STAT. § 608.423 (Supp. 1989).
113. Kansas's statute follows the Florida pattern, referring both to the operating
agreement, see, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7612 (Supp. 1990), and the bylaws, see id. §§
17-7612 to -7613. The "bylaws" language was generally substituted for the term "regula-
tions" as it had been used in the Florida statute.
114. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 7-80-102(11) (Supp. 1990). Compare REVISED UNIF.
LTD. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 101(9) (1985) (defining the partnership agreement, in part, as
"any valid agreement, written or oral ") and Treas. Reg. § 1.761-1(c) (1972) ("Such
[partnership] agreement or modifications can be oral or written.").
115. The RULPA includes written and oral agreements in its definition of the term
"partnership agreement" In situations where a writing is considered necessary, the
RULPA expressly requires it. For example, section 603 states: "A limited partner may
withdraw at the time or upon the events specified in writing in the partnership
agreement." REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 603. The Official Comment confirms
this special treatment stating, "[tihs section additionally reflects the policy determination,
also embodied in certain other sections of the 1985 Act, that to avoid fraud, agreements
concerning certain matters of substantial importance to the partners will be enforceable
only if in writing." Id. § 603 official comment. The Colorado statute retains this require-
ment in the RULPA provisions. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-411 (1)(d), (f0 (refer-
ring to written operating agreements); Id. §§ 7-80-503, -504, -604 (referring to provisions
expressed in writing in the operating agreement).
116. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-706(1). Compare REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP
ACT §§ 302, 405 (section 302 states that "the partnership agreement may grant to all or a
specified group of limited partners the right to vote (on a per capita or other basis) upon
any matter," while section 405 provides that the partnership agreement may grant voting
powers to all or some general partners on a per capita or other basis).
117. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-706(2). The MBCA would require the proxy to be
410 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:387
the MBCA in specifying guidelines for member meetings, 118 no-
tice of member meetings,"19 meeting quorum requirements, 2 '
waiver of notice, 12' and action by members without a meeting. 22
The quorum provision was not adopted verbatim from the MBCA
and might be read to require a majority per capita vote on all
member decisions, rather than a vote by reference to classes, per-
centage interests, or some other basis.' The Kansas statute
strikes a balance between the extremes of the Wyoming and Colo-
rado statutes by concisely addressing times for annual meetings,
notice of meetings, special meetings, actions taken in writing with-
out a meeting, proxies, required officers, and quorum
requirements.2 4
written and limited in duration: "A shareholder may vote either in person or by proxy
executed in writing by the shareholder or by his duly authorized attorney-m-fact. No proxy
shall be valid after eleven months from the date of its execution, unless otherwise provided
in the proxy." MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 33 (1979). This, of course, could be done in
the operating agreement. The Kansas statute permits written proxies to remain valid for
three years unless the proxy provides otherwise. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7613.
118. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-707. Compare MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 28.
The RMBCA also provides for court ordered meetings. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP.
AcT § 7.03 (1984).
119. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-709 (Supp. 1990). Compare MODEL BUSINESS
CORP. ACT § 29. The Kansas statute also requires meetings to be held at the times desig-
nated in the bylaws or upon a minimum 10 days written notice and establishes the formali-
ties for calling special meetings. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7613(b) (Supp. 1990).
120. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-708 (defining a quorum as a "majority of the
members entitled to vote"). Compare MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AT § 32. Kansas's statute
also requires that a majority of the company's voting interests be present to establish a
quorum. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7613(b).
121. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-710(1). Compare MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT §
144. The Wyoming, Florida, and Kansas statutes contain similar provisions. See FLA. STAT.
§ 608.455; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7630; WYO. STAT. § 17-15-131 (1977).
122. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-711. Compare MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT §
145 (1979). Kansas's statute also permits member action without a meeting. See KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 17-7613(b) (Supp. 1990). In a drafting inconsistency, the Colorado and Kan-
sas statutes do not permit action by the managers without a meeting. The MBCA, how-
ever, permits director action without a meeting. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 44.
123. The overall voting requirement which permits voting on any basis is "[s]ubject
to the provisions of this article which require majority or unanimous consent "' COLO.
REV. STAT. § 7-80-706(i). The quorum provision states, however, "[i]f a quorum is pre-
sent, the affirmative vote of the majority of the members shall be the act of the mem-
bers, unless the vote of a greater proportion or number or voting by classes is required by
this article, the articles of organization, or the operating agreement." Id. § 7-80-708. The
roots of this problem are found in the almost verbatim adoption of section 32 of the
MBCA. Drafters of the Colorado quorum provision substituted "members" in a provision
which is tied to number of "shares." See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 32.
124. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7613 (Supp. 1990).
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INTRODUCTION
IN 1977 THE Wyoming legislature, authorized the creation of a
new form of business organization known as the limited liability
company ("LLC").1 Florida subsequently adopted the LLC with
legislation patterned after Wyoming's statute.' The LLC legisla-
tion in each state combined limited partnership and corporate pro-
visions drawn primarily from the Uniform Limited Partnership
Act ("ULPA")3 and the Model Business Corporation Act
("MBCA") .4
From a business planning standpoint, the LLC was created to
secure both the federal income tax advantages associated with
partnership status5 and state law limited liability for all partici-
pants in the venture.' These advantages indirectly presented po-
tential benefits to states permitting the organization of LLCs. The
Wyoming legislators were reportedly interested in pioneering the
new investment vehicle to lure business to their state. In addition,
Wyoming hoped to reap associated benefits from acting as the na-
tional haven for "tramp" LLCs that would bring their activities,
or at least their organizational activities, to Wyoming in order to
avail themselves of the LLC statute.7 The Florida statute-was sim-
1. See Wyo. STAT. §§ 17-15-101 to -136 (1977).
2. See FLA. STAT. §§ 608.401- 471 (Supp. 1989).
3. UNIF. LTD. PAP4TNERSHIP ACT, 6 U.L.A. 561 (1916).
4. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT (1969) (the 1969 version of the MBCA is cited
where the MBCA is compared with the Wyoming LLC since the 1969 version was in effect
when Wyoming drafted its LLC statute).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 349-56.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 61-78.
7. The Wyoming statute requires LLCs to maintain a registered office and registered
agent in the state. See Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-110 (1977). The registered office "may be, but
need not be, the same as its place of business." Id. The Wyoming statute also requires that
the articles of organization list "[t]he address of its principal place of business in the state
and the name and address of its registered agent in the state " Id. § 17-15-
107(a)(iv). While operations need not be conducted in Wyoming, a place of business must
be maintained:
Since the Act does not require that operations be conducted within the State of
Wyoming (the Act merely provides that a place of business and a registered
agent be maintained in the State) it was anticipated that interest in this form of
entity would be generated in all parts of the U.S. as occurred in response to the
attractiveness of the corporation laws of Delaware or Nevada for the organiza-
tion of corporate enterprises. The state would benefit through the generation of
revenues from the modest filing fees provided in the Act and the additional busi-
ness activity which would be generated through the organization of companies
under the Act and maintenance of nominal places of business and registered
agents in the state by such companies.
Burke & Sessions, The Wyoming Limited Liability Company: An Alternative to Sub S
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ilarly intended to attract business investment, especially from
Latin America.'
The Treasury Department frustrated the realization of these
anticipated benefits by its inconsistent treatment of the partner-
ship tax classification issue as it applied to the LLC.8 This incon-
sistency yielded uncertainty, and consequently few LLCs were
formed, leaving Wyoming and Florida as the sole sponsor states.1"
In 1988, however, the Internal Revenue Service ("I.R.S.") is-
sued Revenue Ruling 88-76, favorably classifying a Wyoming
LLC as a partnership for federal income tax purposes.1" This pro-
nouncement has renewed interest in the LLC 1 2 In addition, Colo-
rado and Kansas have recently enacted statutes authorizing the
creation of LLCs,13 and Indiana has provided for the registration
of LLCs from other jurisdictions.1 Like all tax conduit entities,
and Limited Partnerships?, 54 J. TAX'N 232, 235 (1981).
Section 12(a) of the MBCA also provides that the registered office "may be, but need
not be, the same as its place of business." MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 12(a) (1979).
The confusion created by Wyoming's statute is avoided because the articles of incorpora-
tion are not required to set forth the corporation's place of business. Only the address of its
initial registered office is required. See id. § 54(i). An LLC statute enacted in Colorado,
for example, requires only that the articles of organization state "if known, [the LLC's]
principal place of business." COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-204(1)(a) (Supp. 1990).
8. Comment, The Limited Liability Company Act, 11 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 387, 387
(1983) ("The LLC is similar to a business organization called the limitada which exists in
[Latin America]. It was thought that having a familiar business organization would attract
foreign investment." (footnote omitted)).
9. For an account of the Treasury's treatment of the LLC, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 301-48.
10. Two LLCs were reportedly formed under Florida law in the year following adop-
tion of the enabling legislation. See Comment, supra note 8, at 388. As of February 22,
1988, only 26 Wyoming LLCs had been formed. See Comment, The Wyoming Limited
Liability Company: A Viable Alternative to the S Corporation and the Limited Partner-
ship?, 23 LAND & WATER L. REV. 523, 523 (1988) (discussing the tax status and liability
protection aspects of the LLC form as adopted in Wyoming).
11. See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.
12. See, e.g., August & Shaw, The Limited Liability Company - A New Tax Ref-
uge? 7 J. TAX'N INVESTMENTS 179 (1990) (discussing the history, structure, and tax impli-
cations of the LLC,as an organizational form); Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A
Possible Choice for Doing Business?, 41 FLA. L. REV. 721 (1989) (discussing settlement of
the tax status of an LLC following the categorization of the entity as a partnership in
Revenue Ruling 88-76); Lederman, Miami Device: The Florida Limited Liability Com-
pany, 67 TAXES 339 (1989) (discussing the ease with which an LLC could be classified as a
partnership under Revenue Ruling 88-76).
13. See Colorado Limited Liability Company Act, COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-101
(Supp. 1990); Kansas Limited Liability Company Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7601 (Supp.
1990). LLC legislation has also been introduced in Michigan, House Bill No. 5464, 85th
Leg., 2d Sess. (1990), reprinted in 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 401 (March 16, 1990).
14. See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-16-10.1-1 to -10.1-4 (Burns Supp. 1990).
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alert to all of the relevant facts.2 so
However, this article has suggested reasons beyond the ex-
change-promise dichotomy for recognizing a category of fiduciary
relationships and especially for setting a limit on that concept.
Contracts will be made for fiduciary responsibilities by parties un-
til the costs of full disclosure to the fiduciary exceed the benefits
of receiving all the relevant information. 3 1 Costs of disclosure will
tend to exceed these benefits where the relationship offers opportu-
nities to! appropriate the social efficiencies of nondisclosure. Even
if those transactions, considered individually, conferred a $1000
benefit on one party at the expense of a $500 loss to the other, the
losing party would have an incentive to make those transactions a
part of the compensation package of the benefiting party Re-
moval of the fiduciary relationship would allow an arrangement of
the transactions that creates mutual benefit out of transactions
that, individually, were only Kaldor-Hicks efficient.
Beyond the narrow realm of fiduciary relationships, the law
of nondisclosure often refers to the customary morality of the
commercial community 232 For example, the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts requires one to disclose information "basic to the
transaction, if he knows that the other is about to enter into it
under a mistake as to them, and that the other, because of the
relationship between them, the customs of the trade or other ob-
jective circumstances, would reasonably expect a disclosure of
those facts. 233
"Reasonable expectations" is always a slippery concept, espe-
cially since the expectations of commercial parties are often a
230. See Levmore, supra note 150, at 135 (noting the problem that effort is wasted
learning information for one's own protection that someone else already possesses).
231. See Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 436 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting
that, to a certain extent, parties may define their obligation to disclose information), cert.
dismissed, 485 U.S. 901 (1988).
232. Consider, for example, the following:
The continuing development of modern business ethics has, however, limited to
some extent this privilege to take advantage of ignorance It is extremely
difficult to be specific as to the factors that give rise to this known, and reasona-
ble, expectation of disclosure. In general, the cases in which the rule stated in
Clause (e) has been applied have been those in which the advantage taken of the
plaintiff's ignorance is so shocking to the ethical sense of the community, and is
so extreme and unfair, as to amount to a form of swindling, in which the plain-
tiff is led by appearances into a bargain that is a trap, of whose essence and
substance he is unaware.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 comment 1 (1977).
233. Id. § 551(2)(e).
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function of the governing legal rules. It is tempting to conclude
that the "reasonable expectation" is the expectation that is in ac-
cordance with the better ethical view of a particular practice .1 4
Such a conclusion, however, would miss the epistemological gain
from deducing what pre-legal morality had actually evolved to
govern particular types of transactions. The general acceptance of
nondisclosure in a particular setting may be due to the presence of
one or more efficiencies. 23 5 Regarding nondisclosure as unethical
in another setting may result from an absence of opportunities for
efficient transactions in that setting.
In short, while the Kaldor-Hicks benefits from nondisclosure
practices will not always translate into mutual benefits, there is
not as dramatic a gap between these two efficiency concepts as
may at first appear Competition can convert Kaldor-Hicks effi-
ciency into mutual benefit, as can packaging transactions as long
term relationships. In contexts where nondisclosure appears likely
to generate efficiency gains, one might wish to have clear evidence
that the express terms or customary understandings of a particu-
lar trade called for full disclosure before declaring that the back-
ground rule permitting nondisclosure had been contractually
varied.23 6
B. Summarizing the Rules of Nondisclosure
The focus of this article, which has been on the benefits of
certain nondisclosure practices, should not be misinterpreted as a
theory that nondisclosure is generally unobjectionable. Rather, the
focus is a counterweight to a literature which is heavily oriented
toward condemning nondisclosure as tantamount to fraud. Be-
cause of this emphasis, however, the reasons that nondisclosure is
a highly suspect practice bear repeating.
Apart from its distributional effects, trading without disclos-
ure is a source of stark inefficiencies. If a homeowner is aware of
termite infestation or that a polluting factory will soon be operat-
234. Consider the ambiguity between description and prescription in the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts. See supra note 232.
235. See R. SUGDEN. THE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS, CO-OPERATION AND WELFARE 25-
29 (1986) (arguing that existing rules of morality are based on efficient strategies).
236. The relationship between the underlying case for a particular background rule,
or "default" rule, and the clarity of evidence that must be present to vary that rule is
explored in Ayres & Gertner, supra note 177, at 123 (The courts should "establish
'safeharbors' of contractual language that will be sufficient to reach contractual
outcomes.").
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On the other hand, advance consent for the admission of general
partners to a general partnership is enforceable. 147 The limited
partnership provisions in question require written consent to or
ratification of the "specific act"1481 or "specific written consent.' '1 4
9
The general partnership provisions require only the "consent of all
the partners."'150 The LLC statutes refer to "unanimous written
consent," so that comparing only the language itself might lead to
the conclusion that advance consent should be permitted. How-
ever, in the context of the general partnership provisions, the re-
sult is derived from the right of general partners to make agree-
ments about such matters, rather than a close reading of the
"consent of all partners" language.151 ULPA analogies aside, the
LLC statutes suggest a contemporaneous consent process by their
use of such language as "the member proposing to dispose," and
"do not approve of the proposed transfer or assignment," although
the critical issue is still whether the consent requirement is subject
to modification by agreement of the members. 52
narrow aspects of the advance consent. This advance consent restricted the identity of a
new general partner to an officer or director of the retiring general partner's corporate
affiliates. The new general partner was in fact such an officer. However, the general partner
could also have been any fiduciary under the general partner's will or under a trust instru-
ment or any other person receiving the consent of 60% of the Class A limited partner
interests. See Basile, supra, at 247.
147. See Basile, supra note 146, at 239-40. The UPA provides that "subject to any
agreement between them [n]o person can become a member of a partnership without
the consent of all the partners." UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 18(g) (1914). Advance consent
may not be as successful under a different reading of "consent of all the partners" as under
the phrase "any agreement between them." See Weil v. Diversified Properties, 319 F
Supp. 778 (D.D.C. 1970); Bricklin v. Stengol Corp., 1 Conn. App. 656, 667-68, 476 A.2d
584, 590 (1984) (holding that a new partner cannot be admitted to the partnership without
consent of the other partners unless the partnership agreement so provides).
148. UNiF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 9(l)(e); see supra note 146.
149. REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 401; see supra note 146.
150. UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(g) (1916).
151. See supra note 147.
152. For example, Wyoming's statute provides in part:
The interest of all members in a limited liability company constitutes the per-
sonal estate of the member, and may be transferred or assigned as provided in
the operating agreement. However, if all of the other members of the limited
liability company other than the member proposing to dispose of his or its inter-
est do not approve of the proposed transfer or assignment by unanimous written
consent, the transferee of the member's interest shall have no right to participate
in the management of the business and affairs of the limited liability company or
to become a member.
Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-122 (1977). The first sentence permits the operating agreement to
control such matters. It is unclear whether the second sentence overrides the first or if so,
whether the first sentence enables the directive of unanimous consent through members'
1991]
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Tiered ownership structures may mitigate problems with
LLC transfer restrictions. All current LLC statutes permit entities
such as partnerships, trusts, and corporations to function as LLC
members.15 The interests in an LLC may be held, for example,
by two limited partnerships. A transfer of LLC interests would
occur infrequently, if ever, while the interests in the member lim-
ited partnerships could be transferred under the more flexible lim-
ited partnership statutes. There are some drawbacks; for instance,
this structure requires the formation, operation, and management
of one or two other entities in addition to the LLC itself. Further-
more, the effect of this structure on the federal income tax classifi-
cation of the LLC is uncertain. 54
11. Admission of Additional Members
The Wyoming LLC statute does not address the issue of
whether additional members can be admitted to an LLC, for ex-
ample, to provide additional capital. Since assignees cannot be ad-
mitted without unanimous written consent, it follows that the ad-
mission of new members requires no less. However, this principle
may be undermined if the operating agreement can be amended
by a less than unanimous vote. 55 By comparison, the general part-
advance agreements.
153. In describing permissible members, the LLC statutes refer to the term "per-
son." The Wyoming statute defines "person" to include "individuals, general partnerships,
limited partnerships, limited liability companies, corporations, trusts, business trusts, real
estate investment trusts, estates and other associations." WYO. STAT. § 17-15-102(a)(iv).
Kansas's definition of person is identical to the Wyoming statute but mentions only
"trusts" and does not classify them as "business" or "real estate investment." See KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 17-7602(d) (Supp. 1990). Colorado's definition of person is also identical to
the Wyoming statute but omits real estate investment trusts and includes "government or
governmental subdivision or agency" as well as the catchall category "other legal entity."
See COLO. Rav. STAT. §§ 2-4-401(8), 7-80-102(12) (Supp. 1990). Florida defines "person"
to include "individuals, children, firms, associations, joint adventures, partnerships, estates,
trusts, business trusts, syndicates, fiduciaries, corporations, and all other groups or combi-
nations." FLA. STAT. § 1.01(3) (Supp. 1989). The LLC statute states that "person
means any of those entities listed in s. 1.01(3)." Id. § 608.402(4). Together these two
Florida provisions literally suggest the implausible result that only entities can form or be
members of a Florida LLC, since the LLC statute only refers to the entities listed in the
Florida code's definition of "person."
154. See nfra text accompanying notes 336-45 (discussing various private letter rul-
ings pertaining to the federal tax treatment of LLCs).
155. Both partnership agreements and LLC operating agreements are contracts.
Therefore, all parties must agree to any amendment. However, unanimity is not required if
the original agreement, to which all parties assented, provides for future amendments upon
a vote of a majority or supermajority. While such provisions have been upheld in the part-
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ners of a limited partnership can substitute or admit additional
limited partners if the certificate permits such action. 156
The Colorado LLC statute resolves this issue by prohibiting
the admission of additional members except "upon the written
consent of all members. 157 This requirement derives only in part
from the RULPA, and it is unclear whether advance or contempo-
raneous consent is required.1 58 The Florida and Kansas statutes
offer the most flexible treatment by simply providing that the arti-
cles of organization must describe "[t]he right, if given, of the
members to admit additional members and the terms and condi-
tions of the admissions."' 59
Existing members might circumvent the restrictions on ad-
mission of new members through the use of tiered ownership
structures. This approach is addressed in the transferability of in-
terests discussion immediately preceding this section.160 If, for ex-
ample, a limited partnership were utilized as one of the LLC
members, new limited partners could be admitted at that level
without disturbing the composition of the LLC. The uncertainty
nership context, they are subject to the interpretative problem of determining whether the
transaction in question was contemplated by the language of the particular advance agree-
ment. See Hooker, The Power of Limited Partners to Remove and Replace the General
Partner of a Limited Partnership, 19 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1 (1988) (noting that the limited
partners' ability to remove a general partner is a function of the limited partnership agree-
ment, which can be amended to circumvent its undesirable limitations).
156. Reading sections 2(l)(a)(X)-(XI), 8, 9(I)(f), and 19(4) of the ULPA together,
a general partner can admit additional limited partners if the certificate provides for this.
UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP AT §§ 2(i)(a)(X)-(XI), 8, 9(i)(f), 19(4) (1916) (sections per-
taining to the formation of a limited partnership; addition of limited partners; rights, pow-
ers, and liabilities of a general partner; and assignment of a limited partner's interest).
Sections 301 and 704 of the RULPA also permit the admission of additional or substitute
partners without the consent of all partners if the partnership agreement so permits. RE-
VISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 301, 704 (1985).
157. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-701.
158. The 1985 amendments to the RULPA eliminated the specific written consent
language. See supra text accompanying notes 146-54. The model statute now provides that
"additional general partners may be admitted as provided in writing in the partnership
agreement or, if the partnership agreement does not provide in writing for the admission of
additional general partners, with the written consent of all partners." REVISED UNIF. LTD.
PARTNERSHIP AcT § 401 (1985). The official comment states that the "partnership agree-
ment determines the procedure for authorizing the admission of additional partners, and
that the written consent of all partners is required only when the partnership agreement
fails to address the question." REVISED UN F. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 401 official com-
ment. The Colorado statute closely resembles the RULPA in providing only for unanimous
written consent. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-701 (Supp. 1990).
159. FLA. STAT. § 608.407 (1)(g) (Supp. 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7607(A)(7)
(Supp. 1990).
160. See supra text accompanying notes 153-54.
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of the federal income tax treatment of tiered organizations is dis-
cussed later in this article.
1 61
12. Dissolution
a. Events of Dissolution
Under the Wyoming statute, an LLC is dissolved:
(i) When the period fixed for the duration of the limited liability
company shall expire ["fixed duration"];
(ii) By the unanimous written agreement of all members
["agreement"]; or
(iii) Upon the death, retirement, resignation, expulsion, bank-
ruptcy, dissolution of a member or occurrence of any other event
which terminates the continued membership of a member in the
limited liability company, unless the business of the limited lia-
bility company is continued by the consent of all the remaining
members under a right to do so stated in the articles of organi-
zation of the limited liability company ["specified events"] .162
The first provision's maximum time period for fixed duration
of an LLC has been determined to be thirty years. 113 The second
provision's meaning is clear. The third provision is the most criti-
cal because of its importance to the federal income tax classifica-
tion of the entity The importance of this provision is a strong
disincentive to experimentation. Thus, the events of dissolution set
forth in all four LLC statutes are identical.1'6  The described
events expand on the events of dissolution enumerated in the
ULPA,16 5 and their scope approaches the number of general part-
ner withdrawal events that prompt a dissolution under the
RULPA, 66 but the partnership definition of the term "dissolu-
tion" is not included in any of the LLC statutes.167
161. See infra text accompanying notes 336-45.
162. Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-123(a) (1977). For federal income tax purposes, the part-
nership is not terminated until the partnership affairs are completely wound up. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.708-1(b)(iii)(a) (1956).
163. See supra text accompanying notes 53-60 (discussing the duration of LLCs).
164. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-801(1) (Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. § 608.441(1)
(Supp. 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7622 (Supp. 1990); WYo. STAT. § 17-15-123(a); see
also infra text accompanying notes 318-45.
165. See UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP AcT §§ 9(1)(g), 20 (1916) (general partners may
not continue the business on the death, retirement, or insanity of a general partner unless
the right is granted in the certificate).
166. See REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP AcT §§ 402, 801 (1985) (stating general
conditions and circumstances under which one ceases to be a general partner).
167. The UPA defines the dissolution of a partnership as "the change in the relation
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The LLC is subject to dissolution upon the occurrence of any
of the specified events with respect to any of its members. By com-
parison, a limited partnership risks dissolution only for events con-
cerning general partners. For example, the death or bankruptcy of
a limited partner is of no consequence to the continued legal exis-
tence of the limited partnership.168
The resemblance of the LLC's dissolution provisions to those
of the partnership acts results from the goal of achieving a part-
nership classification for federal income tax purposes. The Colo-
rado LLC statute represents the most complete adoption of tradi-
tional partnership attributes, including the troublesome power of a
general partner to withdraw at any time and cause a dissolution of
the partnership. The Colorado statute permits any member to dis-
solve the LLC at any time by withdrawing from the LLC, but the
withdrawing member may be liable for damages if the action vio-
lates the operating agreement.16 9 The other LLC statutes refer to
the "resignation" of members as an event triggering dissolution,
but the power of withdrawal resembles the much narrower power
accorded to limited partners, which can be restricted in the par-
ties' agreement.17 0 Many participants would probably not other-
wise desire broad dissolubility of their business entity, and many
of the legal principles underlying the fragile continuity of partner-
ships arguably do not apply to the LLC.171
of the partners caused by any partner ceasing to be associated in the carrying on as distin-
guished from the winding up of the business." UNIV. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 29 (1914). As
demonstrated in the Appendix, infra p. 497-500, if dissolution occurs without a continua-
tion of the LLC, a corporate style of dissolution patterned after the MBCA is followed. For
example, a statement of intent to dissolve must be filed, followed by the articles of dissolu-
tion. The asset distribution scheme, however, is derived from the ULPA and'the RULPA.
See UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP AT § 23; REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 804.
168. See UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP AT §§ 20 (all events of dissolution refer only to
general partners), 21 (on death of limited partner, the executor or administrator has all the
rights of a limited partner); REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 801 (all events of
withdrawal refer only to general partners).
169. See CoLo. REV. STAT. § 7-80-602 (Supp. 1990). This Colorado provision is pat-
terned after REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP AT § 602.
170. The Florida and Wyoming statutes, for example, adopt the provisions of UNIF.
LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 16 (1916) permitting a member to demand the return of his or
her contribution after six months prior written notice where the time for the dissolution of
the limited partnership is not specified. See FLA. STAT. § 608.427 (Supp. 1989); Wyo.
STAT. § 17-15-121 (1977).
171. Professor Hillman questions the validity of the commonly offered justifications
for the free dissolubility of partnerships. See Hillman, Indissoluble Partnerships, 37 FLA.
L. REV. 691 (1985). Free dissolubility draws support from characterizing partnerships as
close, personal relationships that should not be maintained against the will of a partner.
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b. Continuation of the LLC Business
An LLC's risk of dissolution for the broad range of events
described above is potentially mitigated by the LLC statute's au-
thorization of continuation provisions. The Wyoming statute de-
scribed above requires the consent of all remaining members to
continue under a continuation right stated in the articles of organ-
ization. 7 2 The Colorado statute differs slightly, requiring that any
decision to continue be made within ninety days after the event of
dissolution.17  The Florida and Kansas statutes permit continua-
tion upon the consent of all remaining members or under a contin-
uation right stated in the articles of organization. 74 The latter al-
ternative presents some tax entity classification issues. 171
Excluding the Florida and Kansas provisions, which permit con-
tinuation under a right stated in the articles of organization,"7 6 the
LLC statutes all require the unanimous consent of the remaining
members to continue.17 7 This type of continuation provision would
seem most appropriate for small, closely knit investor groups. The
Free dissolubility also rests on the mutual agency aspects of partnerships that give a single
partner the power to act on behalf of all partners, thus rendering other members jointly
and severally liable. Id. at 699. Even assuming that this rationale is appropriate for part-
nerships, it does not necessarily apply to LLCs. While LLC members might share a close
relationship, the agency aspects of an LLC are not as persuasive. Although Kansas, Flor-
ida, and Wyoming permit LLC members to act on behalf of the LLC, the members lose
this authority if the managers are elected. See FLA. STAT. § 608.422; KAN. STAT. ANN. §
17-7612 (Supp. 1990); WYO. STAT. § 17-15-116. Moreover, in a Colorado LLC, the man-
agers retain such authority in all events, while the members have no opportunity to exercise
it. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-401(1). Finally, unlike members of a partnership who risk
joint and several liability for partnership obligations, members of an LLC are not person-
ally liable for entity obligations. See id. § 7-80-705; FLA. STAT. § 608.436; KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 17-7619; WYO. STAT. § 17-15-113. Elsewhere Professor Hillman has argued that
free dissolubility is inappropriate for a close corporation. See Hillman, The Dissatisfied
Participant in the Solvent Business Venture: A Consideration of the Relative Permanence
of Partnerships and Close Corporations, 67 MINN. L. REv. 1, 87 (1982).
172. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
173. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-801(1)(c). This 90 day requirement is patterned
after the REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 801 (1985).
174. See FLA. STAT. § 608.441(1)(c); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7622(A)(3).
175. The right to continue under the articles of organization resembles the authority
that can be given to the general partner in the certificate of a partnership formed under the
ULPA. See UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 9(l)(g) (1916). This provision probably bears
adverse tax entity classification consequences. See infra text accompanying notes 318-45
(discussing the I.R.S.'s position on continuity of life).
176. See supra note 174.
177. COLO. REV. STAT. 7-80-801(c) (Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. § 608.441(1)(c)
(Supp. 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7622(A)(3) (Supp. 1990); WYo. STAT. § 17-15-123
(1977).
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continuation provisions of the ULPA178 and the RULPA, 179 by
comparison, require the consent of all members only when no
other general partners remain. A more feasible approach under
the LLC statute would be to permit continuation after an event of
dissolution based on the managers' discretion. However, this ap-
proach would require amendments to the LLC statute and might
alter the federal income tax consequences associated with LLC
statutes.180
Another issue requiring additional consideration is whether
the risk of LLC dissolution can be limited further through ad-
vance consent or advance agreements to continue. The effect of
such contractual continuation agreements on federal income tax
entity characterization is discussed later in this article.1 81 The im-
mediate state law issue is whether such continuation or high con-
tinuity agreements are permissible under the LLC statute.
178. UNIE. LTD. PARTNERSHIP AcT §§ 9(1)(g), 20.
179. REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 801 (1985).
180. In Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-1 C.B. 798, the I.R.S. announced its intention to rule
that a partnership has continuity of life if less than a majority in interest of the limited
partners can elect a new general partner to continue the partnership. Assuming that man-
agers are analogous to general partners of a limited partnership the managers would need
to represent at least a majority of member interests to satisfy this requirement. The I.R.S.
appears to have encouraged this analogy: "References to 'general partners' and 'limited
partners' apply also to comparable members of an organization not designated as a part-
nership under controlling law and documents; the "general partners" of such an organiza-
tion will ordinarily be those with significant management authority relative to the other
members." Id. Moreover, Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-10-027 (Dec. 7, 1989) and Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-
29-019 (April 19, 1990) establish that an LLC must satisfy the requirements of Rev. Proc.
89-12, specifically sections 4.01 and 4.03. Many of those requirements (excluding the lim-
ited liability guidelines, which do not apply to an LLC according to Gen. Couns. Mem.
39,798 (Oct. 24, 1989)) are based on distinctions between general and limited partners.
In Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-30-013 (April 25, 1990), an LLC comprised of only two corpo-
rate members with shared management was excluded from section 4 of Rev. Proc. 89-12,
which contains substantive requirements based on distinctions between general and limited
partners. See infra note 312. In Rev. Rul. 88-79, 1988-2 C.B. 361, the I.R.S. classified a
Missouri business trust as a partnership. The I.R.S. found that the trust did not-have con-
tinuity of life even though continuation of the trust after dissolution required only a major-
ity vote of its members and a unanimous vote of its remaining managers. Similarly, this
ruling permitted the admission of transferees of trust interests as new beneficiaries with the
consent of only the managers. See supra note 145. The holding of Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-10-027
that a majority vote of members to continue results in continuity of life, creating adverse
tax entity classification consequences, belies the analogy of member-managers to general
partners suggested in these private letter rulings. Nevertheless, the result in Rev. Rul. 88-
79 and the private letter rulings may be harmonized by noting that the member-managers
in the private letter rulings did not retain the veto power over continuation wielded by the
business trust managers in the revenue ruling.
181. See infra text accompanying notes 318-45.
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It is well established that the partners of a general partner-
ship can agree in advance that the business of the partnership will
be continued after events that would otherwise dissolve and re-
quire the winding up and liquidation of the partnership.182 The
continuation language of the LLC statute is apparently a conjunc-
tion of the disjunctive language of ULPA § 20. Section 20 pro-
vides for the dissolution of a limited partnership upon the retire-
ment, death, or insanity of a general partner "unless the business
is continued by the remaining general partners (a) [u]nder a right
to do so stated in the certificate, or (b) [w]ith the consent of all
members. 18 3
The RULPA continuation provision similarly emphasizes
continuation by the general partners, and only when there is a
default as to this provision is it necessary that "all partners agree
in writing to continue the business of the limited partnership and
to the appointment of one or more additional general partners if
necessary or desired.18 4 The RULPA provision prefaces the
agreement by all partners with the phrase "if, within 90 days after
the withdrawal,"18 5 suggesting that the consent must follow the
event of dissolution. The Colorado LLC statute also incorporates
this language. 86
Some commentators have implied that under the unanimous
consent provisions of both the ULPA and the RULPA, a lone dis-
senter could prevent the continuation of the partnership.8 7 How-
ever, this commentary does not consider the effect of advance con-
sent or continuation agreements. 88 The failure to address this
182. See generally A. BROMBERG & L. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON
PARTNERSHIP § 7.13(i) (1988 & Supp. 1989) (continuation agreements may establish the
price of an outgoing partner's interest); Bromberg, Partnership Dissolution - Causes.
Consequences, and Cures, 43 TEx. L. REV. 631, 647-59 (1965) (discussing alternatives for
dealing with the interest of the withdrawing member).
183. UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 20 (1916).
184. REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 801(3) (1985).
185. Id.
186. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-801(i)(c) (Supp. 1990).
187. See, e.g., Hecker, The Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act: Provisions
Governing Financial Affairs, 46 Mo. L. REV. 577, 611 (1981) ("The more serious problem
that exists under the 1916 Act, the ability of a single dissenter to prevent continuation of
the business unless there are both a remaining general partner and a right to continue
stated in the certificate, is not rectified by the 1976 Act.").
188. See, e.g., Kessler, The New Uniform Limited Partnership Act: A Critique, 48
FORDHAM L. REV. 159, 179 (1979) ("The dissolution article is not without problems, how-
ever. Section 801(3) provides for a ninety-day period after an event of withdrawal during
which all partners may agree in writing to the continuation of the business. The effect of
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issue may reflect the fact that, if continuation were addressed in
writing in advance, it probably would be accomplished by empow-
ering the general partners to continue the partnership in either the
certificate or partnership agreement rather than by obtaining the
advance consent of all partners.
The foregoing discussion is based on the interpretations of the
partnership continuation provisions from which the LLC provi-
sions were derived. The partnership analogy may be overstated
due to the hybrid nature of the LLC, but the language of the
LLC statute alone suggests that advance consent was not contem-
plated, except in the provisions of the Florida and Kansas statutes,
which present tax entity classification difficulties."8 9 The continua-
tion of a Wyoming or Colorado LLC requires both a right to con-
tinue stated in the operating agreement and the consent of all re-
maining members.190 The right to continue contained in the
operating agreement must, of necessity, have been agreed to in
advance, and the operating agreement must be signed by all mem-
bers.1 9' Thus, if the advance consent was also included in the op-
erating agreement signed by all members, the requirement of
unanimous consent to continue would be met. However, if the con-
sent requirement is satisfied by inclusion in and integration with
the operating agreement, the two requirements merge, rendering
the consent requirement surplusage. In a departure from the
RULPA and the ULPA, the consent of all members is not a
fallback provision operating in the absence of a written agree-
ment; there can be no continuation of the LLC unless the power
to continue is provided in advance in the operating agreement.192
A very strict construction of the LLC statute further suggests that
if the consent cannot be part of the operating agreement, it cannot
precede the event of dissolution or it would, by definition, become
part of the operating agreement. 93
this section is to create an extended limbo period during which it is uncertain whether the
partnership will continue."). Professor Basile also seems to imply that RULPA envisions
contemporary consent. See Basile, supra note 146, at 243-44 (noting that the circum-
stances under which such consent is necessary are so remote that the requirement should
never be a serious burden on a limited partnership).
189. See supra notes 174-75.
190. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-801(c); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-123 (1977).
191. See COLO REV. STAT. § 7-80-203 (Supp. 1990) (formation); Id. § 7-80-204
(articles of organization); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-106 (formation); Id. § 17-15-107 (articles
of organization).
192. See supra text accompanying note 190.
193. An operating agreement is defined as "any valid written agreement of the mem-
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With the exception of the uncertain status of the LLC in
nonadopting jurisdictions,194 continuity of existence is the most
significant LLC state law concern. The confusion seems to be the
unintended result of adopting language drafted for limited part-
nerships, which are not entirely similar, rather than a clear legis-
lative desire to preclude advance consent. By analogy to general
partnership law, which permits advance continuation agree-
ments,"95 there is a clear, practical need for advance agreements
concerning continuation, and no apparent state law policy consid-
erations to preclude such advance arrangements. 96 Nevertheless,
since this particular aspect of the LLC is crucial to the determina-
tion of income tax classification, discussed in Part III of this arti-
cle, the I.R.S.'s response to continuation agreements will shape
these agreements far more than state law considerations.
c. Tiered Ownership Structures
As discussed above, tiered ownership structures can minimize
the impact of the transfer and new member admission limitations
of the LLC. 97 Tiered ownership can be still more effective in re-
ducing the hazards of dissolution if the LLC members do not ob-
ject to the difficulties attending the proliferation of multilayered
entities.
For example, assume that two separate individual investor
groups are assembled by two promoters. If all the investors be-
come LLC members, the LLC will be dissolved upon the death or
bankruptcy of any one of them. Moreover, the Colorado statute
dissolves the LLC upon the resignation of any member.'98 If, how-
bers as to the affairs of a limited liability company and the conduct of its business." COLO.
REV. STAT. § 7-80-102(1i).
194. See infra text accompanying notes 217-64.
195. See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
196. The validity of an advance agreement may be subject to several exceptions. In
Phillips v. Kula 200, 2 Haw. App. 206, 629 P.2d 119 (1981), the court rejected the general
partners' contention that a provision permitting the amendment of the partnership agree-
ment by a 75 % vote of limited partner units could be utilized to cure a breach of fiduciary
duty by the general partners. Id. at 210- 11, 629 P.2d at 122-23. In Day v. Sidley & Aus-
tin, 394 F Supp. 986 (D.D.C. 1975), affid sub. nom. Day v. Avery, 548 F.2d 1018, 1028
(D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 908 (1977), a general partner unsuccessfully as-
serted that a less than majority amendment provision did not contemplate the action in
question. The circumscribed events of dissolution to which the advance continuation agree-
ments would apply did not suggest fiduciary duty, overbreadth, or frustration of general
public policy considerations. 394 F Supp. at 993-94.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 153-54 & 160-61.
198. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-801(c) (Supp. 1990).
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ever, each promoter forms a limited partnership comprised of his
or her investor group, the only members of the LLC will be the
two limited partnerships, allowing the two promoters to act as the
managers of the LLC.199 Only the dissolution of one of the limited
partnerships will dissolve the LLC, with resignation or expulsion
unlikely A limited partnership is generally unaffected by events
occurring with respect to its limited partners, consequently, the
occasions for dissolution are limited primarily to events pertaining
to the general partners.2"'
Even if such events of dissolution occur, the remaining gen-
eral partner(s) may continue the member limited partnership
under the RULPA. °1 If a structure enlisting multiple general
partners is not possible or practical, a single corporate general
partner reduces the potential of dissolution by reason of death.
However, if a corporate general partner is utilized, such that no
partner is personally liable for the partnership's debts or obliga-
tions, the LLC is redundant, providing limited liability coextensive
with that already in place. Consequently, the most plausible case
of a tiered arrangement occurs where the promoter continues as
an individual general partner of the member limited partnership.
The risk of dissolution of the member limited partnership, and in
turn the LLC, remains limited to events pertaining to the general
partner or general partner group, and the individual general part-
ners obtain limited liability through the LLC. The effect of such
arrangements on the federal income tax classification of the LLC
is unclear. 2
Given the number of entities created under the tiered owner-
ship structure, a limited partnership utilizing an LLC general
partner might provide a simpler alternative. This structure would
provide limited liability for all, while avoiding the state law disad-
vantages of the LLC with respect to the majority of investors who
would be limited partners. However, in business endeavors involv-
ing only a limited number of investors, the-state law burdens im-
posed through dissolution and transfer of interest restrictions may
199. Under Colorado's statute, which limits managers to natural persons, limited
partnerships could not be the managers. See id. § 7-80-401(2). The Florida, Kansas, and
Wyoming, statutes do not expressly limit management to natural persons. See FLA. STAT. §
608.422 (Supp. 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7612 (Supp. 1990); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-116
(1977).
200. See supra text accompanying notes 165-68.
201. REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 801(4) (1985).
202. See tnfra text accompanying notes 336-45.
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not be sufficient to warrant the use of tiered or hybrid
structures.
20 3
13. Survival of Actions after Dissolution
The LLC statutes incorporate the language of MBCA § 93,
which states that "the existence of the corporation shall cease, ex-
cept for the purpose of suits, other proceedings and appropriate
corporate action by shareholders, directors and officers as provided
in this Act. 20 4 Section 93 refers to MBCA § 105, which provides
for survival of remedies available to or against the corporation, its
directors, officers, or shareholders if the action or proceeding is
commenced within two years after dissolution.205 The Colorado,
Kansas, and Wyoming LLC statutes refer to "suits, other pro-
ceedings and appropriate action as provided in this act"; 206 the
Florida statute is similar but refers to "this chapter. ' 207 However,
all the LLC statutes are deficient insofar as they copy the MBCA
§ 93 language referring to other operative provisions without in-
cluding them.
14. Derivative Actions
The Florida, Kansas, and Wyoming statutes establish that a
member of an LLC is not a proper party to a proceeding by or
203. The LLC statutes impose several burdens. All four LLC statutes provide for the
dissolution of the company upon the death, retirement, resignation, expulsion, or bank-
ruptcy of any member, unless all the remaining members agree to continue the business.
See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text. Furthermore, if an LLC interest is trans-
ferred or assigned, the transferee does not have the right to participate in management or
become a member unless all the other members, excluding the transferor, consent to the
transfer. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
204. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 93 (1979).
205. See id. § 105.
206. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 7-80-807(2) (Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-
7627(b) (Supp. 1990); WYO. STAT. § 17-15-128(b) (1977). The Wyoming statute specifies
that upon the issuance of the certificate of dissolution:
The existence of the company shall cease, except for the purpose of suits, other
proceedings and appropriate action as provided in this act. The manager or man-
agers in office at the time of dissolution, or the survivors of them, shall thereafter
be trustees for the members and creditors of the dissolved limited liability com-
pany and as such shall have authority to distribute any company property dis-
covered after dissolution, convey real estate and take such other action as may
be necessary on behalf of and in the name of such dissolved limited liability
company."
Id.
207. FLA. STAT. § 608.446(2) (Supp. 1989).
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against an LLC, except in proceedings to enforce a member's
rights against or liabilities to the LLC. 08 This provision follows
ULPA § 26,209 which some courts have interpreted as barring de-
rivative suits by limited partners. 10 The Colorado LLC statute
omits this provision as well as the express derivative action provi-
sions introduced by the RULPA,21' which leaves open the ques-
tion of whether derivative action law suits are available in the
LLC context.21 2
15. Foreign and Interstate Commerce
The Wyoming statute "shall apply to commerce with foreign
nations and among the several states only as permitted by law ",213
This language derives from MBCA § 148, which refers to "the
provisions of the Constitution of the United States," 2114 rather than
"by law" The purpose of this provision is to make "it clear that
the Model Act applies to interstate commerce so far as permitted
by the Constitution of the United States. 21 5
Recognition of the LLC outside its state of domicile is a
greater concern, because of the limited number of states that rec-
ognize this organizational form. The uncertain status of entities in
foreign jurisdictions is not unique to the LLC. It remains a funda-
mental issue for limited partnerships formed under the ULPA2 16
208. See id. § 608.462; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7631; Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-130.
209. See UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 26 (1916) (identifying parties who may
bring actions against the partnership). This language was one of many issues in the debate
over whether derivative suits are permitted in a partnership formed under the ULPA. See
Hecker, Limited Partners' Derivative Suits Under the Revised Uniform Limited Partner-
ship Act, 33 VAND. L. REV. 343, 351-53 (1980) (discussing possible interpretations of sec-
tion 26).
210. See, e.g., Bedolla v. Logan & Frazier, 52 Cal. App. 3d I 18, 128, 125 Cal. Rptr.
59, 66-67 (1975); Amster v. American Home Assurance Co., 348 So. 2d 68 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 358 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 1977); Millard v. Newmark & Co., 24 A.D.2d
333, 336, 266 N.Y.S.2d 254, 259 (1966); Lieberman v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 62 Wash.
2d 922, 385 P.2d 53 (1963).
211. See REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 1001-04 (1985) (detailing re-
quirements for derivative actions).
212. Colorado's statute permits the members to seek an accounting, which can
achieve some of the same objectives as a derivative suit based on member or manager
actions or omissions. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 7-80-712(c) (Supp. 1990).
213. Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-135 (1977).
214. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AT § 148 (1969).
215. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AT ANN. § 148 2 comment (2d ed. 1971).
216. This problem prompted amendments to the ULPA.
Article 9 of the 1976 & 1985 Acts deals with one of the thorniest questions for
those who operate limited partnerships in more than one state, i.e., the status of
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and for business trusts seeking to do business outside of Massa-
chusetts.217 The many aspects of this issue, as applied to the LLC,
are discussed below
a. Registering the LLC in Foreign Jurisdictions
The Wyoming statute gives each LLC the authority to "con-
duct its business, carry on its operations and have and exercise the
powers granted by this act in any state, territory, district or pos-
session of the United States, or in any foreign country ",218 In or-
der to do business in jurisdictions other than the state of forma-
tion, the LLC must first have authority from the state of
formation. This requirement is met by a statutory enabling act,
such as the Wyoming provision. 219 The presence of constitutional
or statutory provisions permitting foreign entities to do business in
the host or "forum" jurisdiction must also be examined when as-
sessing an LLC's ability to do business outside its state of forma-
tion. In that regard, only the Colorado and Kansas LLC statutes,
and a separate provision under Indiana law, provide express proce-
dures for the registration of LLCs formed under the laws of other
jurisdictions.220 By comparison, the RULPA 21 and the MBCA222
the partnership in a state other than the state of its organization. Neither case
law under the 1916 Act nor administrative practice made it clear which state's
law governed the partnership or whether, in that other state, the limited partners
continued to possess limited liability.
REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT prefatory note at 229 (1985); O'Neal, supra note
75, at 690 (discussing the current legal approach to the issue of limited partnerships in
states where the partnership was not organized). At least 44 states and the District of
Columbia have enacted the 1976 version of the RULPA and many have also adopted the
1985 amendments as well. REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT, Table of Jurisdictions
Wherein Act Has Been Adopted, 6 U.L.A. 226-27 (Supp. 1990).
217. See Note, Conflict of Laws: Choice of Law and the Foreign Real Estate Invest-
ment Trust, 26 OKLA. L. REv. 395 (1973) [hereinafter Note, Conflict of Laws] (examining
the uncertainty of how business trusts are treated by foreign jurisdictions); Note, The Real
Estate Investment Trust in Multistate Activity, 48 VA. L. REV. 1125 (1962) [hereinafter
Note, Multistate Activity] (discussing difficulties business trusts encounter when trying to
do business outside their home state).
218. Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-104(a)(viii) (1977). The Colorado and Florida statutes
contain similar provisions. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-104(h) (Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. §
608.404(7) (Supp. 1989).
219. "It is elementary that a corporation is a creature of the law and that it has no
authority to exercise in another state or country any powers which its charter does not
confer upon it, either expressly or impliedly " 17 W FLETCHER. CYCLOPEDIA OF THE
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 8317 (rev. perm. ed. 1987).
220. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-80-901 to -913 (extensively outlining the require-
ments for foreign LLCs). Florida's statute implies that foreign LLCs will be admitted to
Florida because the name restrictions apply to "a foreign limited liability company, author-
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offer such provisions to foreign limited partnerships and foreign
corporations, respectively In the absence of specific statutory ac-
ceptance by foreign jurisdictions, an LLC might attempt to regis-
ter under foreign limited partnership or foreign corporation stat-
utes. While meeting the foreign limited partnership definitions
would be difficult, 223 an LLC might be able to register under state
corporation statutes.224
The issuance of a certificate of authority memorializes suc-
cessful registration in a foreign jurisdiction. With a certificate of
authority, "the corporation shall be authorized to transact busi-
ness in this State for those purposes set forth in its application. '225
ized to transact business in this state." FLA. STAT. § 608.406(i). Colorado's statute defines
"[floreign limited liability company" as "a limited liability company formed under the
laws of any jurisdiction other than this jurisdiction." COLO. REV. STAT. § 70-80-102(6).
This provision is meaningless unless other states name these entities LLCs. Florida, Kan-
sas, and Wyoming have named them LLCs, and other states are likely to do so as well. See
FLA. STAT. § 608.401; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7601 (Supp. 1990); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-101.
However, it is unclear whether an examination of the substance of an entity with such a
name is required. The Kansas statute permits the registration of a "foreign limited liability
company" but fails to define the term. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-7636 to -7644. Indiana
is unique in that it permits foreign LLCs to register to do business in Indiana even though
it does not itself allow the formation of LLCs. See IND. CODE §§ 23-16-10.1 to -10.1-4
(1990); see also supra note 14.
221. See REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 902-08 (1985).
222. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT §§ 106-24 (1979).
223. The RULPA defines the term "foreign limited partnership" as "a partnership
formed under the laws of any state other than this State and having as partners one or
more general partners and one or more limited partners." REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNER-
SHiP ACT § 101(4). An LLC does not have partners, or differentiated interests correspond-
ing to general or limited partners. All members enjoy immunity from liability for the obli-
gations of the entity. For federal income tax purposes, however, the management control
exercised by member-managers may liken them to the general partners of a limited part-
nership. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
224. The MBCA defines the term "foreign corporation" as "a corporation for profit
organized under laws other than the laws of this State for a purpose or purposes for which
a corporation may be organized under this Act." MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 2(b). The
RMBCA is broader. "'Foreign corporation' means a corporation for profit incorporated
under a law other than the law of this state." REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT §
1.40(10) (1984). The definitions of corporation in both the 1969 and 1984 Model Business
Corporation Acts are circular, defining a corporation to be a corporation. The authors have
not exhaustively reviewed the corporation laws of all states. Other authors, dealing with
proper names of foreign corporations for registration, suggest that the GmbH, the limitada,
and other foreign entities, might be registered as foreign corporations. See H. HENN & J.
ALEXANDER, supra note 42, § 136, at 321 n.8. The similarity of the LLC to those entities
might provide some basis for registration. See supra note 218 and accompanying text. In
some cases the unincorporated business trust was treated as a corporation. See, e.g., State
v. United Royalty Co., 188 Kan. 443, 460, 363 P.2d 397, 409 (1961) (foreign business
trust treated as a corporation).
225. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 112. This discussion assumes that the LLC has
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Moreover, "[a] qualified foreign corporation usually enjoys in the
jurisdiction where qualified such powers as are permitted by the
laws of the jurisdiction of its incorporation but no greater powers
than domestic corporations formed for the business set forth in the
application. 226
Registration of the LLC in a foreign jurisdiction may be ad-
vantageous for other reasons. It not only affords any protection of
LLC status gained by registration but also helps to avoid the im-
position of penalties if such registration is required. The RMBCA,
for example, levies civil penalties and bars a foreign entity from
maintaining civil actions if it does business without a certificate of
authority 221
b. Conflict of Laws in General
In the case of an LLC, a conflict might arise between a stat-
ute of the forum state prohibiting LLCs and the LLC enabling
legislation of the state of formation. If no LLC statute exists in
the forum state, then an examination of its public policy toward
LLCs will be weighed against the enabling legislation of the state
of formation. In the first situation, some suggest that states can
interstate activities that subject it to regulation by the foreign jurisdiction. The constitu-
tional aspects of doing business in a given jurisdiction, for purposes of personal jurisdiction,
regulation, or taxation, are beyond the scope of this article. See generally H. HENN & J.
ALEXANDER, supra note 42, §§ 96-101 (discussing constitutional aspects involved in the
selection of jurisdiction).
226. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 42, § 136, at 323. This language finds
its origin in REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 15.05(b). California and New York,
however, apply provisions of their own corporate statutes to certain foreign corporations
doing business in the respective states, extending to traditional internal affairs. See CAL.
CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 1977 & Supp. 1990); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1317-20 (Mc-
Kinney 1986 & Supp. 1990); Halloran & Hammer, Section 2115 of the New California
General Corporation Law - The Application of California Corporation Law to Foreign
Corporations, 23 UCLA L. REV. 1282 (1976) (discussing application of California's law to
foreign corporations); Oldham, California Regulates Pseudo-Foreign Corporations -
Trampling Upon the Tramp?, 17 SANTA CLARA L. RaV. 85 (1977) (discussing applicabil-
ity and resulting hardship of California's law to foreign corporations); Comment, Califor-
nia s Statutory Attempt to Regulate Foreign Corporations: Will It Survive the Commerce
Clause?, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 943 (1979) (discussing constitutional limitations on the
California law). For further discussion of these issues, including the constitutional aspects,
see R. LEFLAR, L. McDOUGAL & R. FELIX, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW, 707-13 (4th ed.
1986).
227. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 15.02. See generally R. LEFLAR. L.
McDOUGAL & R. FELIX, supra note 226, § 254, at 703-05 (discussing the enforceability of
these provisions).
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absolutely prohibit the entry of foreign entities,228 but once they
are permitted to enter they are entitled to certain constitutional
protections.2 If the foreign entity engages solely in interstate
commerce, then only reasonable restrictions in the exercise of the
forum state's police power are constitutionally permissible.2 30 In
the absence of LLC legislation in the forum state, the question of
the LLC's status would probably arise in the context of facts con-
nected with the forum state, such as a debt, contract claim, or
claim of liability arising from tortious conduct. In such an event, a
court will base its choice of law on general conflict of laws princi-
ples. 231 A third party claimant who asserts that the LLC is invalid
in the forum state therefore raises unsettled choice-of-law issues.
In dealing with foreign corporations, the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Conflict of Laws ("Second Restatement") provides that
"[i]ncorporation by one state will be recognized by other
states. ' 23 2 The Second Restatement further establishes that the
law of the state of incorporation will be applied to "determine the
existence and extent of a shareholder's liability to the corporation
for assessments or contributions and to its creditors for corporate
debts. 233 Other "internal affairs" of the corporation are governed
by the law of the state of incorporation, unless another state has a
more significant interest.2 34 The relatively specific rules for corpo-
228. R. LEFLAR, L. McDOUGAL & R. FELIX, supra note 226, § 251, at 696 n.6.
229. Id. at 709-13 (noting that these constitutional safeguards prevent a state from
imposing substantial burdens on foreign corporations or excluding foreign corporations en-
gaged in interstate commerce).
230. Id.
231. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 301 (1971) ("The rights
and liabilities of a corporation with respect to a third person that arise from a corporate act
of a sort that can likewise be done by an individual are determined by the same choice-of-
law principles as are applicable to non-corporate parties.").
232. Id. § 297.
233. Id. § 307.
234. Id. § 302. This section establishes the general rule that the law of the state of
incorporation will apply except where some other state has a more significant relationship
to the occurrence and the parties. This would arise, for example, where a corporation incor-
porated in one state does a significant portion of its business in the forum state. "All the
basic rights and duties of all the stockholders (or members) of any corporate entity, be-
tween themselves and toward the entity, ought to be governed by the same law, which has
to be the law of the (or a) place in which the corporate existence was created and is
centered." R. LEFLAR, L. McDOUGAL & R. FELIX, supra note 226, § 60, at 181-82. The
quoted passage refers to a qualifying footnote that states: "A difficulty exists as to corpora-
tions formally organized in one state, perhaps Delaware, but having their principal place of
business and all of their major activities centered elsewhere. Probably as to these the state
of 'commercial domicile' rather than that of incorporation should be looked to." R. LEFLAR.
L. McDOUGAL & R. FELIX, supra note 226, § 60, at 182 n.2 (citing Latty, Pseudo-Foreign
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rations are, however, subject to general conflict-of-laws principles,
including consideration of "the relevant policies of the forum
"1235 This volatile public policy exception figures prominently
in the application of comity discussed below 236
Even assuming, public policy aside, that a court would em-
brace all relevant directives of the Second Restatement, those di-
rectives apply only to corporations,
[o]ther forms of organization are ignored because (1) to date,
they have engaged the attention of the courts only rarely in the
field of choice of law and (2) to the extent that they enjoy the
same attributes as business corporations, the choice-of-law rules
stated in this Chapter should usually be applicable to them.23 7
The Second Restatement discusses some commonly held attributes
of corporations, most of which are satisfied by the LLC.2 31 If the
LLC were, on the other hand, considered a limited partnership,
even more uncertain conflict-of-laws principles would be in-
volved.23 9 This traditional choice-of-law approach, however, does
not necessarily apply to LLCs. All 50 states recognize the corpo-
rate form, and all but Louisiana recognize the limited partnership,
so the conflict-of-laws analysis proceeds from that common ground
to determine which jurisdiction's law applies. In contrast, only five
states expressly recognize the LLC. Therefore, the inquiry will fo-
cus more on comity aspects of the conflict of laws.240
i. Comity Toward Foreign Entities
In the absence of a statute or a constitutional provision ad-
Corporations, 65 Yale L.J. 137 (1955)).
235. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2)(b) (1971).
236. See infra notes 241-48 and accompanying text.
237. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS ch. 13 introductory note.
238. The corporate attributes are: (1) limited liability of shareholders for any act or
omission of the corporation and (2) capacity: (a) to sue or be sued in the corporate name;
(b) to have official representatives with exclusive power to enforce and protect common
rights and interests direct its affairs; (c) to transact with respect to property, real or per-
sonal, in the corporate name; and (d) to endure for a term of years or in perpetuity. See id.
The ready dissolubility of the LLC obviously detracts from the last attribute.
239. See supra note 216. As a hybrid entity, the LLC does not clearly fit as either a
corporation or a limited partnership. For registration purposes, at least, the limited partner-
ship characterization appears to be more strained due to the lack of clearly differentiated
ownership classes corresponding to general and limited partners. See supra note 222.
240. Cf. Comment, Limited Liability of Shareholders in Real Estate Investment
Trusts and the Conflict of Laws, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 696, 701 (1962) (discussing the ration-
ale for establishing choice-of-law rules relating to foreign business trusts by analogy to
similar rules for foreign corporations).
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dressing the status of foreign entities, the right of a corporation to
do business in a jurisdiction outside of its state of formation is said
to be governed by the law of comity 241 Comity is the principle
that a forum state will enforce rights granted by a foreign state
unless enforcement is "inconsistent with any statute or public pol-
icy of the [forum] state "242 In the context of corporations,
it is widely held that "[c]omity is never extended to a foreign cor-
poration where such corporation's existence in the state or the ex-
ercise of its powers there would be prejudicial to the state's inter-
est or repugnant to its declared policy "243
The reception accorded the Massachusetts Business Trust in
other states demonstrates the unpredictability of relying on princi-
ples of comity The Texas Supreme Court ruled that the business
trust did not provide limited liability to its interest holders.244 In
the court's view, the business trust constituted an impermissible
circumvention of the statutorily mandated vehicle for limited lia-
bility" the limited partnership. 2 5 Although several other courts
reached the same conclusion, a number of jurisdictions "saw noth-
ing contrary to public policy or legislative intention in permitting
entrepreneurs to achieve freedom from personal liability without
complying with either the corporation or the limited partnership
statutes."246
From a state law perspective, the LLC is not analogous to a
limited partnership because no member has even nominal liability
to creditors. However, the LLC closely resembles a corporation,
justifying a comparison between LLCs and foreign corporations
241. See generally 17 W FLETCHER, supra note 219, §§ 8330-45 (discussing the
scope of comity with respect to foreign corporations).
242. Id. § 8331.
243. Id. § 8334.
244. See Thompson v. Schmitt, 115 Tex. 53, 69-70, 274 S.W 554, 560 (1925).
245. "They attempted to secure such exemption without procuring anyone to join
them as a general partner, and in fact without compliance with a single statutory require-
ment." Id. at 68, 274 S.W at 560.
246. G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 247(G), at
164 (2d ed. 1977) (discussing the controversy over recognition of the business trust). Most
of the decisions predate amendments made in 1948 to the enabling legislation for the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, which focused more attention on the constitutional implications of
recognition of foreign public acts. See generally infra notes 249-53. The potential for non-
recognition of the foreign trust entity has remained an issue for commentators. See gener-
ally Note, Conflict of Laws, supra note 217 (examining problems of foreign trusts that are
denied recognition and attendant conflict-of-laws issues); Note, Multistate Activity, supra
note 217 (discussing difficulties posed by the varying treatment of business trusts).
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seeking to do business in the forum jurisdiction.24 7 The risks of
nonrecognition can be mitigated through the use of clauses, com-
monly encountered in contracts between business trusts and credi-
tors, releasing the members and managers from all personal liabil-
ity Furthermore, choice-of-law provisions in contracts, stating
that the law of the LLC's state of formation shall apply, also pro-
vide members and managers insulation from liability 248 Neverthe-
less, until more states adopt LLC statutes, or otherwise provide
for their registration or recognition, their status will remain in
doubt.
ii. Full Faith and Credit and Due Process
The Colorado statute contains a declaration of legislative in-
tent that LLCs transacting business outside of Colorado "be
granted the protection of full faith and credit under section 1 of
Article IV of the Constitution of the United States. 2 49 The full
faith and credit clause states: "Full Faith and Credit shall be
given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Pro-
ceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general
Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Pro-
ceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof."250 Until 1948,
the federal enabling statute referred to in the second sentence of
the clause did not refer to "Acts," 25' but the addition of this word
may not have lent any additional force to the clause.252 However,
247. The policy comparison should focus on the LLC and any applicable corporation
statutes. If the forum state has particularly stringent corporation requirements, they should
not be compared with the LLC because these requirements could be avoided through incor-
porating in a much more flexible domicile, such as Delaware. These corporations would
then be subject only to the forum's regulation of foreign corporation internal affairs. See
generally sources cited supra note 226. It is difficult to see any significant circumvention of
corporate policy by LLCs, particularly those formed under the Colorado statute. There
might be some concern for the perceived oppression of dissension and the rights of minority
members regarding dissenters' rights and approval of extraordinary transactions, where
corporate law would require at least majority approval, appraisal rights, and other safe-
guards. However, part of the LLC's attractiveness is its avoidance of these rigid require-
ments. See infra text accompanying note 274.
248. "It is apparently everywhere admitted, however, that by agreement a creditor
may be precluded from proceeding against the beneficiaries G. BOGERT & G. BO-
GERT, supra note 246, § 247(J), at 173.
249. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-106 (Supp. 1990).
250. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1.
251. The current version of the statute refers to acts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988).
252. Professor Weintraub points to pre-1948 decisions of the Supreme Court holding
that the clause refers to "public act[s)" and is self-executing. He suggests that "it is diffi-
cult to see how anything important turned upon the absence from the statute of the word
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there is no question that the full faith and credit clause has placed
a constitutional gloss on the common law principles of comity dis-
cussed above.253
The full faith and credit clause has been applied almost coex-
tensively with the due process clause,254 requiring a sufficient state
interest by the forum state. The clause, as described by Justice
Brennan in Allstate Insurance Co. v Hague, "has invalidated the
choice of law of a State which has had no significant contact or
significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, with
the parties and the occurrence or transaction." '55 A forum state's
application of its own law to a controversy will therefore be sus-
tained under full faith and credit and due process if it has signifi-
cant contacts with the proceeding, but "if a State has only an in-
significant contact with the parties and the occurrence or
transaction, application of its law is unconstitutional. 256
In Hague, an accident occurred in Wisconsin involving three
Wisconsin residents, two of whom were on their way to work in
Minnesota. Despite all the factors pointing to application of Wis-
consin law, the Court upheld the application of Minnesota law be-
cause the deceased, to whom the wrongful death action pertained,
worked in Minnesota, commuted to work there, and his surviving
spouse became a Minnesota resident subsequent to his death but
before the action was commenced.2 57 In most cases of a foreign
LLC entering another state, the challenge to the status of the
LLC would be precipitated by the LLC's business activities, own-
ership of property, or tortious conduct in the forum state. In the
face of such significant contacts with the forum state, it appears
that the forum state would not be constitutionally precluded from
'acts' Nor should very much turn upon the word's subsequent inclusion." R. WEIN-
TRAUB. COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 567 (3d ed. 1986); see R. LEFLAR, L.
McDOUGAL & R. FELIX, supra note 226, at 218 n.5 (asserting that the addition of "Acts"
had no impact).
253. "It substituted a command for the earlier principles of comity and thus basi-
cally altered the status of the States as independent sovereigns." Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S.
541, 546 (1948).
254. In Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 n.10 (1981). Justice Brennan
noted that the tests for full faith and credit and due process are almost always identical.
255. Id. at 308.
256. Id. at 310-I1. The constitutional test resembles the application of common law
choice-of-law principles. "A court may not apply the local law of its own state to determine
a particular issue unless such application of this law would be reasonable in the light of the
relationship of the state and of other states to the person, thing or occurrence involved."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 9 (1971).
257. Hague, 449 U.S. at 305.
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looking to its statutes and public policy in deciding whether to
recognize an LLC.
Application of the laws of the LLC's state of formation might
be constitutionally required under precedent pre-dating the
Court's decision in Hague. A line of decisions ending in 1947 in-
volving fraternal beneficent societies, required application of the
law of the state of incorporation under the full faith and credit
clause to achieve national uniformity of result.258 However, these
cases may no longer be good law259 at least in the insurance con-
text.260 These cases might also be distinguished on the grounds
that they addressed transactions between the members and the
fraternal society, matters similar to the "internal affairs" of a cor-
poration and for which choice-of-laws rules mandate application
of the law of the state of incorporation.26' In contrast, an entity's
dealings with third persons generally are governed by the law of
the forum. 62 The issue of whether to recognize the entity's valid-
258. See, e.g., Order of United Commercial Travelers of Am. v. Wolfe, 331 U.S.
586, 606 (1947); Sovereign Camp of the Woodmen of the World v. Bolin, 305 U.S. 66, 74
(1938); Modern Woodmen of Am. v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544, 550-51 (1925); Supreme Coun-
cil of the Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S. 531, 540 (1915).
259. R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 252, at 522 n.86 (quoting Clay v. Sun Ins. Office,
Ltd., 377 U.S. 179, 183 (1964) (declining to extend or apply the rule developed in the
earlier fraternal society cases)).
260. "The analogy to the common interest of shareholders in a commercial corpora-
tion does not stand up. The analogy should be to choice-of-law rules applicable to insurance
contracts generally, just as it would be to any independent contract between a stockholder
and his corporation. The Hague formula governing legislative jurisdiction should control
these contracts just as it controls other insurance contracts." R. LEFLAR, L. McDOUGAL &
R. FELIX, supra note 226, at 183.
261. See supra text accompanying notes 232-35; see also Kaplan, Foreign Corpora-
tions and Local Corporate Policy, 21 VAND. L. REV. 433, 446 (1968); Reese & Kaufman,
The Law Governing Corporate Affairs: Choice of Law and the Impact of Full Faith and
Credit, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1118 (1958).
262. See supra text accompanying notes 228-31. In referring to the need for uni-
formity of treatment with respect to shareholders' rights to dividends, their right to partici-
pate in management by voting, their liability on unpaid subscriptions, their subjection to
assessments or double liability, and the existence of preemptive rights, one leading com-
mentary states:
As to most or all of these, competing interests of third persons or of other states
will seldom be involved. If no such outside interests are affected, the members of
the corporate body ought all to have identical rights and duties, and a constitu-
tional requirement that one law and one law only govern them is understandable.
Any other rule would defeat the 'justifiable expectations' of the stockholders,
'unfairly surprise' them, operate 'unreasonably,' and constitute an 'arbitrary and
capricious application of laws that have no fair or decent connection' with the
real problem, which is uniformity of treatment.
R. LEFLAR, L. McDOUGAL & R. FELIX, supra note 226, at 182.
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ity implicates elements of each of these choice-of-law principles.
On the one hand, the liability of shareholders might be considered
an "internal affairs" matter governed by the laws of the state of
incorporation. 63 On the other hand, the limited liability of mem-
bers affects the remedies available to third parties; the courts of
the forum state would probably be compelled to consider protect-
ing the interests of citizens of the forum state,2 64 in view of the
alleged repugnancy of the LLC form to a perceived public policy
of the forum state. However, neither inquiry raises constitutional
questions beyond the due process analysis discussed above. At this
point in the development of the law, recognition of the LLC in
other jurisdictions does not appear to be constitutionally required
and is subject to the unpredictable policy determinations of the
forum state's courts.
C. Revising the LLC
We have already identified a number of areas requiring statu-
tory revision.26 5 Because many of the Wyoming statute's provi-
sions were drawn from the ULPA and the MBCA, adapting the
RULPA amendments to the LLC model affords a ready mecha-
nism for effecting these revisions.2 66 This is essentially the path
263. See supra text accompanying notes 228-40.
264. One author notes that cases considering the application of public policy to the
business trust have produced conflicting results. In analyzing these cases, "it is apparent
that the choice of law rested primarily on the result which best protected the forum's citi-
zens. Furthermore, each court's notions of justice dictated the decisions rendered." Note,
Multistate Activity, supra note 217, at 1143. However, this approach may frustrate other
choice-of-law principles applied to LLC members, including "protection of justified expec-
tations," RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2)(d) (1971), and "cer-
tainty, predictability and uniformity of result." Id. § 6(2)(f); see supra note 262 and ac-
companying text (discussing other choice-of-law principles). The rule of comity, discussed
supra text accompanying notes 241-48, "is always subject to and must yield to considera-
tions of public policy." 17 W FLETCHER, supra note 219, § 8334. Furthermore, public
policy limitations on recognition of foreign public acts have been alluded to in some deci-
sions. See Paulsen & Sovern, "Public Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REV.
969, 972, 1010 (1956) (discussing cases involving public policy limitations on judicial rec-
ognition of foreign law).
265. See supra text accompanying notes 79-82 (allow contributions of services), 88-
97 (state whether managers need to be members or residents), 129-35 (provide for alloca-
tions of losses), 136-38 (provide 1 and 6 year statutes of limitations on return of capital) &
213-27 (adopt provisions for admission of foreign LLCs).
266. These RULPA improvements permit an attorney-m-fact to sign articles of or-
ganization and amendments, REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 204(b) (1985); per-
mit amendment or cancellation by judicial act, Id. § 205; consider reservations of LLC
names, Id. § 103; consider abbreviated certificate disclosures, Id. § 201; require mainte-
1991)
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
that the Colorado legislature followed, and the result demon-
strated by the appendix to this article26 7 is striking when com-
pared with the relatively simple structures of the Wyoming and
Florida statutes. This assumes that the RULPA was an improve-
ment over the ULPA. While this assumption is substantially justi-
fied, problems of interpretation and policy pervade some of the
provisions.
26
Colorado's statute added a number of technical and proce-
dural refinements. However, a number of attributes traditionally
associated with the corporate form were not included. Preemptive
rights were not addressed 29 but need not be if approval of addi-
tional members requires unanimous consent 270 and if the operat-
ing agreement treats additional contributions from existing mem-
bers. Voting trusts and member voting agreements were not
addressed. 27 1 Derivative actions were also not mentioned. 272 Draft-
ers of LLC statutes should consider whether to protect minority
members by requiring a supermajority for transactions outside the
ordinary course of business, whether to give dissenters appraisal
rights,2 a and whether to permit mergers. 1 4 The challenge is
drawing a line between the traditional detail of a corporation and
the flexibility of a partnership. The Wyoming, Florida, and Kan-
sas statutes are very flexible. The Colorado statute attempts to
walk this line by making many of the prescribed statutory provi-
sions applicable only in the absence of the members' express
agreement. "Agreement" is the key that should not be lost, lest
nance of certain books and records and ensure members' rights to inspect them, Id. §§ 105,
305; expressly address the rights of the estate of a deceased or incompetent partner, Id. §
705; permit judicial dissolution, Id. § 802 (Florida has incorporated this provision, FLA.
STAT. § 608.448 (Supp. 1989)); consider the derivative action provisions, Id. §§ 1001-04;
and consider a severability clause, Id. § 1103.
267. See infra pp. 472-501.
268. See, e.g., supra note 187 (discussing concern with the RULPA's continuation
and dissolution aspects).
269. Compare MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 26 (1979) (no preemptive rights un-
less articles of incorporation provide otherwise).
270. See supra text accompanying notes 157-61.
271. Compare MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 34 (allowing voting trusts of up to ten
years in duration).
272. Compare id. § 49 and REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP AcT §§ 1001-04
(1985) (allowing limited partners to bring derivative suits and establishing procedures
therefor).
273. Compare MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT §§ 79-81 (establishing dissenting share-
holders' right to fair market value of their shares).
274. Compare id. §§ 71-77 (allowing mergers and establishing procedures). The
Kansas statute permits mergers. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7650 (Supp. 1990).
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the freedom of contract enjoyed by the general and limited part-
nership be swallowed up in the more unyielding structure of cor-
porate law 275 Although LLCs are not corporations, the courts
may apply corporate principles in determining the relationship of
their members. Such an approach would be unfortunate because
the tax induced structural limitations on LLC duration and trans-
ferability will probably relegate the LLC to closely held opera-
tions for which partnership flexibility is more desirable.
II. FEDERAL INCOME TAX CONSEQUENCES
A. Classification of the LLC for Tax Purposes
1. State Law Treatment
Wyoming has no state income tax.27 16 The Florida statute re-
quires taxation of the LLC as a corporation for Florida state taxa-
tion purposes.2  The Colorado statute taxes the LLC as a part-
nership.278 As more states adopt LLC statutes, the tax
characterizations of domestic LLCs, and perhaps foreign LLCs,
may diverge from the desired federal tax results that originally
motivated creation of the LLC.
2. Federal Tax Law Classification in General
Classification of the LLC as a partnership, rather than a cor-
275. "Perhaps the most striking feature of a partnership is its basically contractual
nature. Though there is a partnership statute, it is basically a 'default' or 'suppletory'
law - one which, concerning the partners, inter se, will only apply when the parties have
not agreed otherwise." Karjala, A Second Look at Special Close Corporation Legislation,
58 TEx. L. REv. 1207 (1980) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of the MBCA
and special state statutes dealing with close corporations); Kessler, The ABA Close Corpo-
ration Statute, 36 MERCER L. REV. 661, 663-64 (1985). Freedom of" contract has been
extended to close corporations through special statutes. See Fessler, The Fate of Closely
Held Business Associations: The Debatable Wisdom of "Incorporation," 13 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 473, 486-95 (1980) (arguing that the freedom of contract granted to close corpora-
tions is contrary to the justifications underlying the corporate entity). In comparing the
New Jersey corporate law to the New Jersey limited partnership association, at least one
commentator has found more freedom in the limited partnership association provisions to
fashion control mechanisms for the business. See Schwartz, supra note 19, at 77. The
Michigan legislature, on the other hand, added cumulative voting for and reduction in the
number of partnership association managers, voting by proxy, and prohibition of class vot-
ing for managers. See MICH. CoMp. LAWS § 449.351 (1979).
276. An "annual tax" of $50.00 is, however, due and payable on January 2 of each
year by each LLC. Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-132(a)(vi) (1977).
277. See FLA. STAT. § 608.471 (Supp. 1989) (LLC regarded as an artificial entity).
278. See CoLo. REV. STAT. § 39-22-205 (Supp. 1990).
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poration, for federal income tax purposes is crucial to the viability
of the LLC as an alternative form of business organization. The
factors considered in the classification of an entity as a partner-
ship have been discussed at length in a number of other publica-
tions and will therefore be dealt with briefly in this article .27  The
inquiry focuses on the existence of factors of corporate resem-
blance identified in the Supreme Court's 1935 decision in Morri-
sey v Commissioner 280 Although the decision in Mornsey estab-
lished the guidelines, the Treasury's regulations and
pronouncements have provided the operative details.
The current regulations governing entity characterization for
federal income tax purposes identify six factors drawn from the
Morrisey opinion: (1) associates; (2) an objective to carry on busi-
ness and divide the gains therefrom; (3) continuity of life; (4) cen-
tralization of management; (5) liability for corporate debts limited
to corporate property; and (6) free transferability of interests.281
An unincorporated organization will not be classified as an associ-
ation, which is taxable as a corporation, unless the organization
has more corporate characteristics than noncorporate characteris-
tics, not considering characteristics common to both the unincor-
porated organization and a corporation. 2 Since associates and an
objective to carry on business and divide the gains therefrom are
common to both corporations and partnerships, the four remaining
factors are determinative of an entity's classification. 283 The fac-
tors are equally weighted; thus, if an unincorporated organization
lacks any two, it generally will not be classified as an association
taxable as a corporation, barring .other considerations.2 84
279. See, e.g., August & Shaw, supra note 12.
280. 296 U.S. 344 (1935). The Court identified a number of corporate
characteristics:
1. Associates in a joint enterprise;
2. A purpose to transact business and share its gains;
3. Title to property held by the enterprise as an entity;
4. Centralized management through representatives of the participants;
5. Entity existence unaffected by the death of participants;
6. Beneficial interests in the entity transferable by the participants without af-
fecting the continuity of the enterprise;
7. The introduction of large numbers of participants; and
8. Liability of participants limited to their investment in the enterprise.
Id. at 356-59.
281. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) (as amended in 1983).
282. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(3).
283. See id.
284. See Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159 (1976) (entity that had corporate
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a. Continuity of Life
If the death, insanity, bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, or
expulsion of any member will cause a dissolution of the organiza-
tion, the entity does not possess continuity of life.285 An agreement
providing that the remaining members will continue the business
in the event of the death or withdrawal of a member does not
engender continuity of life if, under local law, the death or with-
drawal of any member causes a dissolution of the organization. 286
For a limited partnership to be classified as a partnership for fed-
eral income tax purposes, the partnership agreement must require
at least a majority of the limited partners to elect a new general
partner to continue the partnership in the event of the removal of
a general partner.287
b. Centralization of Management
"An organization has [the corporate characteristic of] cen-
tralized management if any person (or any group of persons which
does not include all the members) has continuing exclusive au-
thority to make the management decisions necessary to the con-
duct of the business for which the organization was formed." 288 A
limited partnership subject to a statute corresponding to the
ULPA does not have centralized management unless substantially
all the interests in the partnership are owned by the limited part-
ners.2 89 If all or a specified group of the limited partners may re-
move a general partner, all the facts and circumstances must be
characteristics of centralized management and free transferability of interests but lacked
continuity of life and limited liability, classified as a partnership for tax purposes). In not-
ing the equal weight of the factors, the Tax Court stated: "This apparently mechanical
approach may perhaps be explained as an attempt to impart a degree of certainty to a
subject otherwise fraught with imponderables." Id. at 172. In addition to the four principal
factors, the regulations leave open the possibility that other factors might influence the
characterization issue. See infra text accompanying notes 297-300.
285. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(I).
286. See id. § 301.7701-2(b)(2). The effect of continuation agreements is an impor-
tant issue for the LLC because such agreements could reduce the difficulties posed by the
numerous potential causes of dissolution. See supra text accompanying notes 162-96. For a
discussion of the effect on tax classification, see infra text accompanying notes 318-45.
287. See Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-1 C.B. 798, 801. The authors of the American Law
Institute Subchapter K project considered, but rejected, a revision to the continuity of life
test that would require the consent of all members in the event of a technical dissolution
under state law. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 143, at 381.
288. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(I) (as amended in 1983).
289. See id. § 301.7701-2(c)(4).
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examined to determine whether the partnership possesses central-
ized management.29 0  However, the limited partners do have a
"substantially restricted right" to remove the general partner if,
for example, it is limited to the general partner's gross negligence,
self-dealing, or embezzlement. The exercise of this right will not
itself lead to a finding of centralized management.291
c. Limited Liability
An organization has the corporate characteristic of limited
liability if, under local law, no member is personally liable for the
debts of or claims against the organization.29 2 By definition, LLCs
will always have this corporate characteristic because LLC mem-
bers are absolved from liability 293
d. Free Transferability of Interests
An organization possesses "free transferability of interests if
each of its members or those members owning substantially all of
the interests in the organization have the power, without the con-
sent of other members, to substitute for themselves in the same
290. Id.
291. Id. For ruling purposes, the I.R.S. will find centralized management if limited
partner interests, excluding those held by general partners, exceed 80% of the total inter-
ests in the partnership. In addition, the I.R.S. will consider all the facts and circumstances,
including limited partner control of the general partners (whether direct or indirect) in
determining whether the partnership possesses centralized management. See Rev. Proc. 89-
12, 1989-1 C.B. 798, 801 (specifying the conditions that the I.R.S. will consider when
classifying an organization as a partnership for tax purposes).
292. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(1) (as amended in 1983).
293. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. In a limited partnership, "personal
liability does not exist with respect to a general partner when he has no substantial
assets (other than his interest in the partnership) which could be reached by a creditor of
the organization and when he is merely a 'dummy' acting as the agent of the limited part-
ners." Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(2). A limited partnership with corporate general part-
ners will generally be deemed to lack limited liability if the net worth of the corporate
general partners, at the time of the ruling request, is equivalent to at least 10% of the total
contributions to the limited partnership and is expected to continue to represent at least
10% of the total contributions throughout the life of the partnership. If the only general
partners are corporations, and those general partners do not meet the 10% requirement,
then it must be demonstrated that either a general partner has (or the general partners
collectively have) substantial assets, other than the interest in the partnership, that partner-
ship creditors might reach or that the general partners will act independently of the limited
partners. See Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-1 C.B. 798, 801. The authors of the American Law
Institute Subchapter K Project proposed elimination of the inquiry into a corporate general
partner's financial holdings or its control by limited partners. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
supra note 143, at 386-87.
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organization a person who is not a member of the organiza-
tion."2 4 An interest is not freely transferable if each member can,
without the consent of other members, assign only the right to
share in profits but cannot also assign the right to participate in
management. 95 An obligation to offer an interest to other mem-
bers of the organization at its fair market value before transfer to
a nonmember, known as a first right of refusal, is considered a
modified form of free transferability but is accorded less weight
than unmodified free transferability 296
e. Other Factors
The regulations provide that "other factors may be found in
some cases which may be significant in classifying an organization
as an association, a partnership, or a trust. '297 In Revenue Ruling
79-106,299 the I.R.S. excluded a list of elements from considera-
tion as "other factors," limiting their significance to establishing
the presence of the six major corporate resemblance factors.2 "9 In
that regard, Revenue Procedure 89-12 contributes to the level of
complexity in gaining assurance that an entity will be treated as a
partnership for federal income tax purposes. It prescribes general
requirements for a favorable ruling, in addition to specific require-
ments for satisfying the four major determinative characteristics:
continuity of life, centralized management, limited liability, and
free transferability of interests.300
294. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(1).
295. Id. If consent may not be unreasonably withheld, the interests are freely trans-
ferable. See Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159, 183 (1976) (limited partners' income
rights considered freely transferable despite a requirement of the general partner's consent,
circumscribed by a standard of reasonableness).
296. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(2).
297. Id. § 301.7701-2(a)(1).
298. 1979-1 C.B. 448.
299. See id. (stating that the I.R.S. will not consider the factors enumerated in Lar-
son as "other factors" that have significance, other than their bearing on the six major
corporate characteristics, with respect to the classification of an entity as a limited
partnership).
300. See Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-1 C.B. 798, 800. Under this revenue procedure,
general partners, as a group, are required to have at least 1% of each material item of
partnership income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit at all times during the existence of the
partnership. In addition, subject to certain qualifications, the general partners, taken to-
gether, must maintain the lesser of $500,000 or a minimum capital account balance equal
to 1% of total positive capital account balances for the partnership. Id.
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3. Federal Tax Law Classification of LLCs
a. The Troubled History
Until recently the I.R.S. vacillated in its application of the
corporate resemblance test to LLCs. When the LLC was first con-
ceived in 1977, the I.R.S. was still assessing its position in the
wake of its defeat in Larson v Commissioner 301 In 1980 the
I.R.S. issued proposed regulations that would deny partnership
status if no member were liable for entity debts.3 0 2 Because no
member of an LLC is personally liable for the debts of the LLC,
these proposed regulations would have precluded partnership tax
classification. This approach, however, had been rejected in dic-
tum by the Board of Tax Appeals in Glensder Textile Co. v
Commissioner 30  The American Law Institute's Federal Income
Tax Project (Subchapter K) also rejected the contention that lim-
ited liability of participants should result in classification as a cor-
poration. The ALI report indicated that the limited liability of the
participants was not relevant to the policy considerations underly-
ing the establishment of pass-through partnership treatment.0 4
301. 66 T.C. 159 (1976) (holding that a limited partnership whose general partner is
a corporation is taxable as a partnership). In two memoranda, the I.R.S. studied whether
an LLC should be classified as a corporation due to the presence of "other characteristics."
See Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,281 (Feb. 15, 1980) (Wyoming LLC could not be classified
outright as a corporation under Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819),
because the LLC would dissolve upon the death or bankruptcy of a member); Gen. Couns.
Mem. 38,036 (Aug. 7, 1979) (undisclosed membership of LLC members not more signifi-
cant than the four principal factors).
302. 45 Fed. Reg. 75,709 (1980) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 301) (proposed
November 17, 1980) (proposing amendments including Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-
2(a)(2), 301.7701-2(a)(3), 301.7701-2(a)(4)).
303. 46 B.T.A. 176 (1942). In discussing the structure and role of the limited part-
nership association, the precursor to the LLC, the Glensder court asserted that the absence
of personal liability "cannot be taken as the sole touchstone of classification " Id. at
183.
304. "Of what importance is it to the fisc that the participant in a business venture
has limited liability or that he does not participate in management?" AMERICAN LAW IN-
STITUTE, supra note 143, at 377. "[T]he conclusion was that the pass-through method of
taxation permitted under Subchapter K is appropriate for the type of entity formed under
limited-partnership statutes. It was noted there that the existence of limited liability, with-
out more, does not seem sufficient reason for imposing a corporate-tax regimen on an en-
tity." Id. at 386. However, in suggesting changes to the classification regulations, one com-
mentator noted: "The characteristic of limited liability is so significant that, if all the
members of an organization have limited liability, it is suggested that the organization be
classified as an association taxable as a corporation regardless of the other characteristics."
Peel, Definition of a Partnership: New Suggestions on an Old Issue, 1979 Wis. L. REV.
989, 1015.
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In 1981 the I.R.S. issued a private letter ruling, dated No-
vember 18, 1980, classifying a Wyoming LLC as a partnership.30 5
This ruling was a hollow victory for other taxpayers considering
the formation of LLCs because it was made one day after the
publication of the 1980 proposed regulations. In 1982 the I.R.S.
withdrew the 1980 proposed regulations, promising a study of the
entity classification rules.30 6 In Private Letter Ruling 83-04-138
the I.R.S. reversed its course and held that an LLC should be
classified as a corporation because it possesses limited liability,
centralized management, and continuity of life. 0 The I.R.S. also
announced that it vas suspending the issuance of private letter
rulings addressing the entity classification of LLCs.308
In 1988 the I.R.S. removed the classification of LLCs for fed-
eral income tax purposes from the list of issues on which private
rulings would not be issued.309 Shortly thereafter the I.R.S. ruled
that a Wyoming LLC should be classified as a partnership.3 10
Other developments have followed this ruling, including the exten-
sion of partnership classification to a Florida LLC, 11 and a
favorable ruling on the conversion of an existing limited partner-
ship to a Florida LLC.312
b. Revenue Ruling 88-76: A Simple Case
The facts in Revenue Ruling 88-76 describe a relatively sim-
ple Wyoming LLC. The LLC in question had 25 members includ-
ing three member managers.1 3 The structure of the LLC followed
the basic statutory requirements that transferees of member inter-
ests not be admitted as members without the consent of all mem-
bers and that the LLC be dissolved upon the death, retirement,
resignation, expulsion, bankruptcy, or diss.olution of a member, or
305. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-06-082 (Nov. 18, 1980).
306. See I.R.S. Announcement 83-4, 1983-2 I.R.B. 31 (discussing I.R.S. News Re-
lease IR-82-145 (Dec. 16, 1982)).
307. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 83-04-138 (Oct. 29, 1982).
308. See Rev. Proc. 83-15, 1983-1 C.B. 676.
309. See Rev. Proc. 88-44, 1988-2 C.B. 634.
310. See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.
311. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-37-010 (June 16, 1989).
312. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-10-027 (Dec. 7, 1989); see also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-30-013
(April 25, 1990) (allowing a Florida LLC comprised of two corporate members to be clas-
sified as a partnership); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-29-019 (April 19, 1990) (allowing the conversion
of a general partnership to a Florida LLC).
313. See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360, 360. The ruling did not reveal the aggre-
gate percentage ownership interest held by the three managers.
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the occurrence of any other event that terminates the membership
of a member, subject to an agreement by all members to continue
the organization. 14 Not surprisingly, the I.R.S. held that the LLC
possessed limited liability and, due to the selection of managers
apparently holding less than twenty percent of the total LLC in-
terests, centralized management .31  The LLC did not, however,
possess continuity of life or free transferability of interests.31
The taxpayer apparently could have avoided the attribution
of centralized management by- (1) having all members manage;
(2) having member managers own at least twenty percent of the
member interests; or (3) empowering the managers to perform
only ministerial acts at the direction of the members. 7 The effi-
cacy of these alternatives depends upon factors such as the num-
ber of members and the type of management and control relation-
314. See id.
315. See id. at 361. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(4) (as amended in 1983) states that
"limited partnerships subject to a statute corresponding to the [ULPA], generally do not
have centralized management, but centralized management ordinarily does exist if
substantially all the interests in the partnership are owned by the limited partners." Rev.
Proc. 89-12, 1989-1 C.B. 798, 801, provides that the I.R.S. will rule that the partnership
has centralized management if the limited partner interests, excluding those held by gen-
eral partners, exceed 80% of the total interests in the partnership. Application of the 80%
guideline to LLCs rests on the analogy of general partners and limited partners of a limited
partnership to the member-managers and nonmanaging members of an LLC. This analogy
is suggested by several I.R.S. pronouncements. See supra note 180. Not all aspects of Rev.
Proc. 89-12 apply to LLCs. In Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-30-013 (April 25, 1990), the Florida LLC
in question was comprised of only two corporate members, sharing equal management
rights. On the basis of the LLC's limited management feature, the I.R.S held that section
4 of Rev. Proc. 89-12 did not apply to the LLC. Section 4 contains most of the substantive
guidelines of Rev. Proc. 89-12, including the subsections distinguishing between general
and limited partners. In Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,798 n.3 (Oct. 24, 1989), the I.R.S. stated
,that the limited liability net worth requirements of section 4.07 of Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-1
C.B., 798 do not apply to limited liability companies.
316. See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360, 361.
317. Management by all members would be unwieldy in large organizations, but it
did obviate centralized management from the two member LLC described in Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 90-30-013. See supra note 315. The 20% guideline for the ownership of member-
managers rests on an analogy between member-managers and general partners of a part-
nership. Even if that analogy is apt, an LLC could not rely on the percentage guideline
without securing a private letter ruling. See id. The regulations state that an organization
does not possess centralized management if the managers perform ministerial acts at the
direction of the members. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(3). The Colorado LLC statute,
which vests management solely with the managers, would not readily permit this. Under
the other statutes, the members could retain management authority, rather than delegating
it to managers, appointing certain individuals for circumscribed operational tasks. For a
more detailed discussion of the various statutes that govern the organization and delegation
of management responsibilities, see supra text accompanying notes 83-124. In any event,
such an arrangement would appear to be impractical for LLCs with large memberships.
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ship desired for nonmanager members as opposed to the
managers.
c. Continuity of Life: The Uncertain Consequences of
Continuation Agreements
The emphasis on continuity of life is somewhat troublesome.
As discussed earlier, state LLC statutes are unclear on whether an
advance agreement to continue is permitted.318 The Florida and
Kansas statutes mitigate the risk of dissolution by permitting con-
tinuation "under a right to continue stated in the articles of or-
ganization of the limited liability company "319 However, from a
tax standpoint, the favorable private letter ruling issued in 1989
with respect to a Florida LLC expressly found that this provision
was inoperative under the facts presented. 20
The I.R.S. recently found that a Florida LLC possessed con-
tinuity of life because, under a right stated in the articles of incor-
poration, the members could agree to continue by only a majority
vote, rather than the statutory alternative requiring a unanimous
vote.321 In effect, one-half of the members relinquished, in ad-
vance, their right to prevent the continuation of the LLC business.
Unlike the Florida and Kansas statutes, the Wyoming and
Colorado statutes do not permit simplified continuation in the arti-
cles of organization. The Wyoming and Colorado statutes require
the unanimous consent of all members but grant the right to con-
sent in the articles of organization. 22 The Wyoming LLC de-
scribed in Revenue Ruling 88-76 apparently was not subject to a
continuation agreement. The validity of continuation agreements
318. For a discussion of the implications of dissolution and continuity of the LLC
under LLC statutes, see supra text accompanying notes 162-96.
319. FLA. STAT. § 608.441(1)(c) (Supp. 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7622(A)(3)
(Supp. 1990).
320. See Prwv. Ltr. Rul. 89-37-010 (June 16, 1989) (despite the fact that the firm
allowed for the continuance of the LLC upon consent of all the members, the holding
disregarded the provision because continuity was not assured). In a recent private ruling in
which continuity of life was not found, the I.R.S. stated that "no right to continue the
business of X upon a member ceasing to be a member of X is stated in the articles of
organization or other documents submitted with the request apart from continuance of X's
business upon the consent of all the remaining members." Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-29-019 (April
19, 1990). In Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-30-013 (April 25, 1990), also dealing with a Florida LLC,
continuation similarly required the unanimous consent of both members.
321. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-10-027 (Dec. 7, 1989).
322. See CoLo. REV. STAT. § 7-80-801(1)(c) (Supp. 1990); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-
123(a)(iii) (1977).
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in the LLC context was not addressed. If valid under state law, a
contractual agreement to continue could be imbedded in the oper-
ating agreement at the outset, and unanimous consent would be
achieved because all members are signatories. The continuity of
the LLC would be even more secure than that of the LLC in Pri-
vate Letter Ruling 90-10-027 The unresolved issue is whether this
private letter ruling suggests a prohibition on any advance agree-
ment eroding the right of all members to participate in a contem-
poraneous vote to continue the LLC upon an event of dissolution.
The entity classification regulations permit the use of contin-
uation agreements without creating continuity of life. An agree-
ment to continue despite the death or withdrawal of a member
does not create continuity of life if state law provides that death
or withdrawal dissolves the organization. 23 Under this regulation,
the continuation agreement at issue in Private Letter Ruling 90-
10-027 arguably did not establish continuity of life.
The I.R.S.'s apparent unanimity requirement seems to ignore
language in the regulations permitting continuation agreements,
focusing instead on the regulations' conclusion that a limited part-
nership does not possess continuity of life if the withdrawal of a
general partner causes a dissolution "unless the remaining general
partners agree to continue the partnership or all remaining
members agree to continue the partnership "7324 This regula-
tion cites as authority the Board of Tax Appeals' decision in
Glensder Textile Co. v Commissioner,a2 5 which found continuity
lacking where continuation is contingent upon the agreement of
the general partners. The Tax Court's predecessor referred to this
principle as "contingent continuity of existence"326 because
"[c]ontinuance will be certain only if the remaining general part-
ners agree to it ",327 Glensder and the portion of the regula-
tion referring to continuation by general partners are arguably not
applicable to LLCs unless member managers are substantially
equivalent to general partners. Moreover, the state LLC statutory
provisions do not obviously permit continuation by consent of the
managers alone, unless managers may receive unanimous advance
delegation of such authority as the equivalent of unanimous mem-
323. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(2) (as amended in 1983).
324. Id. § 301.7701-2(b)(1).
325. 46 B.T.A. 176 (1942).
326. Id. at 185.
327. Id.
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ber consent.
Revenue Ruling 54-484328 similarly failed to find continuity
of life in an agreement "making it possible for the continuing
members to continue the partnership if they choose."3 9 Further-
more, in Zuckman v United States,330 the partnership had agreed
with a lender that it would not dissolve. Nevertheless, distinguish-
ing between the power and the right to dissolve, the Court of
Claims found that the limited partnership lacked continuity of life
because a general partner could breach the agreement and dis-
solve the partnership. 3 ' Most of the LLC statutes, however, do
not expressly empower a member to unilaterally withdraw and
cause dissolution of the entity Only the Colorado statute permits
any member to resign at any time, subject, however, to remedies
of the other members for breach of the organization agreement. 3 2
The ability of a member to withdraw and cause dissolution obvi-
ates continuity of life under the regulations. 333 This is a significant
advantage from an income tax standpoint, if the LLC can endure
dissolubility at will.
The regulations and other authority addressing the effects of
continuation agreements proceed from the rationales underlying
partnerships and do not clearly apply to the LLC. In this environ-
ment, the LLC is hostage to the administrative posturing of the
I.R.S. At present, the I.R.S. apparently views this factor very re-
strictively, and caution will probably prevail until an authoritative
precedent is established. On the other hand, the small investor
groups that may find the LLC particularly attractive may be more
aggressive in testing the entity classification issue than was the
limited partnership industry for which a favorable tax opinion let-
328. 1954-2 C.B: 242.
329. Id. at 243.
330. 524 F.2d 729 (CI. Ct. 1975).
331. See id. at 735.
332. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-602 (Supp. 1990). The Wyoming, Florida, and
Kansas statutes all refer to the "resignation" of a member as an event triggering dissolu-
tion, but none of those statutes expressly grants a member the unilateral authority to with-
draw as if a general partner. See supra text accompanying notes 162-71.
333. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(3) (as amended in 1983). In Foster v. Com-
missioner, a partnership agreement provided for continuation despite the occurrence of cer-
tain events, including the death of a partner. Thus, the general partner had the power to
withdraw and dissolve the partnership, but not the right to do so. Nonetheless, the Tax
Court held that the partnership did not possess continuity of life because "it is the power,
not the right, to dissolve which is the touchstone of the regulation." 80 T.C. 34, 188
(1983). In so holding, the court gave effect to a prior analysis of tax classification. See
Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159, 173-74 (1976).
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ter as to classification was an integral part of most offering
materials.
d. The Thirty Year Limit on Duration
With the emphasis placed on events of dissolution occurring
with respect to members, it appears that the thirty year limited
life requirement of the LLC statutes was not determinative of tax
classification. Under the regulations, a fixed period of existence,
however abbreviated, does not vitiate continuity 334 This limitation
might be eliminated to conform to the durational scheme utilized,
for example, by the RULPA.3 5
e. Tiered Ownership Structures
Participants in an LLC may seek to avoid state law disadvan-
tages through a tiered ownership structure."' 6 Although authority
exists that addresses general income tax consequences of tiered
partnerships,3 3 7 there is little authority suggesting the appropriate
tax classification inquiry for LLCs involved in such tiered struc-
tures. While Revenue Ruling 88-76 addressed a twenty-five mem-
ber LLC, the status of the members was not discussed. However,
a recent private letter ruling classified an LLC with two corporate
members as a partnership.3 8 Nevertheless, no rulings have ad-
dressed the utilization of limited partnership members, particu-
larly arrangements where a purpose of the tiered structure was
the avoidance of the state law restrictions on the transfer of LLC
interests and of the uncertainty of dissolution.
The entity classification test should be applied at each level,
334. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(3) (all agreements will be examined in light of
local law and the pertinent partnership act, but should the agreement provide that the
organization is to continue for a stated period, the organization has continuity of life if the
effect of the agreement is that no member has the power to dissolve the organization in
contravention of the agreement).
335. See supra text accompanying notes 53-60.
336. See supra notes 153-54, 160-61 & 197-203 and accompanying text.
337. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 706(d)(3) (1988) (allowing items attributable to interest in
lower tier partnership to be prorated over entire taxable year where there is a change in the
partners' interests in the tiered partnership); Rev. Rul. 87-50, 1987-1 C.B. 157 (sale of an
interest in an upper tier partnership is a sale of its interest in the lower tier partnership
where the sale causes the termination of the upper tier partnership); Rev. Rul. 86-138,
1986-2 C.B. 84 (a subsidiary partnership must separately state items of income, gain, loss,
deduction, and credit).
338. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-30-013 (April 25, 1990) (involving an LLC organized
under the Florida LLC Act); see also supra note 315.
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rather than by collapsing the various layers together. In one rul-
ing, the I.R.S. considered the classification of a limited partner-
ship in which the sole general partner was another limited part-
nership." 9 The ruling's analysis is instructive. First, it did not
address the classification of the general partner itself, that being a
separate issue.3 ' 0 Second, the lower tier partnership was classified
as a partnership because the general partner of the upper tier lim-
ited partnership had substantial assets, which avoided limited lia-
bility 341 Moreover, the limited partnership lacked continuity of
life because it was organized under a statute corresponding to the
ULPA. 341 The ruling did not elaborate, but the partnership proba-
bly lacked continuity of life because a dissolution of the general
partner would cause a dissolution of the limited partnership.
Under all of the LLC statutes, the dissolution of a member causes
a dissolution of the LLC 43
In the LLC context, overlapping ownership in the upper tier
entities should be avoided to elude the single economic interest
theory advanced in Revenue Ruling 77-214.344 Beyond that, the
I.R.S.'s response to aggressive tiered LLC arrangements is diffi-
cult to predict.345
f. Summary
Conservative taxpayers may have to live with some draw-
backs in the areas of transferability of interests and continuity of
life in exchange for some degree of certainty of tax result. In this
339. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-53-006 (Sept. 30, 1987).
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. See supra text accompanying notes 162-71.
344. 1977-1 C.B. 408. In this ruling, the two members of a German GmbH were the
subsidiaries of a common parent. See id. The I.R.S. viewed the organization as enjoying
free transferability of interests because, in substance, no adverse party held any manage-
ment control. See id. at 409. One court has rejected this approach, and the I.R.S. has not
followed it faithfully. See supra note 33.
345. In Rev. Rul. 77-220, 1977-1 C.B. 263, 264, the I.R.S. disregarded a partnership
of three S corporations that had been formed to avoid the statutory limitation on the num-
ber of S corporation shareholders. The tiered LLC structure does not circumvent a provi-
sion of the Internal Revenue Code and can be distinguished on that basis; the tiered struc-
ture is a response to state law disadvantages. It also does not provide the participants with
greater benefits with respect to the continuity of life and transferability of interests than
could be achieved under limited partnerships formed under the ULPA or the RULPA,
both of which would be accorded partnership status for income tax purposes. The tiered
arrangement should, therefore, be respected.
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regard, Private Letter Ruling 90-10-027346 also complicates mat-
ters by implying that LLCs must comply with the minimum gen-
eral partner percentage interest and capital account requirements
of Revenue Procedure 89-12 ,47 again suggesting an analogy be-
tween member-managers and the general partners of a limited
partnership. 48
The classification of LLCs as partnerships presently rests
upon the limited acceptance by the I.R.S. of the vehicle and the
continued abandonment of the position expressed in the 1980 pro-
posed regulations that an entity for which no member has per-
sonal liability cannot be a partnership. Assuming that the current
administrative posture is continued, qualification will require rigid
adherence to clumsy transferability and continuation provisions
that are less flexible and bear less predictable tax consequences
than those permitted for limited partnerships.
B. The Promised Reward: Partnership Taxation Treatment
Partnership classification unlocks a number of tax advan-
tages, a topic thoroughly discussed in numerous other articles. 49
Briefly, the partnership pays no entity level tax and items of in-
come, gain, loss, deduction, or credit pass through to the part-
ners,3 50 avoiding the "double taxation" to which a corporation is
subject. On the other hand, if the partnership incurs losses or is
eligible for credits, the partners can utilize those items personally
to shelter other income.3851 Moreover, income, losses, and credits
346. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-10-027 (Dec. 7, 1989).
347. Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-1 C.B. 798.
348. See supra text accompanying notes 294-98; see also supra notes 180 (discussing
the general partner/member-manager analogy) & 315 (discussing Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-30-
013 (April 25, 1990), which exempted a two member LLC from much of Rev. Proc. 89-
12).
349. See, e.g., Rabinowitz, Realty Syndication: An Income Tax Prumer for Investor
and Promoter, 29 J. TAX'N 92 (1968) (discussing advantages of a partnership form for a
real estate "syndicate"); Robinson, Setting up the Real Estate Venture: An Overview, 3 J.
REAL EST. TAX'N 28 (1975) (discussing tax implications of a real estate partnership); Wil-
liford, The Unique Tax Characteristics of Partnerships, 13 REAL EsT. REV., Summer
1983, at 28 (discussing federal income tax treatment of partnerships).
350. See I.R.C. § 701 (1988) (partners are subject to tax, not the partnership).
351. This ability is not unqualified. For instance, the partner must have a sufficient
basis from which to deduct the losses. See id. § 704(d). The partner also must have suffi-
cient amounts at risk. See id. § 465; Moreover, the losses may be subject to the passive
activity loss limitation. See id. § 469; see also Goldberg, The Passive Activity Loss Rules:
Planning Considerations, Techniques, and a Foray into Never-Never Land, 15 J. REAL
EsT. TAX'N 3 (1987).
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can be allocated disproportionately among partners so long as
such allocations comply with the notorious requirement of "sub-
stantial economic effect."35
Formation of and property contributions to a partnership are
relatively simple from an income tax standpoint, with no require-
ment that the transferor exercise control over the partnership.3 53
Distributions from a partnership, whether nonliquidating or liqui-
dating, generally do not generate a recognized gain or loss to the
distributee or the other partners. 354 Upon the withdrawal of a
partner, the remaining partners have broad discretion in arranging
partially deductible or nondeductible purchases of the withdraw-
Ing partner's interest.355 In addition, if a prospective partner
purchases the partnership interest of a current partner or a part-
ner dies and his or her estate succeeds to the decedent's partner-
ship interest, the new partner may adjust a share of the inside
basis of partnership assets to reflect any amount by which the
purchase price (or fair market value as of the date of death or an
alternate valuation date in the case of a decedent's estate) exceeds
the partnership's adjusted tax basis in the partnership assets.3 56
352. See I.R.C. § 704(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) (1988) (discussing the deter-
mination of a partner's distributive share and the analysis for determining whether such
allocation has substantial economic effect); Bailis & Hartung-Wendel, Meeting the Eco-
nomic Effect Test under Section 704(b) Regulations, 3 J. PARTNERSHIP TAX'N 3 (1988)
(although the methods for determining a partner's interest in the partnership are vague,
allocations will be respected if the allocations meet the strictures of the substantial eco-
nomic effect test); infra note 423 and accompanying text.
353. See I.R.C. § 721 (providing for nonrecognition of gain or loss upon contribu-
tion). By comparison, transfers of property to a corporation in exchange for stock constitute
a taxable exchange unless the transferors are in control of the corporation after the ex-
change. See id. § 351(a). If the property is encumbered, the contributing partner may
recognize gain from debt relief under I.R.C. § 752.
354. See id. § 731 subject, however, to I.R.C. § 751 (1988) (providing that certain
distributions of partnership property receive sale or exchange treatment).
355. See id. § 736 (regarding "payments to a retiring partner or a deceased partner's
successor in interest"); see also Cleveland, Retirement Payments to Partners: Timing of
Recognition of Income, 57 J. TAX'N 86 (1982) (discussing the relationship of I.R.C. § 736
to recognition of a retiring partner's capital gain from a partnership distribution); Solomon,
How Use of Section 736 Enhances Planning in Liquidating Partnership Interests, 51 J.
TAX'N 347 (1979) (analyzing I.R.C. § 736 and discussing its adaptability to various finan-
cial circumstances).
356. See I.R.C. § 743 (1988) (permitting a transferee partner's share in the adjusted
basis of partnership property to increase by the amount that such partner's basis in the
partnership interest exceeds his or her share in the adjusted basis of the partnership
property).
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C. The Competing Entity- The S Corporation
If a taxpayer seeks conduit treatment for items of income,
gain, loss, deduction, or credit, the S corporation offers a compet-
ing option. Generally, such items pass through to the individual
shareholder. 57 Again, there is no "double taxation" of earnings,
and the opportunity exists to pass through losses to the individual
shareholders. However, the S corporation is not as flexible as a
partnership in this regard. Special allocations of income or loss
are not permitted, and a shareholder can receive only a pro rata
share of such items based on their proportional ownership inter-
est."' 8 The amount of losses and deductions a shareholder is per-
mitted to take in a given year is limited to the adjusted basis in
the shareholder's stock plus the shareholder's adjusted basis of
any indebtedness of the corporation to the shareholder. 59 If the
entity level debts are incurred by a partnership, a partner is
treated as having contributed money to the partnership. The part-
ner's tax basis for the deduction of losses increases in the amount
of the partner's share of liabilities.3 60 This difference is probably
the key factor in choosing between a partnership and an S corpo-
ration. Moreover, if the S corporation was previously a C corpora-
tion, the immunity from entity level taxation would be lost if the S
corporation had built-in gains from a period in which it was not
an S corporation.3 61 The corporation could also be charged a pen-
357. See id. § 1366 (allowing items of income, loss, deduction, and credit to 'pass
through' to S corporation shareholders for the purpose of determining their individual tax
liabilities).
358. See id. § 1377 (requiring that S corporation shareholders report items of in-
come, loss, deduction, and credit in direct proportion to their respective interests in the
corporation). This general rule might be softened through the use of several techniques.
See, e.g., J. EusTiCE & J. KUNTZ, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF S CORPORATIONS §
6.04, at 6-21 to -22 (1985 & Supp. 1990) (suggesting the use of stock purchase options to
produce sharing ratios that vary over time as the options are exercised and shift stock
ownership); I. GRANT & W CHRISTIAN, SUBCHAPTER S TAXATION 3-4 (3d ed. 1990) (pro-
posing the formation of several S corporations that in turn join in a partnership; the special
allocations are made at the partnership level).
359. See I.R.C. § 1366(d) (1988). However, there is some controversy as to the basis
treatment of entity level debt in very thinly capitalized corporations. Compare Selfe v.
United States, 778 F.2d 769 (11 th Cir. 1985) (third party loans, guaranteed by the share-
holder, to a thinly capitalized corporation treated as shareholder loans to the corporation)
with Harris v. United States, 902 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1990) (refusing to treat shareholder
guarantee as a loan to the corporation) and Estate of Leavitt v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 206
(1988) (rejecting Selfe), aff'd, 875 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1989).
360. See I.R.C. § 752(a) (When a partner's share of the partnership's liabilities in-
creases, the increase in liability is treated as a contribution of money to the partnership).
361. See id. § 1374 (discussing qualifications for tax imposed on net built-in gains of
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alty tax362 and lose its S corporation status3863 if it receives signifi-
cant amounts of passive income.
S corporations are subject to further requirements not appli-
cable to partnerships. For instance, the formation of an S corpora-
tion and subsequent contributions of property in exchange for
stock must satisfy the control requirements of I.R.C. § 351.364 In
addition, distributions of appreciated property from an S corpora-
tion yield taxable income.365
There are some advantages to the S corporation form. For
state law purposes, the S corporation is a conventional corporation
and, as such, provides limited liability to all participants. Upon
the contribution of property with a fair market value that differs
from its adjusted basis, there is no statutory requirement similar
to I.R.C. § 704(c), requiring the allocation of built-in gain or loss
to the contributing party 366 Losses on the sale, exchange, or
worthlessness of S corporation stock are eligible for ordinary loss
treatment, while such transactions generally would be capital gain
or loss transactions if a partnership were involved. 67
Although the purchaser of S corporation stock cannot elect to
increase the inside adjusted tax basis of his or her share of the
corporation's assets, the sale of such stock has little effect on the
corporation. By comparison, if, within a twelve month period, a
partner sells or exchanges fifty percent or more of his or her total
interest in capital and profits, the disposition causes a termination
of the partnership for federal income tax purposes. 368 Finally, al-
S corporations).
362. See id. § 1375 (discussing tax imposed on passive investment income of corpo-
rations that have subchapter C earnings and whose profits exceed 25% of gross receipts).
363. See id. § 1362(d)(3) (discussing termination where passive investment income
exceeds 25 % of gross receipts for three consecutive taxable years and corporation has sub-
chapter C earnings and profits).
364. See id. § 351(a) (providing nonrecognition treatment where property is trans-
ferred to corporation controlled by transferor in exchange for stock).
365. See id. § 1374.
366. Shareholders report only their pro rata shares of income, loss, or credits. See
supra note 358. The I.R.S., however, has a general power to reallocate income and deduc-
tions among family members in a manner resembling I.R.C. § 704(e), which applies to
partnership allocations. See I.R.C. § 1366(e) (1988) (reallocation if shareholder of S cor-
poration provides services or capital without receiving reasonable compensation).
367. Compare I.R.C. § 1244(a) (1988) (permitting ordinary loss treatment for small
business stock) with id. § 741 (treating sales or exchanges of partnership interests as the
sale or exchange of a capital asset, subject to I.R.C. § 751).
368. See id. § 708(b)(1)(B). The election to operate as an S corporation may be
revoked only upon the consent of shareholders holding more than one-half of the shares of
stock of the corporation on the day of revocation. See id. § 1362(d)(i)(B). Thus, a sale or
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though the partnership contribution and distribution rules do not
present many obstacles to reorganizations with other partnerships
and unincorporated businesses, S corporations can also take ad-
vantage of the corporate reorganization provisions which provide
access to reorganizations with larger, publicly traded pools of
capital.161
One area in which partnerships enjoy a distinct advantage
over S corporations is the formal qualifications for S corporation
status. The S corporation may not have more than thirty-five
shareholders;370 nonresident aliens cannot be shareholders; a71 other
than estates and certain trusts, only individuals can be sharehold-
ers;372 an S corporation cannot own interests in corporate subsidi-
aries that would render it a member of an affiliated group;373 and
it cannot issue more than one class of stock.374 This last provision
precludes the shifting of risks that certain business arrangements
require.
A number of articles have been devoted to comparing part-
nerships to S corporations . 75 Neither of these organizational
forms is conclusively preferable to the other. The choice in any
particular case rests on a number of specific factual concerns. If
the entity will generate debt leveraged losses, then the shareholder
exchange of S corporation stock will result in a termination of the S election only if the
purchaser or transferee provides such consent and acquires, or combines with a class of
similar shareholders, who hold more than one-half of the corporation's shares. See id. For a
definition of an S corporation, see id. § 1361(b)(1).
369. See, e.g., id. §§ 368, 354, 356, 361.
370. See id. § 1361(b)(1)(A). Spouses are treated as one shareholder. See id. §
1361(c)(1).
371. See id. § 1361(b)(1)(C).
372. See id. § 1361(b)(l)(B).
373. See ad. § 1361(b)(2)(A). An exception applies to ownership of stock in inactive
corporations. See id. § 1361(c)(6). The I.R.S. has administrativel excused transitory sub-
sidiaries. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 73-496, 1973-2 C.B. 313 (existence of an active subsidiary for
less than 30 days did not terminate the election).
374. See I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(D) (1988). However, differences between classes of
stock based solely on voting rights will not constitute different classes of stock. See id. §
1361 (c)(4).
375. See, e.g., Kaplan & Ritter, Partnership and S Corporations: Has the Tax Gap
Been Bridged?, I J. PARTNERSHIP TAX'N 3 (1984) (comparing tax features of S corpora-
tions and partnerships in the formation, operation, and liquidation phases and concluding
that, as a result of the inherent flexibility of Subchapter K, partnership is preferable for the
operation of most closely held businesses); Liveson, Partnershaps vs. S Corporations: A
Comparative Analysis an Light of Legislative Developments, 5 J. PARTNERSHIP TAX'N 142
(1988); Mullaney & Blau, An Analytic Comparison of Partnerships and S Corps as Vehi-
cles for Leveraged Investments, 59 J. TAX'N 142 (1983) (explaining the major differences
that exist between S corporations and partnerships with respect to debt treatment).
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basis limitations of an S corporation render the partnership form
preferable. If the entity will hold substantial property, the pliable
partnership contribution and distribution sections will be attrac-
tive. Also, if an entity other than an individual seeks to participate
in the business, the S corporation form may be unavailable. On
the other hand, for transactions involving little property, but for
which limited liability is desired, the S corporation is attractive
because it involves only one entity A limited partnership with a
corporate general partner, by comparison, requires two entities:
the corporate general partner and the limited partnership. A lim-
ited partnership also presents uncertainty and complexity in
achieving classification as a partnership under the corporate re-
semblance test. This expresses the essence of the LLC's allure:
limited liability with only one entity and partnership tax treat-
ment, while avoiding some of the tax entity classification concerns
of the limited partnership and shortcomings of the S corporation
election. On the other hand, a form of doing business which lacks
both familiarity and an established body of precedent presents
substantial uncertainty, at least over the short run.
D. Other Tax Considerations
1. Foreign Taxpayers
Nonresident aliens are unable to own S corporation stock 376
but may be members of an LLC. Also, the estate of a nonresident
alien would be subject to federal estate tax for stock issued by a
domestic corporation. Although an LLC is not a corporation, s
an LLC interest may be included in the value of an estate for tax
purposes because it would be property "situated in the United
States."3 79
A nonresident alien is not subject to a gift tax on the transfer
of "intangible property "380 Even if an LLC interest is an intangi-
376. See I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(C) (providing that "the term 'S corporation' means
a small business corporation" that prohibits nonresident aliens from stock ownership).
377. See id. § 2104(a) (For purposes of the estate tax provision, stock held by a non-
resident alien must have been issued by a domestic corporation to meet the definition of
"property").
378. The definitions of "coriioration" and "partnership" under I.R.C. §§ 7701 (a)(3)
and (a)(2), respectively, apply to all of Title 26 "where not otherwise distinctly expressed
or manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof." Id. § 7701(a).
379. Id. § 2103 (Only the portion of the estate "situated in the United States" at the
time of death is included in the value of the nonresident alien's estate.).
380. Id. § 2501(a)(2) ("Transfers of intangible property shall not apply to the
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ble asset, a taxpayer would use a foreign corporation to avoid the
broader sweep of the estate tax. With respect to the income taxa-
tion of nonresident aliens, "a nonresident alien individual or for-
eign corporation [would] be considered as being engaged in a
trade or business within the United States if the partnership of
which such individual or corporation is a member is so engaged
"9381 An LLC would be a partnership for this purpose.3 82
2. State Taxation Considerations
Taxation in the state of formation may be another important
factor in selecting an organizational form. Under Florida tax law,
for example, ownership of LLC interests is treated differently than
ownership of partnership interests for purposes of the intangible
property tax.383 The tax treatment of LLCs in states admitting
them to do business will be an additional factor. For example,
states might not agree that the LLC should be treated as a part-
nership for their state tax purposes. On the other hand, a jurisdic-
tion that does not recognize the S corporation election for state or
local tax purposes but would treat the LLC as a partnership ex-
tends a tax advantage to LLCs over S corporations.38 4
transfer of intangible property by a nonresident not a citizen of the United States.").
381. Id. § 875(1). The I.R.S. has taken the position that a "permanent establish-
ment" is imputed to a limited partner, as with a general partner, of a partnership for treaty
purposes. See Rev. Rul. 85-60, 1985-1 C.B. 187, 187.
382. LLCs might present some advantages to foreign taxpayers owning interests in
U.S. corporations. A foreign shareholder who is not present in the United States for 183
days or more will generally not pay U.S. tax on a sale of the corporate stock. See I.R.C. §
871(a)(2) (1988). The exclusion is couched in terms of "capital gains," so gains received
upon the liquidation of a corporation would generally qualify. See id. § 331(a). A foreign
taxpayer is still, therefore, extremely interested in the capital gains versus ordinary income
distinction. See 1 J. ISENBERGH, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: U.S. TAXATION OF FOREIGN
TAXPAYERS AND FOREIGN INCOME § 8.7, at 242-43 (1990) (sale or exchange treatment,
including the effects of liquidation-reincorporation transactions, remains a significant issue
for foreign owners of U.S. corporations). The Tax Reform Act of 1986 rendered liquida-
tion-reincorporation transactions less attractive because United States residents enjoy little
benefit from the capital gains on the constructive sale of their stock upon a liquidation,
while the corporation must pay a tax on the appreciation inherent in its assets. See gener-
ally B. BITTKER & J. EusTiCE, supra note 52, § 14.54. As discussed above, foreign share-
holders still have a strong interest in seeking sale or exchange treatment in a liquidation-
reincorporation, avoiding recharacterization as a "D" reorganization. One common struc-
ture to avoid such recharacterization is the placement of the assets of the liquidating corpo-
ration in a partnership. The LLC is well-suited for this duty because it is treated as a
partnership for income tax purposes, but also provides a state law entity with limited liabil-
ity for the continuation of the liquidated corporation's business.
383. See Lederman, supra note 12, at 349.
384. The following jurisdictions do not recognize S corporation status: Connecticut,
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III. WEIGHING THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES
A. LLC Compared with S Corporation
If tax consequences were the sole consideration, the LLC
would be preferable to the S corporation for those types of trans-
actions in which the partnership taxation rules hold more benefits
than the S corporation rules, including highly leveraged transac-
tions, transactions with participants other than individuals, and
transactions in which the number of participants exceeds thirty-
five shareholders. From a strict tax standpoint, the LLC may suf-
fer in the tax entity classification area. Revenue Ruling 88-76, the
polestar of LLCs, dealt with highly stylized facts on the issues of
continuity and transferability, yet it narrowly resulted in an even
split between the corporate resemblance factors.3 85 The tax conse-
quences of any deviation from these facts are uncertain.
State law uncertainty is another matter. The S Corporation is
a more established corporate form and benefits from years of
practitioner experience. Corporations are recognized in every
state, and, therefore, enjoy a familiar body of statutory law and
judicial interpretation. The organizer of an LLC has a cleaner, if
more uncertain, slate upon which to write, but that flexibility may
be advantageous.386 At this point, however, the lack of guidance
as to recognition in foreign jurisdictions is troublesome. In addi-
tion, the LLC transfer and continuity of life provisions, drafted
with an eye toward tax consequences, are awkward for transac-
tions involving many participants. Tiered ownership structures
combining limited partnerships with an LLC offer a solution to
some of the state law transfer and dissolution concerns. However,
the effect of this solution on tax classification is uncertain. Until a
number of states accept LLCs and grant them extraterritorial rec-
ognition, the entity, like its ancestor the partnership association,
the District of Columbia, Louisiana, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York
City, and Tennessee. See State Tax Guide (CCH) 1 10-100 (March 1991). See generally
Maule, Effect of State Law on the Use of S Corporation, 37 TAx LAW. 535, 536-41
(1984) (treatment of S corporations is complicated and inconsistent, indicating a need for
reform).
385. See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360, 360-61; see also supra text accompany-
ing notes 313-16.
386. The uncluttered flexibility of the limited partnership association was a perceived
advantage over the corporate form. See supra text accompanying notes 19-32. Those state
corporation statutes that impose the fewest restrictions are generally viewed as the most
advantageous under which to incorporate. Kaplan, supra note 261, at 436 (explaining the
preference of organizations to incorporate in Delaware).
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would seem to play a significant part only in highly leveraged, tax
sensitive transactions involving relatively few participants and do-
ing business in the state of formation.
B. LLC Compared with General Partnership
The LLC and general partnership are on an equal footing
with respect to tax consequences aside from the entity classifica-
tion issue. However, the LLC is preferable to the general partner-
ship in that it limits the liability of participants. With respect to
other factors, the results are mixed. For instance, the transferabil-
ity aspects of an LLC are more complicated than those of a gen-
eral partnership.388 On the other hand, while the apparent author-
ity of nonmanaging LLC members is more circumscribed than
that of nonmanaging general partners, 89 the apparent authority
of LLC managers exceeds that of any general partner. 9 ' Further-
more, the limited number of participants and the consensus man-
agement style of many general partnerships are suited to the LLC
format. With the exception of the Colorado statute, which permits
members to withdraw at any time, the LLC is not dissoluble at
will, unlike the general partnership.3 9 The remaining problem is
the possibility that a foreign jurisdiction will refuse to recognize
the LLC as a legitimate business form. Should that occur, how-
ever, the participants are no worse off than if they had utilized the
competing general partnership form. However, the mere fact that
the LLC offers the tax advantages of a partnership coupled with
the limited liability of a corporation does not make it universally
preferable to the partnership as an organizational form.
C. LLC Compared with Limited Partnership
The LLC and the limited partnership with a corporate gen-
eral partner are almost equivalent for federal income tax pur-
poses. A disparity arises to the extent that profits and losses are
allocated to the corporate general partner, which, as an S or C
corporation, suffers from tax disadvantages compared with a
387. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
388. For example, general partners can agree in advance to admit certain classes of
substitute general partners. Members of an LLC cannot. See supra text accompanying
notes 157-59.
389. See supra text accompanying notes 98-111.
390. See id.
391. See supra text accompanying notes 169-71.
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partnership.9 2
The inquiry into LLC entity classification is simpler than that
required for a limited partnership. Under Revenue Ruling 88-76,
the LLC only failed two of the four corporate resemblance
tests.393 In drafting a limited partnership agreement under the
RULPA, it is easy to avoid two of the corporate resemblance fac-
tors, as well as the attribute of limited liability in larger transac-
tions where a substantial general partner is present. 94
For state law purposes, the transferability of interests 95 and
continuity of life 96 provisions under an RULPA partnership are
much more flexible than the LLC provisions. Furthermore, the
limited partnership offers a significant advantage in its probability
of extraterritorial recognition, particularly if the forum state is
one of the majority of states that have adopted the RULPA.a97
The limited partnership formed under the RULPA may also
have an advantage in terms of limited liability of the participants
because limited partners can engage in some activity without lia-
bility 398 By comparison, an active LLC member may invite a
court to pierce the corporate veil of the LLC.39 9 The relative ad-
vantage may be slight and assumes a larger limited partnership
arrangement where there are limited partner investors apart from
the managing general partner group. Assuming that the LLC is
better suited for smaller groups of participants that would other-
wise use a general partnership or S corporation, the relevant com-
parison is with a limited partnership in which some of the limited
392. Under the tax entity classification rules, all corporate general partners must
maintain at least an aggregate one percent interest in the partnership. See supra note 300.
393. See supra text accompanying notes 314-16.
394. Some commentators contend:
[T]he classification issue with regard to limited partnerships has become "much
ado about nothing." Given the pro-partnership orientation of the Regulations,
the equivalent weighting of all four factors and the recent interpretations placed
upon the liability standard it is particularly difficult for entities formed
under the RULPA or ULPA to be classified as an association unless they consti-
tute publicly traded partnerships under [I.R.C.] § 7704.
1 A. WILLIS, J. PENNELL & P. POSTLEWAiTE. PARTNERSHIP TAXATION § 34.11, at 34-27 to
-28 (4th ed. 1989).
395. See supra text accompanying notes 140-52.
396. See supra text accompanying notes 162-96.
397. See supra note 216.
398. Piercing a thinly capitalized limited partnership has apparently not been a cred-
itor remedy if the limited partner does not participate in the control of the partnership
business. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
399. See supra text accompanying notes 65-75.
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partners also control the corporate general partner In such a case,
the limited partner shareholders may be subject to liability should
a court decide to pierce the veil of the corporate general
partner. 00
The LLC may compare more favorably to a limited partner-
ship organized in one of the few states that have not adopted the
1985 amendments to the RULPA. Inasmuch as the Wyoming
LLC statute was patterned after the ULPA, an LLC formed
under it will resemble limited partnerships in states which have
not enacted the RULPA. Therefore, the technical improvements
introduced by the RULPA will not place the LLC at a compara-
tive disadvantage in non-RULPA states.
In some respects, the LLC is superior to both the ULPA and
the RULPA. For example, LLC statutes do not require disclosure
of the members' names in the articles of organization, while the
ULPA 1 and the original version of the RULPA °2 require the
certificate to disclose the names of the limited partners.
A limited partnership with an LLC general partner may re-
present a compromise structure that mitigates the perceived disad-
vantages of the LLC in the area of extraterritorial recognition and
the general uncertainty regarding the legal aspects of its opera-
tion. This structure provides a degree of comfort to the limited
partners concerning fundamental matters, such as their limited li-
ability in a foreign jurisdiction, the legal aspects of the entity's
operation and the rights of members, 03 and federal income tax
aspects of the LLC that remain unsettled.0 4 The remaining un-
certainties would be limited to the LLC general partner and its
members. The limited partnership can also facilitate the tiered
ownership structure offered previously as a solution to the state
law impediments to transfer of interests and dissolution.0 5
IV SOME ADDITIONAL UNANSWERED QUESTIONS AND
OBSERVATIONS
In enacting its LLC statute, the Colorado legislature adopted
400. See supra note 73.
401. See UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 2(l)(a) IV (1916).
402. See REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 201(a)(4) (1976) (amended in
1985 to eliminate disclosure requirement).
403. See supra text accompanying notes 218-64.
404. See infra text accompanying notes 412-39.
405. See supra text accompanying notes 336-45.
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numerous conforming amendments to other statutes. For example,
the term "limited liability company" was added to statutes refer-
ring to "corporations" or "limited partnerships."4 °6 Such defini-
tional changes will not clarify all matters. Unresolved, for in-
stance, is the status of the LLC for federal diversity
jurisdiction,40 7 the classification of LLC interests as "securities"
under security regulation laws,40 8 the application of bankruptcy
law to LLCs,409 and the applicability of corporate usury exemp-
406. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 2-4-401, 7-3-106, 7-62-102 (Supp. 1990).
407. A corporation is treated as a citizen of its state of domicile, regardless of the
citizenship of its individual shareholders, managers, or directors. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988).
However, an unincorporated association is deemed to be a citizen of every state in which
one of its members is domiciled for the purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction. See Note,
Diversity of Citizenship of the Limited Partnership: A "Real Party" Rule as Federal
Common Law, 71 IOWA L. REV. 235, 235-36 (1985) (reviewing the contradictory rulings of
several circuits in determining requirements for diversity jurisdiction over limited partner-
ships). The Supreme Court of the United States has recently addressed this issue in con-
nection with limited partnerships, holding that the citizenship of both general and limited
partners is determinative. See Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 110 S. Ct. 1015, 1021 (1990). In
Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449, 457 (1900), the Court held that the
citizenship of all members of a limited partnership association is to be considered for this
purpose. For an analysis finding corporate characteristics in an unincorporated association,
compare Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476 (1933) (holding that a Puerto Rican
sociedad en comandita should be treated as a corporation, distinguishing the limited part-
nership associations as "partnerships"). Id. at 480-81. One distinction between the socie-
dad en comandita and the LLC is that "[w]here the articles so provide, the sociedad en-
dures for a period prescribed by them regardless of the death or withdrawal of individual
members." Id. at 481. Other factors discussed by the Court in support of corporate charac-
terization are enjoyed by the LLC, including: the power to contract, to own property, and
transact business and to sue and be sued in its own name and right; creation by articles of
association filed as public records; powers of management that may be vested in managers;
and members who are not primarily liable for its acts and debts. See id. The Carden Court
distinguished the result in Russell & Co., reasoning that the civil law origin of the socie-
dad en comandita virtually limited the case to its facts, thus the LLC is likely to be treated
as a partnership for diversity jurisdiction purposes. See Carden, 110 S. Ct. at 1018.
408. Corporate stock is a "security" under a literal reading of the Securities Act of
1933. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 687-88 (1985). An interest in
an LLC, if not stock, would probably be tested as an investment contract in the manner of
partnership interests. See, e.g., Note, General Partnership Interests as Securities Under
the Federal Securities Laws: Substance Over Form, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 303, 306-10
(1985).
409. See 11 U.S.C. § 109 (1988) (setting forth the debtors eligible for protection
under Chapters 7 and 11). This statute refers to a "person." A "'person' includes individ-
ual, partnership, and corporation " Id. § 101(35). A "corporation" includes a "part-
nership association organized under a law that makes only the capital subscribed responsi-
ble for the debts of such association," id. § 101(8)(A)(ii); an "association having a power
or privilege that a private corporation, but not an individual or a partnership, possesses,"
id. § 101(8)(A)(i); and an "unincorporated company or association " Id. §
101(8)(A)(iv). The term "corporation" expressly excludes a "limited partnership." Id. §
101(8)(B). An LLC would, therefore, appear to be a corporation for the purposes of the
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tions to LLCs.410 Some of the questions will turn upon whether
the LLC is a corporate entity or a partnership aggregation of
interests."
These questions aside, the federal income tax aspects of the
LLC are not altogether clear. Revenue Ruling 88-76 classified the
LLC described in its simple facts as a partnership for federal tax
purposes. 412 That designation, under I.R.C. § 7701(a)(2), controls
the usage of the term "partnership" throughout Title 26, which
includes income, gift, estate, generation skipping, withholding,
employment, and excise taxes where "not otherwise distinctly ex-
pressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof. ' 413 In
addition, this designation most likely applies to the crucial part-
nership income tax provisions of Subchapter K.414 However, the
narrow holding of Revenue Ruling 88-76 might be overlooked.
Definitional effects aside, partnership designation alone does not
address the complex issues of taxation as applied to LLCs, such as
bankruptcy code. This could create some inconsistencies in the application of the bank-
ruptcy tax provisions of section 728, which prescribe marshalling rules for partnerships for
purposes of state and local taxes. Id. § 728. The LLC might be a corporation for bank-
ruptcy purposes, but it can be treated as a partnership for state or local taxation purposes.
410. See, e.g., Leader v. Dinkier Management Corp., 20 N.Y.2d 393, 400-01, 230
N.E.2d 120, 123-24, 283 N.Y.S.2d 281, 286 (1967) (explaining the justification for the
New York corporate borrower exception).
411. See Appendix, infra pp. 472-74 (illustrating the adoption of corporate powers,
including, the power to sue or be sued in the LLC name and to borrow, lend, and deal with
property in the LLC name); see also supra note 238 (the Restatement (Second) of Conflict
of Laws listing of corporate characteristics). The aggregate versus entity controversy in
partnerships raises such issues as the application of employment discrimination and work-
men's compensation statutes to partners. See A. BROMBERG & L. RIBSTEIN, supra note
182, § 1.03.
412. See supra notes 313-16 and accompanying text.
413. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(2) (1988).
414. For example, "[a] partnership as such shall not be subject to the income tax
imposed by this chapter." Id. § 701. Even though an organization is excluded from the
application of Subchapter K, it is undetermined whether the balance of the Internal Reve-
nue Code continues to apply. Treasury regulations provide: "Under conditions set forth in
this section, an unincorporated organization may be excluded from the application of
all or a part of the provisions of subchapter K of chapter I of the Code." Treas. Reg. §
1.76-2(A)(1) (1972); see Bryant v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 848 (1966) (although petition-
ers made an election not to be treated as partners under subchapter K, they were still
treated as partners for purposes of computing their investment credit), a.ff'd, 399 F.2d 800
(5th Cir. 1968). But see Rev. Rul. 83-129, 1983-2 C.B. 105 (partnership election to be
excluded from the provisions of Subchapter K applies to other sections of the Code as well,
allowing two partners to make different elections under section 616 rather than a single
partnership election). For a discussion of the conflicting treatment of this issue and the
I.R.S.'s attempt to, resolve the conflict, see 1 A. WILLIS, J. PENNELL & P POSTLEWAITE,
supra note 394, § 2.06, at 2-17 to -18.
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basis computations involving partnership debt and allocations of
items of partnership income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit. Reve-
nue Ruling 88-76 did not effect a considered revision of the tax
statutes and regulations and undoubtedly created inconsistencies.
For example, a statute or regulation that distinguishes between
limited and general partnerships and between limited and general
partners must incorporate the LLC and its members into its
framework. LLCs may present additional uncertainties regarding
taxation. A discussion of these uncertainties follows.
A. Tax Matters Partner
The partnership audit sections provide for a tax matters part-
ner who is "the general partner designated as the tax matters
partner . "415 There is no distinction between "general" and
"limited" members of an LLC. However, insofar as the statutory
general partner requirement is based on management control, the
tax matters partner should be a member-manager.416
B. Partner Signatories
The income tax return for a corporation may be signed "by
the president, vice-president, treasurer, assistant treasurer, chief
accounting officer, or any other officer duly authorized to sign
such returns. 417 However, only a partner may sign the partner-
ship income tax return.418 Therefore, nonmember-managers, who
resemble corporate officers, apparently are not the proper persons
to sign partnership income tax returns for the LLC.
C. Partnership Liabilities
Under section 752 of the Internal Revenue Code a partner's
share, or assumption, of the partnership liabilities affects the tax
basis of that partner's interest in the partnership. An increase in
the partner's share, or assumed portion, of liabilities is treated as
a contribution of capital to the partnership, and a decrease is
415. I.R.C. § 6231(a)(7)(A).
416. I.R.C. § 6231(a)(7) also provides that if there is no general partner designated,
and it is "impracticable to apply [I.R.C. § 6231(a)(7)(B)], the partner selected by the
Secretary shall be treated as the tax matters partner." The Secretary may also appoint a
limited partner. For a description of the I.R.S.'s procedures and criteria for the selection of
a tax matters partner, see Rev. Proc. 88-16, 1988-1 C.B. 691.
417. Treas. Reg. § 1.6062-1(a)(I) (1973).
418. Id. § 1.6063-1(a).
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treated as a distribution.41" 9 The temporary regulations interpret-
ing section 752 generally apportion partnership debt to those part-
ners who bear the economic risk of loss.420
Because no member of an LLC is liable for its debts, the eco-
nomic risk of loss rules for recourse liabilities prevent members
from adjusting their partnership basis for the LLC's liabilities.421
Thus, where a member incurs personal liability on indebtedness
encumbering property that is subsequently transferred to an LLC,
the bases of the interests of nontransferor members will not re-
ceive any increase, even though the LLC will ultimately repay the
debt. This rule encourages nontransferor members to enter into
assumption of liability agreements or to convert the debt to a non-
recourse liability in order to fall within the special rules for nonre-
course liabilities.422
D Special Allocations
The allocations of profit and loss made in the LLC agreement
must have "substantial economic effect" to be valid for federal
income tax purposes. 423 The regulations generally require capital
account accounting, liquidation distributions in accordance with
capital accounts, and an unconditional obligation to restore deficit
capital accounts. 24 The Wyoming, Florida, Colorado, and Kansas
LLC provisions governing distributions are modeled after the
ULPA and the RULPA distributions provision,425 thus there is no
structural impediment to capital account accounting. 426 No obli-
gation to restore deficit capital accounts, which might be imposed
by state law in the case of a general partner,427 will apply to an
419. See I.R.C. § 752 (1988).
420. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-iT(a) (1989).
421. See id. § 1.752-IT(a)(1).
422. See id. § 1.752-IT(a)(2).
423. See I.R.C. § 704(b)(2).
424. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (b)(2) (1988) (these methodologies, which are used to
determine economic effect, must be contained in the partnership agreement and must be in
effect for the full term of the partnership).
425. See supra text accompanying notes 129-35.
426. The state law provisions themselves do not provide for the strict capital account
accounting procedures that the regulations mandate. This places a premium on drafting the
partnership agreement. The principal state law contribution is the subordination of the
state's statutory scheme to the agreement of the parties. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-
80-805(b) (Supp. 1990) ("[e]xcept as provided in the operating agreement"); FLA. STAT. §
608.444 (Supp. 1989) ("[s]ubject to any statement in the regulations"); Wyo. STAT. § 17-
15-126 (1977) ("[s]ubject to any statement in the operating agreement").
427. See, e.g., Park Cities Corp. v. Byrd, 534 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1976); Gazur, Part-
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LLC in the absence of express language in the operating agree-
ment. However, no such provision is necessary if the qualified in-
come offset provisions and the "minimum gain" rules for the allo-
cation of deductions attributable to nonrecourse liabilities are
applicable. 28
E. Passive Activity Losses
Except as provided in regulations, the limitation on passive
activity loss deductions precludes treating a limited partner's in-
terest "as an interest with respect to which a taxpayer materially
participates."' 2  The regulations treat a partnership interest, thus
limiting the deduction of losses, as a limited partnership interest if
the interest is designated as such in the limited partnership agree-
ment.30 While this definition does not apply to LLCs, an alterna-
tive definition treats an interest as a limited partnership interest if
the law of the state in which the partnership is organized provides
that the holder's liability for partnership obligations is limited to a
"determinable fixed amount. '43 1 An LLC interest probably satis-
fies this latter definition. Therefore, the LLC members will only
be able to participate materially, and deduct all losses, if their
level of activity meets the thresholds prescribed by the
regulations. 32
F Self-Employment Tax
For self-employment tax purposes, "the distributive share of
any item of income or loss of a limited partner, as such, other
ner Beware: Evaluating the Economic Risks Presented by an Obligation to Restore a Defi-
cit Capital Account Balance, 3 TAX L.J. 179, 184-90 (1986) (asserting that the obligation
to restore a deficit capital account is not without economic risk and, as each partnership is
unique, the partners must carefully consider the facts and circumstances in order to deter-
mine whether such an obligation is warranted); Teitelbaum, The Impact on Partners of
Allocations That Have Substantial Economic Effect, 4 J. PARTNERSHIP TAX'N 112 (1987).
But see Hogan v. Commissioner, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 870, 875 (1990) (the Pennsylvania
Partnership Act does not require the restoration of deficit capital account balances upon
liquidation); Goldfine v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 843, 853 (1983) (finding no express deficit
restoration obligation under the Illinois Uniform Partnership Act).
428. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.704-IT(b) (1989) (nonrecourse deductions must
be allocated in proportion to each partner's interest in the partnership).
429. I.R.C. § 469(h)(2) (1988), amended by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1989, 26 U.S.C.A. § 469 (West Supp. 1990).
430. See Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(e)(3)(i)(A) (1989).
431. Id. § 1.469-5T(e)(3)(i)(B).
432. See id. § 1.469-5T(e)(2)-(3).
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than guaranteed payments" is excludable from self-employment
net earnings.4"8 The purpose of such exclusion was to preclude in-
vestors performing no services from qualifying for social security
benefits based on passive investment activity 484 Regulations ad-
dressing this issue are needed, particularly in the case of active
member-managers.
G. Family Partnerships
The treasury regulations interpreting the family partnership
provisions address the relationship of family members in a limited
partnership.485 In assessing the validity of profit and loss alloca-
tions, some weight is given to the fact that the general partner,
usually the parent, risks his or her personal assets in the busi-
ness. 436 In the absence of a contractual agreement to the contrary,
the factor of personal liability will not apply to any LLC member.
H. Exempt Organizations
The I.R.S. scrutinizes exempt organizations acting as general
partners and examines the liability to which the organization is
subjected. 87 The LLC's limited liability and partnership tax sta-
433. I.R.C. § 1402(a)(13) (1988), amended by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1989, 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 1402, 3127 (West Supp. 1990).
434. As a House Report declared:
Under present law each partner's share of partnership income is includable in
his net earnings from self-employment for social security purposes, irrespective
of the nature of his membership in the partnership. The bill would exclude from
social security coverage, the distributive share of income or loss received by a
limited partner from the trade or business of a limited partnership. This is to
exclude for coverage purposes certain earnings which are basically of an invest-
ment nature.
H.R. REP. No. 702, 95th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1, at 11, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws 4155, 4168.
435. See Treas. Reg, § 1.704-1(e)(2)(ix) (1988).
436. See id. § 1.704-1(e)(3)(ii)(c).
437. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,546 (Aug. 15, 1986) (stating the current position of
the I.R.S. regarding situations in which exempt organizations can hold general partner
status); see also Plumstead Theatre Soc'y, Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1324, 1333-34
(1980) (rejecting the I.R.S.'s former position that any non-profit corporation that acts as a
general partner fails to meet exemption requirements), aff'd, 675 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1982).
A general partner's liability is, however, only one of several factors considered in the treat-
ment of the participation in partnerships by tax exempt entities. Many of the I.R.S.'s con-
cerns would probably still apply to an exempt organization's status as a manager. See
generally B. HOPKINs, THE LAW OF TAx-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 829-43 (5th ed. 1987)
(discussing tax implications of exempt organizations engaging in an unrelated trade or
business).
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tus may promote its use by tax exempt organizations.
I. Estate Valuation Freezes
The limited partnership was one of the primary targets of the
so-called "estate valuation freeze" legislation introduced under the
Revenue Act of 1987 438 The estate tax provisions would apply to
LLCs in a similar fashion.439
CONCLUSION
The LLC is an entity in the development stage and thus con-
tinues to exhibit some contradictions in its focus. The LLC is
noteworthy for its potential ability to avoid the thirty-five share-
holder limitation of S corporations; however, some of its govern-
ance provisions make the vehicle most effective for organizations
with far fewer than thirty-five participants. The LLC can offer tax
advantages in leveraged, tax sensitive business arrangements, but
questions regarding its status in other jurisdictions may confine it,
438. See I.R.C. § 2036(c) (1988) (enacted by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, §§ 10401, 10402, 101 Stat. 1330, 1330-430 to -432 (1987),
amended by Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, §
3031, 102 Stat. 3342, 3634-3637 (1988)). See generally Bush, Many Estate Planning De-
vices Affected by IRS Notice on Impact of Section 2036(c), 17 EST. PLAN. 66, 66-67
(1990) (Section 2036(c) includes in a transferor's estate property in which the transferor
retains a substantial interest, including interest in the income of or rights in the enterprise);
Gazur, Congressional Diversions: Legislative Responses to the Estate Valuation Freeze,
24 U.S.F. L. REv. 95 (1989) ("[R]etention of an interest by a person, typically an elder
generation member, will be considered a retention of the enjoyment of an interest trans-
ferred to another person, typically a younger generation member, within the context of the
Internal Revenue Code section 2036(a).").
439. On November 5, 1990, Congress passed the Omnibus Budge Reconciliation Act
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388. In part, the new legislation retroactively
repealed the existing "anti-freeze" statute. See id. § 11601, repealing I.R.C. § 2036(c)
(1988). Congress added several complex provisions focusing on the appropriate valuation of
interests retained by the elder generation in corporate and partnership freeze arrange-
ments, and the effect on valuation of transfers of interests in a trust, and restrictions such
as options to purchase and the treatment of lapsing rights and restrictions. Id. § 11602 (to
be codified at I.R.C. §§ 2701-04 (1988)). A discussion of the new law is beyond the scope
of this article. Generally, the impact on the LLC appears to be mixed. The expansive
statute that was repealed strictly limited the use of limited partnership, and consequently
LLC, structures that were strongly disproportionate in transferring all appreciation ele-
ments to the younger generation; that regime has been eliminated. On the other hand, the
new legislation critically addresses the effect of value depressing devices crucial to the suc-
cess of many freeze structures, which will increase the gift tax stakes in transferring junior
partnership and LLC interests to members of the younger generation. For a discussion of
the new provisions, see Mezzullo, New Estate Freeze Rules Replacing 2036(c) Expand
Planning Potential, 74 J. TAX'N 4 (1991).
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for the present time, to its state of origin. Therefore, it will not be
the entity of choice for any remaining tax shelter syndication ac-
tivity Until more states adopt LLC legislation, the LLC will
probably be confined to closely held intrastate transactions.
The emphasis on the uncertainty of recognition in foreign ju-
risdictions and the awkward governance aspects of the LLC may
be, in the words of a well-worn phrase, "seeing the cup as half-
empty instead of half-full." Granted, there should be reluctance to
use this form for investments with numerous participants doing
business outside of those states that expressly recognize LLCs.
The limited partnership vehicle probably remains better suited for
those purposes. A limited partnership with an LLC general part-
ner may provide a compromise. Tiered ownership structures utiliz-
ing limited partnerships as LLC members may also solve some of
the perceived state law, shortcomings of the LLC, albeit at the
price of multiple entities. Viewing this entity in proper perspec-
tive, as a substitute for the S Corporation, it represents a viable
business planning option. The I.R.S. has, in effect, permitted the
creation of a new limited liability entity that completes the unfin-
ished job of placing S corporations on a par with partnerships.4 0
However, this result carries the price of highly restrictive transfer
and continuation provisions that may be intended, in part, to limit
its utility to public tax shelter promoters or entities with many
owners.
4 4 1
The LLC holds great promise for estate planning purposes
because there are no restrictions on membership and different
classes of economic membership interest can be utilized. The S
corporation election, by comparison, does not permit more than
one economic class of stock, and only narrowly tailored trusts can
qualify as shareholders. Estate planning aside, the LLC might be
valuable for a number of family or closely held enterprises, such
as farming, real estate, hotels, and restaurants, that hold signifi-
440. See Coven, Subchapter S Distributions and Pseudo Distributions: Proposals
for Revising the Defective Blend of Entity and Conduit Concepts, 42 TAX L. REv. 381
(1987) (discussing the continuing lack of parity between partnerships and S corporations).
441. The restrictions may also limit the use of the LLC for larger businesses that
seek to escape the "prison" of Subchapter C but are unable to utilize the S corporation
election because the number of participants exceeds the 35 shareholder limitation. At the
extreme end of the pass-through entity continuum, where the master limited partnership
lies, the publicly traded partnership limitations of I.R.C. § 7704 (1988) will be more of an
impediment than the LLC restrictions. For discussion of the uneven sweep of Subchapter C
as applied to businesses having few, as compared with many, participants see supra note
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cant assets but subject the owners to potential liability for breach
of contract or tortious behavior.
The LLC, in the proper context, deserves the consideration of
those seeking both limited liability and partnership tax classifica-
tion. If a significant number of states recognize the LLC, it may
eclipse the S corporation as the organizational form of choice in
the future.
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